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The research incorporates both practical and theoretical methods. The theoretical 
component of the research, (represented by this thesis,) was a philosophical 
investigation into Graham’s Harman’s OOO philosophy, applying it to spectatorship 
and art writing to frame the problem of the irreducibility of the literary and the 
visual, before extending it provide an alternative template for better art writing. 
 
This philosophical thesis both provides support to and is supported by the practical 
research I have also undertaken. The practical component incorporates my creative 
practice as is, that is painting, writing and curating. These practical outcomes were 





This theoretical thesis is accompanied by three publications. Stories for Paintings; a 
collection of ten fictions written as part of this research. Two of the stories, Morta 
Della and The Polycephalus had their own specific supplementary publications that 
were also submitted for examination. Each of these supplementary publications were 
printed for two exhibitions that I organised to publish my research. One, Cap Gros, 
showed paintings made in response to the third object I formed with the 
Romanesque artwork of Catalunya. The other AS I TOOK HER ARM SHE STARED 
THROUGH MY FACE AT THE DARK BRANCHES OF THE TREES OVER MY 
HEAD I curated and organised to answer the following question; how do we paint 
about writing? I invited five other painters to make new work for the exhibition. 
 
During the three years of doctoral research preceding my ‘writing-up year’ I made 73 




Claims for Originality 
 
I identify within the ever-changing and evolving philosophy of Harman his ‘third 
object thesis’, that directly pertains to spectatorship, and in which the artwork and 
viewer are indissociable, are joined in a third object, which must be written about 
instead of the artwork. This provides a new approach to the ‘well-worn’ problem of 
the irreducibility between the literary and the visual. This novel approach provides 
original insights into the problem and a template for working beyond it that utilises 
fiction, as I do in my Research Outputs. 
In the course of this work I show that despite assumptions to the contrary, Harman’s 
take on spectatorship is neither post-human, nor does it conform to other well 
recognised Modernist models. 
This is the first thorough practical application of OOO to artistic practice, ‘road-
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The irreducibility between image and word is a subject with a substantial 
lineage and though there are doubtless much earlier examples of this vexed 
relation, this thesis is happy to set its earliest citation in 1767 and Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing’s Laocoön; An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. 
Lessing’s essay contains the oft-cited difference that painting contains and 
specialises in the depiction of space, whereas poetry discloses time, and that 
neither form can hope to better the other in their specialisms. In his words, in 
poetry, ‘the action is visible and progressive, its different parts occurring one 
after the other in a sequence of time,’ (Lessing, 1767, p77) whereas in painting, 
‘the action is visible and stationary, its different parts developing in co-existence 
in space.’ (Lessing, 1767, p77) 
 
As a brief aside: This thesis understands the irreducibility between image and 
word as that between the visual and the literary and when this thesis refers to 
the ‘artwork’ or ‘the work of art’ it is primarily, (though not exclusively,) 
discussing ‘visual’ experience. Therefore, this would not normally include a 
poem or a novel. That is not to say though, that the methodology I elucidate for 
bridging the gap between the work of art, and how to describe it, couldn’t be 
applied to a poem or a novel, just that it wasn’t the goal of this thesis to find 
such a method. Likewise, ‘artwork’, ‘work of art’ and ‘painting’ are used to some 
extent interchangeably. What is most important to note is that each artwork or 
painting has its own specific irreducibility, that needs addressing individually. 
Though it is fair to say that this thesis, like its author, has a bias toward 
painting. 
 
This irreducibility is often seen as transmitted by something ineffable within the 
artwork. It becomes apparent when we wonder why the appeal of the work of art 
is indescribable. That there is something ineffable contained therein, is 
generally taken as a given, as Susan Sontag says in her essay On Style ‘Every 
work of art…  needs to be understood not only as something rendered, but also 
as a certain handling of the ineffable.’ (Sontag, 1965 p36) The resultant formula 
might then be that as there is something ineffable in art, and as writing by its 
very nature is effable, then art as a different mode, cannot find agreement with 
writing. As painter Amy Sillman has it, 
 
‘There is a mystical part of making things or beholding the world that is 
very important to me… At the core of everything there’s something that is 
unknowable, unconquerable, impenetrable, inexplicable, and enigmatic. 
Art is a temporary palliative for the anguish and blindness that we have 
to live through.’ (Sillman, 2007 p54) 
 
The passage that tends to be most-quoted in texts that discuss the irreducibility 
of these forms, is the following by Foucault. From the beginning of his essay on 







‘The relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is not that 
the words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the visible, they 
prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other’s 
terms: it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in 
what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of 
images, metaphors or similes, what we are saying; the space where they 
achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that defined 
by the sequential elements of syntax.’ (Foucault, 1966, p9) 
  
It is the severity of Foucault here that is important, he is clear that language and 
painting are so different as to make attempts at translating one form into the 
other is an impossible task. 1  
 
This thesis disputes that conclusion, and therein disputes an oft-stated artworld 
sentiment.  
 
It is my claim that there is something singular about the appeal of an artwork – 
agreeing here with Foucault - but I reject the idea that it is hopeless to try and 
capture this appeal in words. As I say in Chapter Two, this thesis doesn’t dispute 
that magic exists, rather it disputes that it is ineffable. 
 
To add some context here: It might be because of the perceived hopelessness in 
trying to capture the singular appeal of an artwork that art criticism is in such a 
parlous state. James Elkins has asked What Happened to Art Criticism? Before 
delimiting seven models that have replaced what might previously have been 
thought of as art criticism, (Elkins, 2003b). Likewise, Peter Osborne has stated 
that ‘contemporary art is badly known.’ (Osbourne, 2013, p1), before explaining 
why: 
 
‘The dominant category of modernist art criticism was for many years, up 
until the 1960s, the category of medium. The subsequent dissolution of 
the limits of mediums as the ontological bases of art practices, and the 
establishment of a complex and fluid field of generically artistic practices, 
has posed new problems of critical judgement to which the concept of the 
contemporary represents an increasingly powerful response.’ (Osbourne, 
2013, p3) 
 
What Osborne is saying is that when faced with how to define art practice, 
critics can no longer resort to the definition of the medium to explain what art is 
or should be. And a present-day writer on art would instead use the definition of 
the ‘contemporary.’ But in either case, the ineffability of art is seemingly taken 
as certain, so those writing about art must instead categorise their focus. In the 
                                                          
1 What is (these days) said less often is that Foucault has written this before embarking on a chapter 
length analysis of a single painting. (Las Meninas). The quotability of the passage, its seeming 
appositeness at pinpointing exactly what it is that makes the task of writing about a painting impossible, 
leads us to forget that this is what Foucault was about to do. The painting, for Foucault, has been 
encoded by Velazquez, and shows us how a contemporaneous viewer thought about reality. Foucault 
finds within it an epistemological content. When I read his essay one of the things I think is ‘I can tell 
Foucault wasn’t a painter.’ The sensorial experience of the painting has been lost. So then, perhaps, the 
real point of Foucault’s introduction was to explain how he would be unable to elucidate an analysis of 





first case it was the category of the medium, in the second it was ‘the 
contemporary’. Whichever category is used to define the artwork, neither of 
them are satisfactory when required to describe the appeal of the artwork. The 





On a personal level, as both a painter and a writer, this seemingly irreducible 
barrier between the literary and the visual manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, 
when I have tried to explain why I have chosen to paint the things that I have, 
and secondly in my frustration with much of the writing that has been written to 
accompany painting. Within this writing, (as mentioned above,) the sensorial 
experience of looking at a specific painting is lost. This sensorial experience or 
singular appeal is generally supplanted by a formal account of the surface of the 
work; the colours, the composition, etc. This account might be thought of as 
underlining the medium-specificity of the work, what makes the painting I am 
reading about, this particular painting, (so to speak.) The viewer is given a list of 
component parts of a work, rather than a prompt to a painting’s charm. (I 
discuss this charm later in terms of the ‘singular echo’, but the word ‘charm’, 
although vague, suffices for now). If not this then the painting is fitted into a 
larger schema, such as an artistic movement or a socio-political trend; the 
movement of capital at that time for example. An attempt to describe the 
singular appeal of the artwork has been replaced with an essay of economics, or 
with biographical information about the artist, what else they were doing when 
the work was made, who with, and where. We might think of these ways of 
‘missing’ the painting – noted above – as three fallacies: the descriptive fallacy, 
the contextual fallacy or the biographical fallacy, (these are described in more 
depth later in the thesis.) In all these cases the specific experience of the artwork 
evades capture, or capture is not attempted as it is assumed that we can only 
describe the material formation or context of a painting or an artwork. One task 
of my thesis is to find a mode of writing that is adequate to it. As painter Amy 
Sillman says, 
  
‘How can we get to issues of subjectivity and subject formation and 
things like that, and totally skip over the discussion of the simple 
relationship between us and the art subject and the art object?’ (Sillman, 
2007, p18) 
 
But secondly, as well as being a cause of frustration I have also utilised this 
perceived irreducibility. For five years I set myself the restriction of only making 
paintings of moments that I couldn’t describe the appeal of in words. These 
instances might be described prosaically as an overheard sentence that I 
couldn’t contextualise (see Appendix Three, p. viii), or the composition in a 
painting by Leonardo da Vinci (see Appendix Three, p. xvi) or some card left on 
a table (see Appendix Three, p. xii.) But though I can describe these instances 
matter-of-factly, I can’t describe what it was about them that appealed to me, 
that made them seem charged with the potentiality of a painting. 
 
Following this, one of the hypotheses of this research was that, if the appeal of a 





my painting practice to find a method for writing about the ineffability of the 
artwork. This proved a productive strategy, the key being, as will be explained, 
to focus on the moment of irreducibility, the encounter with the ineffable, rather 





To begin with we need to isolate the moments that we are saying are irreducible. 
I believe that this leaves us with four moments we can define as encounters. 
These are: 
 
1) The encountering of something (stimuli) I think should be painted 
2) The act of making a painting of that stimuli 
3) The encounter with an artwork (spectating) 
4) Writing a text about an artwork 
 
I would bracket these encounters as dealing with the same phenomenon, 
defining them as encounters as Simon O’Sullivan does in his book Art 
Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation. His 
explanation is as follows:  
 
‘An object of an encounter is fundamentally different from an object of 
recognition. With the latter our knowledges, beliefs and values are 
reconfirmed. With a genuine encounter however the contrary is the case. 
Our typical ways of being in the world are challenged, our systems of 
knowledge disrupted. We are forced to thought. The encounter then 
operates as a rupture in our habitual modes of being and thus in our 
habitual subjectivities… …the rupturing encounter also contains a 
moment of affirmation, the affirmation of a new world… This is the 
creative moment of the encounter that obliges us to think otherwise.’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2006, p1) 
 
O’Sullivan stresses these encounters change or challenge the way we think about 
or experience the world, and posits that it is something distinctive to art. 
 
‘Art then is the name of the object of an encounter, but also the name of 
the encounter itself, and indeed of that which is produced by the 
encounter. Art is this complex event that brings about the possibility of 
something new… … They are all involved in questioning accepted 
assumptions about the world. We might even say that each produces a 
different kind of world, whether it be through a painting, an earthwork or 
indeed a form of collective collaboration.’ (O’Sullivan, 2006, p2) 
 
So, art is three-layered, it is the object, the encounter and what is produced by 
it. The three are bound together. All the four encounters I have delimited as 
being fundamental to my practice are of the same order as this. What links them 
is their irreducibility; the encounter cannot be paraphrased by previous 
experience, so I feel I have to make a painting of it to understand it, but in 
painting it I translate the experience into the material substance of the painting. 





translating that is trying to find something of similar significance. In many ways 
this distinction is the subject of my thesis.  
 
In talking about the temporality of his own encounters with paintings O’Sullivan 
is surely referring back to Lessing´s distinction between painting and poetry 
when he claims that ‘this also implies a different temporality of painting, in fact 
an understanding of painting as an event. Indeed, this is the time of painting 
(just as it is the time of revolution.)’ (O’Sullivan, 2006, p135) 
 
So, the time of painting is the moment of the encounter with it. But if painting is 
an event and the artwork is the encounter, and the encounter the art, then, we 
need a way of writing about a single painting not Painting as a whole, or, vis a 
vis O’Sullivan, Art as a whole.  
 
The encounter with an artwork, singular, is between the spectator, (who later 
might write about it,) and the work. But that specific work only. It is an intimate 
relation between two encountering forms, the writer and the painting. The task 
of this thesis has been to develop a method for writing about such an encounter. 
This is not the development of an ‘a-social’, or worse still anti-social art-theory. 
My position has an ethics, one outlined in Chapter 4. 
 
In looking for a term to describe what it is we are trying to define – that 
particular or singular experience of a painting - we must be careful. For one, to 
use the term specificity is redolent of medium specificity, most often associated 
with Clement Greenberg and 1960’s Modernism. (Greenberg, 1960) Likewise 
Adorno’s sensuous particularity (Adorno, 1970) comes with its own ‘baggage’. 
And, though we might understand this as an aesthetic encounter, as O’Sullivan 
does, ‘as simply the name for an affective deterritorialization, a becoming,’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2006, p22) aesthetics is another term that would require much 
unpacking and its meaning is too disputed to provide clarity.2 We are therefore 




Translation / The Singular Echo 
 
I propose that it is useful to think that when one is writing about painting it is, 
as already intimated, a translation of one form into another. Sophie Collins 
writing on translation asks for ‘intimacy’ rather than fidelity in translation. 
Intimacy,  
 
‘is intended to shift the translation relationship from a place of 
universality, heteronormacy, authority and centralised power, towards a 
particularised space whose aesthetics are determined by the two or more 
people involved, in this way amplifying and promoting creativity and 
deviant aesthetics in translations between national languages.’ (Collins, 
2018) 
 
                                                          
2 For a rigorous unpacking of the slipperiness of the term, see the second chapter of Osborne´s book, 





This take on translation emphasises a specific intimate relationship between 
two agents, in this case translator and writer, that I said I wanted the writer to 
look for when writing about artwork. In a beautiful essay entitled The Task of 
The Translator Walter Benjamin says that this task is ‘finding the particular 
intention toward the target language which produces in that language the echo 
of the original.’ (Benjamin, 1923, p258). In my analysis it would be this echo 
that we are missing when we read most writing about painting.  
 
‘Unlike a work of literature, translation finds itself not in the centre of the 
language forest but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; it calls into it 
without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to give, 
in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one.’ 
(Benjamin, 1923 p258-259) 
 
Each painting has its own singular echo that must be searched out and then 
translated. This singular echo can neither be approached in a description of the 
medium of painting; nor in an overview of whichever movement a work might 
be tagged as being a part; nor in a biography of the artist who created it. I will, 
therefore, use this term singular echo to describe that which has been previously 
missed by most writing about painting, the sensorial experience of an artwork, 
the event that looking at a painting is. As an echo is something that one is inside 
it underlines my assertion that the encounter with the artwork is as important 
as the artwork itself, when trying to describe the appeal of the artwork. 
 
 
Irreducible Objects  
 
Instead of thinking this irreducibility as only existing between the literary and 
the visual we can change tack and adopt a philosophy of irreducibility for a new 
solution to the problem. To analyse the world in this way I looked to 
contemporary object philosophy as practiced by such philosophers as Ian 
Bogost, Graham Harman and Timothy Morton to provide us with the formula. 
Harman stresses that all representation is translation (Harman, 2010, p49) and 
it is he who has provided the most thorough philosophical framework for 
irreducible objects. He is the ‘first architect’ of the movement to use Morton’s 
words. (Morton, 2013, p19) Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, (or OOO,) is a 
universe of withdrawn autonomous units or Objects.  
 
Harman’s ontology began to gain traction as part of the Speculative Realism 
movement in philosophy, inaugurated in 2007 in opposition to the assumption 
that the ‘human-world gap is the privileged site of all rigorous philosophy.’ 
(‘Harman, 2011b, p136) Instead, the central conceit of Harman’s own 
philosophy is that objects, (as he defines them,) are the ‘root of all philosophy’ 
(‘Harman, 2011b, p138) he believes that ‘objects cannot be reduced to anything 
else, and must be addressed by philosophy on their own terms.’ (‘Harman, 
2011b, p138) Harman, who as we shall see, might be classed as a contemporary 
phenomenologist, identifies the way that objects tend to be reduced and names 
these reductive strategies as either overmining or undermining. I unpack these 
terms in depth in Chapter One, but for now I will put it briefly and say when an 
object is overmined it is interpreted as a part in a larger schema, whereas when 





I have transposed these reductive strategies onto the fallacious art writing types 
I identified above, (In Chapter Two of this thesis.) I also go on to show how 
opinions on painting and writing about painting often serves to overmine or 
undermine what I now call the singular echo of specific paintings, what Harman 
might term the object-ness of an individual painting. I critique over 
contextualisation, (overmining.) But also, the opposite move that provides a 
straight-forward description of artworks, (undermining.) I identify a vicious 
circle in relation to these methods that I term the analytical roundabout, and 
show that Harman provides a way ‘off’ this ‘roundabout.’ 
 
Within Harman’s ontology there is a metaphysics between objects that this 
thesis explicates. He outlines within all objects a fourfold structure containing 
the object and its qualities. He claims that ‘the tensions between objects and 
their qualities and other objects can be used to account for anything else that 
exists.’ (‘Harman, 2011b, p138) 
 
I use one particular tension, that Harman classes as allure (Harman, 2005) and 
his theory of vicarious causation (Harman, 2005), to show how Harman’s 
solution to object encounters and how objects change within his ontology is also 
key to understanding how experience operates. Specifically, how experience-as-
painter, and experience-as-spectator functions. In so doing I show how, in terms 
of spectatorship, OOO doesn’t fit comfortably into post-humanism, (where it is 
most often placed.) I also show how Harman’s perspective on spectatorship is 
different to other well recognised models – Heidegger, Greenberg, Fried - this 
analysis takes place in Chapter Three. The work I do here shows that Harman’s 
philosophy offers significant novel resources for spectator theory and a 
philosophy of art writing. Harman posits the solution that all encounters take 
place within a third object, one that is generated by the encounter. These newly-
formed objects contain qualities of both objects involved in the encounter. It 
follows that such an object must be created by an artwork encounter; creating 
an object that is part-spectator and part-painting. Underling my conclusion that 
painting and encounter are, from this perspective, indissociable. My deduction 
is that if I were to describe this third object of the encounter, I would get closer 
to describing the singular echo. 
 
So, the process of painting, and spectating are viewed through the lens of 
Harman’s ‘third object’ theory. I do significant work here identifying this theory 
within the ever-changing and evolving philosophy of Harman. This thesis is as 
much about explaining and interpreting Harman as it is transcribing it. 
 
I provide the first account of a methodology for describing this third object and 
as a result the singular echo of the artwork. To avoid confusion between these 
two terms; the third object is generated between all encounters, I use singular 
echo to denote that which appeals about an encounter. In the case of this thesis 
that generally means the artwork encounter, but as this thesis develops I suggest 
that it is within a philosophy of encounters that we might find an ethics for 
ecological living. 
 
There has previously been a little analysis of the relevance an influence of OOO 





philosophy onto an art-specific context; writing about art. I then use this 
application to work toward a better method for this writing. 
 
I take the ‘well-worn’ problem of the irreducibility between the literary and the 
visual and examine it afresh, through the prism of OOO. This novel approach 






‘Shields, masks, tools, artefacts, mirrors, Avebury Circle, swimming 
underwater, snorkelling, views from planes, volcanoes, mountains, 
waterfalls, rocks, graffiti, stains, damp walls, cracked pavements, 
puddles, the cosmos inside the human body, food, drink, being drunk, 
sex, music, dancing, relentless rhythm, the Caribbean, the tropical light, 
the northern light, the oceanic light. Primitive art, peasant art, Indian art, 
Japanese and Chinese art, musical instruments, drums, jazz, the 
spectacle of sport, the colour of sport, magic realism, Borges, the 
metaphysical, dawn, sunsets, fish eyes, trees, flowers, seas, atolls. The 
Book of Imaginary Beings, the Dictionary of Angels, heraldry, North 
American Indian blankets, Rio de Janeiro, Montego Bay!’ (Gooding, 
2011) 
The list above was given by abstract painter John Hoyland when describing 
what inspires paintings. Within the context of Object philosophy, I found 
immediate synergy when I read the work of Ian Bogost, with its own insistence 
on the importance of lists. Bogost uses the term Ontography, (Bogost, 2012) 
(though it is distinct from Harman’s own usage of the word Ontography, the two 
are very much allies within Object philosophy,) to describe the practice of 
compiling a list.  
‘Faced with such a situation, the first reaction we might have is that of the 
registrar, taking note of the many forms of being. Let’s adopt ontography 
as a name for a general inscriptive strategy, one that uncovers the 
repleteness of units and their interobjectivity. From the perspective of 
metaphysics, ontography involves the revelation of object relationships 
without necessarily offering clarification or description of any kind. Like 
a medieval bestiary, ontography can take the form of a compendium, 
record of things juxtaposed to demonstrate the overlap and imply 
interaction through collocation. The simplest approach to such recording 
is the list, a group of items loosely joined not by logic or power or use but 
by the gentle knot of the comma. Ontography is an aesthetic set theory, in 
which a particular configuration is celebrated merely on the basis of its 
existence.’ (Bogost, 2012 p38) 
The list then, maintains the autonomy of its components. This idea of an 
ontography as a record of everything, arranged non-hierarchically has symmetry 
with my own project of painting ineffable moments. I can surmise that abstract 





from real lived experience,) obvious from the above list of things he gave as 
inspiring his work. If and when I give such a list it is to underline the 
equivalence of these moments. The following list is the inspiration for fifteen of 
the paintings, in the order they appeared on my website in February 2017: 
A taxidermied toad, a fountain in the Jardines de Sabatini, Madrid, an 
advert for a car, a painting in a Delacroix exhibition, (though not by 
him), an intervention in the house of Joaquin Sorolla, a painting by 
Titian, a painting by Bellini, a girl looking at you through her hand, a 
gate, a diamond pattern in the manner of Cezanne, an instinctive 
landscape, a painting by Andrea del Sarto, the design on a box of 
screws, a plant, a painting by Paul Cezanne. 
All these encounters are of equal importance, each one ‘gets its own painting.’ 
There are no privileged ‘ineffable moments.’ As anthropologist and filmmaker 
Elizabeth Povinelli puts it, ‘to experience the truth of object relations, one must 
make all objects and their relations the same. The world must be a flat world.’ 
(Povinelli, 2016, p109). It is within this thought, of equivalent encounters, that 
the ethics of my thesis is enumerated in Chapter Four. 
Moreover, Bogost tacitly and explicitly backs painting as record, as well as 
practice as research with the following statement:  
‘Counterintuitive though it may seem, the characterisation of an 
experience though supposedly objective evidence and external 
mechanisms leads us farther from, not closer to, an understanding of the 
experience of an entity.’ (Bogost, 2012, p63.)  
The implication being that it is a subjective record of experience that brings us 
closer to an entity, therefore painting, and therefore practice as research do the 
same. The task of this thesis was to find the method for writing the experience of 
the artwork, that would do the same. 
Through this study I’ve realised that the translation of the ineffable moment 
into a painting, was not about trying to depict what I was looking at, but instead 
trying to paint the moment I wanted to make a painting of the thing I was 
looking at. This process finds accordance with Amy Sillman’s statement when 
she says, ‘I always felt like the only thing I’m representing is consciousness.’ 
(Sillman, 2007, p10) Particularly if the consciousness that Sillman is 
representing is consideration of something else. 
 
I realised that this was coherent with Harman’s third object theory, as myself 
and the thing I was encountering were both contained within the third object. It 
was this third object, containing myself, stimuli, and the desire to paint the 
stimuli that I was translating into painting. Harman stresses that objects can 
only ever be approached obliquely: The representation of this third object 
became abstract, like Sillman, I viewed abstraction not as a heroic gesture but a 
non-hierarchical record of intimate experience.  
 
If we were to think about the task of writing about painting in the same way, 





written about; the third object we are inside, the sensorial experience of the 
engagement with the painting. 
 
 
(Writing) Fictions for  
 
Through analysis of Harman I divined that that the viewer and the painting 
were fused together by the artwork encounter. This coupling takes place within 
a third object that we can think of as being, in effect, the encounter itself. My 
hypothesis is that by finding a way of describing this third object we will be 
describing the singular echo of the artwork. 
 
If I remain true to Harman’s doctrine, the only way I can describe an object is 
obliquely: I can’t just list the qualities of this object, seek to summarise or 
paraphrase it, as that would fall into the reductionist strategies that Harman’s 
designates as undermining and overmining. Therefore, I realised that I must 
write aesthetically about the painting, and that meant I must write fiction. This 
method must be endorsed, as, following Harman, we have to adopt an aesthetic 
response to objects. This includes the third object, (the object that is generated 
by an encounter with the artwork.)  
 
In Chapter Four I think-through this third object with relation to fiction, 
specifically science-fiction. I develop a series of speculative techniques and 
strategies for five 
 
These are fictions written for the artwork, rather than about the artwork, (as in 
traditional ekphrasis.) This is important distinction as it acknowledges the 
ineffability of the artwork can’t be captured but by taking an oblique approach 
and writing about the encounter with the artwork we find ourselves closer to the 
artwork and capture its singular echo. 
 
Fiction is not only the most appropriate method for capturing the singular echo 
because it is an aesthetic method, but also because of its intimacy. The 
relationship between a reader and a fictional world is an intimate one, as is the 
relationship between a spectator and a painting. 
 
Creative responses to artworks, such as mine, tend to be bracketed as forms of 
ekphrasis. My research into ekphrasis, (included here in Chapter Four,) proved 
disappointing though. It provided examples of writing that sought to depict the 
artwork in question, not describe the way the encounter with it felt; the 
sensorial experience of it. For that what is needed is my own form of ekphrasis, 
an ekphrasis of the artwork encounter. An ekphrasis that might be termed 
associative ekphrasis. 
 
Overview of Thesis 
The strategy of this thesis then, is in using OOO to frame the problem of 
irreducibility. Though much has been written about this problem, it hasn’t 
previously been interrogated through the prism of contemporary object 
philosophy. I show that here we find a potential method for bridging the liminal 





provides support to and is supported by the practical research I have also 
undertaken.  
In Chapter One, I provide the philosophical framework. This necessitates giving 
an overview of the foundations of Harman’s philosophy, explaining both its 
contemporary philosophical context within the speculative realist movement 
and its background. Speculative realism began with embracing Quentin 
Meillassoux rejection of correlationism, a term I explain. I focus particularly on 
Harman’s concepts of overmining and undermining which Harman mobilises to 
justify his ontology as the only philosophy that can explain the existence of 
objects as we experience them. I examine the geneses of Harman’s thought, his 
interest in phenomenology and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. I give some 
detail of Heidegger´s tool analysis and explain how Harman re-reads it to 
provide his own radical interpretation, leading to Harman’s concepts of 
withdrawal and emergence. I likewise explain how Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality has influenced Harman’s thought on the sensual realm of 
existence. Harman calls the withdrawn reality of an object the Real Object, 
whereas the reality we experience is the Sensual Object. These two poles join 
with Real Qualities and Sensual Qualities to compose the four poles that 
Harman claims exist with every object in a structure he terms the Fourfold. I 
explain some of the relations that exist within this Fourfold, (and give further 
detail in Appendix One.) 
I highlight the relation allure and the concept of vicarious causation as being 
fundamental to understanding both interaction between Harman’s objects and 
how we might write about the singular echo of the artwork. The implications of 
this are unpacked at the end of Chapter Four. 
The next stage is to apply what we have learnt about Harman’s ontology to the 
practice of writing about art and in Chapter Two I go into more detail into what 
I termed above the three fallacies; the descriptive fallacy, the contextual fallacy 
and the biographical fallacy. I overlay Harman’s concepts of undermining, 
overmining and duomining on top of them, as well as three categories of Elkins’ 
to provide a more art-specific contextualisation. In doing so I show, with 
examples, how opinions on painting and writing about painting often serve to 
overmine or undermine the object-quality, or singular echo, of specific 
paintings. I split them into three categories: The Undermining Artist, The 
Overming Critic, and The Duomining Theorist.  I critique over-
contextualisation, but also the opposite move that provides a straight-forward 
description of artworks. I identify a vicious circle in relation to the fallacious 
methods, terming it ‘the analytical roundabout’, explaining how this lead to the 
adoption of Speculative Realism with art schools.  
As already mentioned a philosophy of the artwork encounter means a 
consideration of spectatorship and in Chapter Three, I examine spectatorship 
through the prism of OOO. I begin by debunking misinterpretations of the 
artwork within OOO; namely the notion of an artwork existing without a 
spectator or a return to the modernistic spectator impressed by the ‘auratic’ 





Modern or Relational spectator, namely that it relies on an attentive spectator 
who is immersed in the artwork, not in its relations. Following this I explain 
how spectatorship within OOO really operates.  I then explicate Harman’s 
concept of vicarious causation, as he does, through analysis of metaphor. This 
simultaneously completes a gap in Harman’s ontology, in accounting for 
‘change’, and gives instruction on how we might write about the singular echo of 
an artwork, namely by describing the encounter with the artwork, the third 
object the viewer and artwork are inside during the encounter. 
In Chapter Four, I will provide a method for describing the third object 
encounter. As the thesis continues the tone changes, the analytical and 
diagnostic voice that probed Harman’s philosophy becomes more personal as it 
speculates on how what we have learnt can be utilised as a practical device for 
writing and artmaking. This doesn’t weaken the philosophical work that has 
preceded it, the conclusions simply have to be speculative given their nature. In 
adopting fiction as method consideration must be given to ekphrasis and this 
thesis uses Stephen Cheeke as guide to the traditional form of ekphrasis. It finds 
it lacking as it is generally simply a (however poetic) description of what is being 
looked at. Whereas this thesis requires a description of the experience of 
looking. An ekphrasis for the artwork encounter. The following section 
incorporates comparisons between Science Fiction and Abstraction as the two 
oblique approaches to representation favoured by the author. A method for 
writing is speculated on, incorporating four modes; metaphor, personal 
narrative, abstraction and intimacy. After proposing intimacy, the chapter ends 
with a brief consideration of a potential ethics inherent in aesthetics, on what 
might be termed a ‘third object approach to living’. Centred on thinking more 
ecologically and local, resting upon the thought of philosopher Jane Bennet and 
writer Susan Sontag. 
In Chapter Five, I give an overview of the practical research I have undertaken 
explaining its links with philosophical research. I begin with a recap of the 
implications of Harman’s thought on the four encounters I identified as being 
fundamental to this study earlier in this introduction. I continue in the more 
personal tone that I began to adopt in the previous chapter. With that in mind I 
make the point that adopting Harman’s ‘aesthetic approach’ to philosophy and 
advocating an ‘oblique’ response to artwork means it would be ridiculous to 
‘unpack’ the paintings I have made and the texts that I have written as part of 
my research. However, I am able to give the framework I used when writing the 
texts and mobilise the lexicon of Harman to explain my painterly decisions. I 
explain in detail my decision-making process in one text, The Battle of San 
Romano, (written for the painting of the same name.) I also include analysis of 
the exhibitions I have organised and four of the paintings made as part of the 
study. 
This theoretical thesis is accompanied by three publications, Stories for 
Paintings, a collection of fictions written for third object encounters as part of 
this research. Morta Della, which is one of these fictions combined with 





one of the exhibitions I organised and acted as the only interpretive text for the 
show.  
 
Contemporary context – Art Writing 
Though there hasn’t previously been a study into the irreducibility between the 
literary and the visual through the prism of Object Oriented Ontology there are 
many writers who I would consider as allies to this study. 
Writing as art practice has become more widespread this decade. There is, 
concurrently, if not a movement, then a tendency to look for alternative forms of 
art criticism. The ELEVEN STATEMENTS AROUND ART WRITING by Maria 
Fusco, Yve Lomax, Michael Newman, Adrian Rifkin, the teaching team of the 
now defunct MFA Art Writing at Goldsmiths, University of London, give a 
flavour of the multifarious and playful nature of these two forms. That the Royal 
College of Art now offers an MA in writing and ‘criticism’ is a part of the title of 
the MA in Culture, Criticism and Curation at Central Saint Martin’s shows the 
traction that writing as a creative and critical practice has gained. 
Fusco’s own practice is paradigmatic of writing as art practice; her 2017 book 
The Legend of the Necessary Dreamer was an exploration of a real space, (the 
Palácio Pombal in Lisbon, through fiction,) charging language with the task of 
evocating the materiality of the building. (Fusco, 2017) 
There are now publishers dedicated to publishing experimental writing of this 
type. One such of these is Bookworks, who publish The Happy Hypocrite3. An 
example of a book published by Bookworks that uses fiction as art writing is 
Katrina Palmer The Fabricator’s Tale (Palmer, 2014.) The stories within the 
book use the tropes of artworld discourse to construct a dysfunctional 
relationship that seem to be both about art practice and not about art practice 
simultaneously. 
 
Context – Writing 
I am an avid reader of fiction beyond its use within art, of writing as well as ‘art 
writing.’ As already noted fiction makes one think metaphorically and 
empathetically; makes one think outside of the situation one is in and has 
provided inspiration in several different ways. Ali Smith’s collection of essays 
Artful provided a valuable template for dealing with issues of criticism 
creatively, the following is an explanation of liminal space she provides within 
Artful,  
‘What’s liminal space? …It’s kind of an in-between. A place we get 
transported to. Like when you look at a piece of art or listen to a piece of 
                                                          
3 Issue 10 of The Happy Hypocrite, Tolstoyevsky, included the text Morta Della which was written as part 





music and realise that for a while you’ve actually been somewhere else 
because you did.’ (Smith, 2012, p111) 
That I found redolent of this study, with its own focus on the space in-between 
painting and writing. But with its exhortations and endorsement of an aesthetic 
philosophy there were several passages I found in novels I was reading, 
unrelated to my research, that seemed appropriate to OOO. I shall limit myself 
to just one, from The Man who was Thursday, in which Syme is seemingly 
speaking the words of Graham Harman, 
‘Shall I tell you the secret of the whole world? It is that we have only 
known the back of the world. We see everything from behind, and it looks 
brutal. That is not a tree, but the back of a tree. That is not a cloud, but 
the back of a cloud. Cannot you see that everything is stooping and hiding 
a face? If we could only get round in front-’ (Chesterton, 1908, p160) 
 
Contemporary context – Critical Writing  
Further to the practice of Art Writing mentioned above. In thinking through 
how to produce critical writing for the artwork encounter, the criticism of 
performance practices has proven instructive in how one can think of the non-
objective experience; as writing for an encounter is about more than the ‘art-
object.’ Della Pollock’s writing on Performative Writing for Performance Art is 
one example of such criticism, and her thinking-through how the ephemeral 
nature of viewing performance might be captured. (Pollock, 1988)  
In terms of more general approach to critical and theoretical practices, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s incorporation of affect theory is insightful and generous. 
(Kosofsky Sedgwick, 2003) It proved particularly useful in illustrating how one’s 
own theoretical conclusions can sit beside another’s, without the need to 
polemicize. (See Chapter Two for more details.) 
 
Contemporary context – Painting 
 
When it comes to painting, Amy Sillman is an obvious ally for my project as 
already noted, apparent in the extended quotation below. In both asking for 
concentration on the specificity of an individual artwork but also in taking 
seriously the metaphorical content of it. 
 
‘I’d like to really, really talk about a painting’s, or art object’s, qualities. 
This is an underdeveloped muscle in critical apparatus. I think we should 
be looking at objects formally, while understanding that, of course, 
content is part of form and form is part of content and abstraction now 
and what they are really doing. I wish there was less embarrassment, less 
tension around a kind of formal and poetic response, where you describe 
something in terms of feeling or association, or you look at how 
something plays, rather than just how it signifies, or how it deals with the 





critical language around art may fall short, and need to be refreshed, or 











































In this chapter I will give an overview of the background to Harman’s 
philosophy, explaining both its contemporary philosophical context within the 
Speculative Realist movement and its foundation on his concepts of overmining 
and undermining. I examine the roots of Harman’s metaphysics, his 
interpretation of Heidegger’s tool analysis and Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality. His understanding of both leads him to posit a fourfold structure 
within all objects and this is also explicated. I elucidate the relations within this 
fourfold that are pertinent to this study. I claim that the relation Allure and the 
concept of Vicarious Causation are fundamental to understanding change 
within Harman’s ontology and of prime importance to this study. This 
importance is due to how Harman completes the ‘gap’ in his ontology; namely 
how do withdrawn objects touch. I will apply his solution to the previously 
irreducible forms of writing and painting.  
 
Introduction to Speculative Realism 
‘If a common thread can be said to connect the diverse schools of 
speculative realism (or, speculative materialism), that thread would be 
common abhorrence of Immanuel Kant´s influence on metaphysics and 
critical theory.’ (Povinelli, 2016, p107) 
 
Speculative Realism began as a conference at Goldsmiths, University of London 
in 2007 at which Harman was one of four philosophers who presented. Equally 
synonymous and present were Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant and Quentin 
Meillassoux. As Brassier says; ‘The impetus for the original, eponymous 
workshop was to revive questions about realism, materialism, science, 
representation, and objectivity, that were dismissed as otiose by each of the 
main pillars of Continental orthodoxy: phenomenology, critical theory, and 
deconstruction.’ (Brassier, 2014 p 417) 
 
Half of the name Speculative Realism was overtly borrowed from Meillassoux’s 
name for his own philosophy; Speculative Materialism. (Meillassoux, 2006) He 
introduced this viewpoint in his book After Finitude. (2006), in which he 
delineates the steps philosophy can reach beyond the finitude of human 
knowledge, the limits previously placed on it within the thought of Immanuel 
Kant (1781) These limitations were described in one of an abundance of 
‘primers’ on the Speculative Realist movement that have been published since 
2007 as follows; ‘the social and cognitive conditions of thought restrict and 
shape what can be thought and repudiate the claim that there can be knowledge 
of the real as such other than in terms of its cognition and discourses.’ 






That is Kant’s assertion that as we exist in / understand / experience the world 
we simultaneously mediate it, so that we can claim no genuine knowledge of the 
‘real’ unfiltered world, only of the world that we experience.  This ‘real’ 
unfiltered world Kant refers to as noumenal, or ‘the thing in itself,’ and the 
world as we know it as the phenomenal world. (Kant 1781)  
 
According to the Speculative Realists, philosophers since Kant have tended to 
agree that the noumenal world is unknowable and this position of limited access 
has been the grounding of philosophy; we can only postulate accurately on that 
which we can think, so the world outside of thought is unknowable to 
philosophy. (Harma, 2011, p4) Or as Meillassoux has it, ‘The idea according to 
which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, 
and never to either term considered apart from the other’ (Meillassoux, 2006, 
p5) 
 
This usage of the term correlation leads Meillassoux to coining the term 
correlationism, (Meillassoux, 2006) a term that has proved popular within and 
without the Speculative Realist movement. As Harman calls it, it is a ‘permanent 
contribution to the philosophical lexicon.’ (Harman, 2011, p7) It is a term used 
by others to refer to the aforementioned restriction placed on human thought by 
adopting this Kantian position, and the problematic limitations this places on 
philosophy. For Harman and others, a rejection of correlationism is what unites 
the Speculative Realists. (Harman, 2011b, p136) 
 
Instances of such correlational limitations within Continental philosophy, might 
be found within poststructuralism. To give two examples, either in a Derridean 
sense, which prioritised the usage of language as a prism through which the 
world might be accessed or analysed. (Derrida, 1967) Or, in a Baudrillardean 
sense; in which the real world no longer exists and has been replaced by a 
simulation. (Baudrillard, 1983) This gives a clue as to why Speculative Realism 
has gained traction within an art context, a topic I will describe in more detail in 
the next chapter, but it is founded on the limitations of a textual analysis of the 
visual. As philosopher Tom Sparrow points out, not only is this a limiting 
perspective, the correlationist position is also hubristic, prioritising an 
anthropocentric viewpoint: ‘The problem is that this supposition reduces the 
real to the meaningful, as if our capacity to make sense of the universe 
encompassed the totality of what the universe is.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p87) 
 
So, the belief in a universe outside of what can be thought made the four 
philosophers realists, (in a philosophical sense,) and this is the realism of 
Speculative Realism. These are philosophers who want to talk about this 
noumenal world. Meillassoux refers to this space, that philosophy has been 
denied access to, as ‘the Great Outdoors,’ (Meillassoux, 2006) and his goal is, 
‘Waking us from our correlational slumber, by enjoining us to reconcile thought 
and absolute.’ (Meillassoux, 2006, 128) 
 
For all four philosophers not only does the real world exist but to some, 
(Harman included,) it is also accessible or knowable through philosophy. They 
each have their own strategies for accessing the real, their own realisms; it is 





thesis. Sparrow describes this realism as one that ‘multiplies the dimensions of 
reality by identifying those irreducible speculative moments of philosophical 
analysis that summon us to assume a realist stance because idealism, 
correlationism, and the linguistic turn leave us wanting.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p146) 
That is to say, Sparrow promises us that when other philosophies have fallen 
short of their subject, not only will Harman’s philosophy show us what we have 






As a caveat or coda to this section it is worth noting that there is some debate as 
to whether Speculative Realism still refers to anything concrete, be it a 
movement or even a shared philosophical position. Brassier in particular has 
been particularly hostile to the term. As he has it: ‘Impatience with the rhetoric 
of finitude and distaste for excessively mannered prose hardly amounts to a 
common philosophical agenda.’ (Brassier, 2014, p414) Clearly stating that a 
belief in the limitations of ‘correlationism’ is not enough to bracket theses 
philosophers together, that their differences are more profound than their 
similarities.  
 
However, though there might be strong cause to dismiss Speculative Realism as 
a coherent philosophical movement there can be little doubt that it provided 
Harman with the opportunity to launch his own philosophy, his Object Oriented 
Ontology, or OOO. He describes the opportunity thusly, 
 
‘Once we give up the notion... that philosophy should deal only with the 
conditions of  possibility of objects or of human access to them, 
everything changes. From that moment on, every aspect of our 
experience, from the simplest motion of dogs and waiters to our dealings 
with ruined glass, wire, and cardboard in a garbage dump, begins to bear 
witness to a genuine metaphysical event’ (Harman, 2005, p179-80). 
 
Before continuing it will be useful to insert a definition of Metaphysics and 
Ontology taken from the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Metaphysics is: 
 
‘The philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure 
of reality. It is broader in scope than science… since one of its traditional 
concerns is the existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also 
more fundamental, since it investigates questions science does not 
address but the answers to which it presupposes. Are there, for instance, 
physical objects at all, and does every event have a cause?’ (Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p563) 
 
Metaphysics was called first philosophy as it is the study of ‘the most general 
and necessary characteristics that anything must have in order to count as a 
being, an entity.’ (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p564) The 
definition continues on the subject of ontology that ‘Sometimes ‘ontology’ is 





often used as a synonym of ‘metaphysics’.’ (Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, 1995, p564) 
 
The entry on Ontology is simply ‘see metaphysics’ (Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, 1995, p631) so we can conclude that the two words are often 
synonymous with one another. In Harman’s case, he builds his own ‘realism’ as 
an ontology and metaphysics. His ontology as how he separates the world into 
fundamental constituents; non-reducible entities he classes as Objects. Because 
of the idiosyncratic nature of these objects and their relations, there are 
metaphysical implications as he details how they interact. 
 
 
Graham Harman’s Objects 
 
Harman believes that objects are the root of all philosophy. (‘Harman, 2011b, p 
138.) And in short, everything is an object. 
 
‘Along with diamonds, ropes and neutrons, objects may include armies, 
monsters, square circles, and leagues of real and fictitious nations.’ 
(‘Harman, 2011b, p5) 
  
As well as everything being an object, these objects are equal as objects, (this is a 
flat or non-hierarchical ontology,) and all relations between objects are 
equivalent and indeed are often objects as well.  This is true of the human, the 
animal, the mineral, the fictional, the organic, the inorganic, the temporal, and 
the categorical. (Harman, 2002) 
 
He defines objects as follows: ‘An object is anything that is more than its 
components and less than its effects.’ (Harman, 2016, p218) As we shall this 
means any unit that isn’t exhausted by description, be that by listing its 
constituents or by explaining what it does. This, therefore is a broad definition. 
 
Accordingly, Harman would agree with me on the irreducibility of the 
encounters I elucidated in the introduction, and indeed, of the literary and the 
visual, that one cannot paraphrase the other. However, that is because he 
believes that nothing can be paraphrased or reduced, almost everything is its 
own autonomous unit, or object.  
 
The tendency to paraphrase or reduce objects is one that Harman identifies as 
rife and mendacious within philosophy, both historically and 
contemporaneously. As he says, 
 
‘Instead of accepting this inflated menagerie of entities, critical thinking 
debunks objects and denies their autonomy. They are dismissed as 
figments of the mind, or as mere aggregates built of smaller physical 










Undermining, Overmining and Duoming 
 
In choosing to take an ontological approach to philosophy Harman has to prove 
why it is objects that we should be focussing on, and he is keen to underline the 
centrality of the entities he has designated as objects to existence. To do this he 
begins most introductions to his ontology by detailing how other philosophers 
or theorists have treated objects poorly. (Harman, 2011b) He classifies these 
mistreatments as falling into three categories: undermining, overmining and 
duomining. 
 
‘Those who deny that objects are the building block of philosophy have 
only two basic alternatives. They can say that objects are a mere surface 
effect of some deeper force, so that the object is undermined. Or they can 
say that objects are a useless superstition in comparison with their more 






Undermining is to reduce things to smaller components, that is, rather than to 
think of propositions and entities as ‘ontologically basic’ it is to find out what 
constitutes them: ‘The first critical response to objects asserts that they are not 
fundamental. All of the dogs, candles, and snowflakes we observe are built of 
something more basic, and this deeper reality is the proper subject matter for 
philosophy.’ (‘Harman, 2011b, p8)  
 
This is a strategy with a long history, Harman refers to pre-Socratic 
philosophers such as Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles and Democritus who 
each thought that the building blocks of the world were respectively; water and 
air or earth, water, fire and air or differently shaped and sized atoms. (Harman, 
2011b, p8) The problem though is not limited to Ancient Greece, and a parallel 
with contemporary science and particle physics is obvious.  It is less common in 
social theory but sometimes occurs and Harman singles out another 
contemporary philosophical movement, New Materialism (Harman, 2014c) as 
being guilty of undermining when it forefronts humans’ dependence on their 
environment and its constituents, such as micro-bacteria, atmospheric 
conditions or the natural world in general. (Harman, 2016b, p8-9)  
 
‘All of them claim that objects are too specific to deserve the name of 
ultimate reality, and dream up some deeper indeterminate basis from 
which specific things arise… They view objects as too shallow to be the 
fundamental reality of the universe.’ (‘Harman, 2011b, p10) 
 
According to Harman theories that undermine are flawed as they cannot 
account for emergence, that is, why there are distinct entities and why these 
entities can be altered but continue to exist. In Harman’s words, ‘an object is not 
equal to the exact placement of its atoms, since within certain limits these atoms 
can be replaced, removed, or shifted without changing the object as a whole.’ 






But this is also true of entities on a non-molecular level; people move in and out 
of London all the time, but London still exists. Things have a conceptual solidity 





In the opposite fallacy, Overmining, rather than reducing the objects 
downwards, we paraphrase them within another system, they are talked of as 
causal agents or as part of trends. Unlike undermining, overmining is common 
within the Humanities according to Harman (Harman, 2016b, p10.) It is an 
attitude that in Harman’s words sees that, ‘objects are important only insofar as 
they are manifested to the mind, or are part of some concrete event that 
privileges affects over people as well.’ (‘Harman, 2011b, p11) 
 
But for Harman a philosophy that exemplifies the strategy of overmining is 
Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (or ANT.) Though that is not to say that 
he dislikes Latour, he has authored more than one book on him, and describes 
him thus, ‘Latour is surely the most stimulating present-day thinker of 
overmining,’ (Harman, 2016b, p10) 
 
The following tenet of ANT might be a paradigm of overmining with its 
emphasis on the effect of a unit rather than the unit itself. The tenet states that: 
‘There is no other way to define an actor than through its actions, and there is 
no other way to define an action but by asking what other actors are modified, 
transformed, perturbed, or created,’ (Latour, 1999, p122)4 
 
The problem with defining an object (or actor) in these terms is that it means 
that all an object is, is its effects and no more. As Harman says: 
 
‘Whether we praise objects for their agency or brashly deny that they 
have any, we overlook the question of what objects do when not acting. 
To treat objects solely as actors forgets that a thing acts because it exists 
rather than existing because it acts. Objects are sleeping giants holding 
their forces in reserve, and do not unleash all their energies at once.’ 
(Harman, 2016b, p7) 
 
Harman often uses Aristotle’s rebuttal of the Megarians to underline the falsity 
of this position. The Megarians stated that only someone building a house can 
claim to be a house-builder, but that does not account for a house-builder who 
might be asleep or a house-builder that has since retired, to wit, there is more to 







                                                          
4 Harman would also include Humean empiricism in this category as describes objects as bundles of 
qualities, actualised as objects by our minds. See Lucy Kimbell & Graham Harman (2013). The Object 







Duomining has its own Ancient Greek progenitor in Parmenides who in 
Harman’s words ‘proclaimed a double cosmos with a single unified Being on 
one side,’ (Harman, 2016b, p11) this unified being is extrapolated in the 
Cambridge dictionary of philosophy in the following manner, ‘that “the real” or 
“what-is” or “being” …must be ungenerable and imperishable, indivisible, and 
unchanging.’ (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p646) This would be 
overmining as, as we have seen, it includes everything within an interlinked 
unchanging whole. One the other side of Parmenides cosmos is ‘Opinions,’ ‘the 
second part of the poem, he expounds a dualist cosmology,’ (Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p647) where despite the unified nature of 
existence he proposes that the world as we experience is ‘a truthless play of 
opinion and appearance on the other,’ (Harman, 2016b, p11) which would be 
undermining as it reduces the world to its constituents, in this case this is its 
appearance and beliefs. 
 
As mentioned previously it is both under and overmining simultaneously. It is 
common in much of Scientific Materialism according to Harman, as alongside 
reducing objects down to particles, quarks or strings it paraphrases them 
upwards as part of an overarching mathematical schema. (Harman, 2016b, p11-
12)  
  
‘The whole of modern science is a duomining project, since it aims both 
to reduce objects downward to the most basic constituents and to claim 
that these things are, in principle, knowable through mathematization.’ 
(Harman, 2013b, p46) 
 
All three of these positions are fundamentally flawed for Harman as, much like 
the writing about art I referenced earlier, they take us further from the truth / 
essence of the object than closer to it. (Harman, 2011b) 
 
To summarise; by undermining an object and describing it in only its 
constituent parts we are unable to account for the whole that emerges from all 
the ‘atoms’ that makes it up, that I am distinct from the thing next to me, and 
can lose atoms to it whilst still remaining myself. Whereas overmining fails to 
leave account for change, a potentiality for difference. If all substance is 
connected in one network, say a rhizomatic system, with the individual agents 
defined by their causational impact, agents through which energy pulses along, 
then, where does that energy come from? Where is the surplus within the 
system if everything in the system is connected? Likewise, what is an object’s 
status when it is not involved in this system if an object is only about ‘whatever 
they modify, transform, perturb, or create’?  (Harman, 2016b, p10) Does it still 
exist? To Harman it is self-evident that it does and therefore overmining 
strategies fail. Duomining is to perform both reductions at once, as in Scientific 
Materialism when an object is explained as part of a larger schema whilst 









The Third Table 
 
It is perhaps useful at this juncture to give further example of these reductive 
strategies in action. In his text The Third Table, written for dOCUMENTA 135 
Harman uses Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington's parable of two tables from his 1927 
Gifford lecture as the starting point to explain this and his philosophy of objects. 
Eddington asserts that his world, exemplified by the table he is sitting at writing 
the lecture, is split into two; divided between the quotidian, ‘substantial’ 
manifest world and table, and the world and table he knows exists because of his 
study of physics; actually, a composite of ‘electric charges,’ bouncing about one 
another. (Harman, 2012b, p7) For Harman these are just the overmined or 
undermined caricatures of the table. Harman thinks both worlds ignore the real 
table, the first as the table is more than what is graspable in an everyday sense; 
it is more than simply an example of a particular type of table and is not wholly 
explained by its usage. Though Eddington ‘knows’ the table as the desk he writes 
at, that doesn’t mean he knows all of it, it has a reality more complex than that, 
a reality that can never be completely explored; like the ship of Theseus, even if 
he had changed parts of it, scratched it, or even destroyed the table, the table 
will continue to exist whether the same but altered or in memory. Therefore, it 
has a reality we can't access; the table is more than ‘its theoretical, practical, or 
causal effects on humans or on anything else.’ (Harman, 2012b, p10) 
 
Likewise, though, we can imagine that we could look at the table through a 
quantum microscope and see the atoms that it consists of; it is more than simply 
a collection of atoms. Not only could some of these atoms be removed without 
altering the table but also, simply saying what something is made of, does not 
bring us any closer to its reality: ‘[T]he table has an autonomous reality over and 
above its causal components, just as individual humans cannot be dissolved 
back into their parents.’ (Harman 2012, p7-8) 
 
So, Harman concludes: 
 
‘Eddington's first table ruins tables by turning them into nothing but 
their everyday effects on us or on someone else. Eddington's second table 
ruins tables by disintegrating them into nothing but tiny electric charges 
or faint material flickerings. Yet the third table lies directly between these 
other two, neither of which is really a table. Our third table emerges as 
something distinct from its own components and also withdraws behind 
all its external effects.’ (Harman, 2012b, p10) 
 
                                                          
5 In 2012 the director of dOCUMENTA 13, Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, commissioned a series of 100 
‘notebooks’ for the festival. Each of these was designed to illuminate a particular way of thinking, many 
took a position that might be described as post-humanist*. That number 85 of these was by philosopher 
Graham Harman shows the significance and influence Harman and the emerging philosophy Speculative 
Realism had, and still has, within the art world.  
 
*Because of the determination within Speculative Realism to move beyond the anthropocentric, there is 
a tendency to bracket all non-human-centred or post-human philosophy together. The aim of keeping 
OOO distinct from these philosophies might explain Harman’s keenness to emphasise the overmining 





Knowledge of what the table is made of is predicated on the notion that the table 
exists. But this table, the third table, is ignored by science or the humanities 
who simply want to explain what it is made of or what it does. (Harman, 2016, 
p180) 
 
Likewise, we can assert in this study we are looking for a third way of writing 
about an artwork, one that doesn’t rely on simply describing what it is we are 
looking at or explaining its existence using conceptual apparatus.  
 
 
Withdrawal and Emergence 
 
The notion of withdrawal is vital in Harman’s philosophy. It is a notion he has 
taken from his understanding and reading of Heidegger and other 
phenomenologists. (Harman, 2002 & 2005) This is readily apparent in Tom 
Sparrow’s book The End of Phenomenology; structured around a reconsidering 
of Phenomenology in the light of Speculative Realism, most specifically 
Harman’s OOO, 
 
‘Among the philosophers associated with speculative realism, the richest 
and most extensive engagement with phenomenology is found in the 
work of Graham Harman.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p114) 
 
Regarding the concept of withdrawal, it is specifically Heidegger’s notion of 
Zuhandenheit in his tool-analysis, most often translated as ‘ready-to-hand’ (In 
opposition to Vorhandheit or ´presence-to-hand’) that Harman engages with. 
(Harman, 2002) Indeed, the entire metaphysics of Harman’s ontology depend 
on his reading of this tool-analysis: 
 
‘Heidegger’s tool-analysis should not be read as a limited account of 
human productive or technical activity. Instead, it turns out that with the 
theory of equipment Heidegger gives us an insight of overwhelming 
scope, one that cannot be restricted to ‘tools’ in the narrow sense of the 
term, and ultimately cannot even be restricted to the sphere of human 
life.’ (Harman, 2010b, p45) 
 
Harman is clear that his is not a traditional reading of the tool-analysis, and 
moreover, that his reading is not one that Heidegger himself would have 
approved. (Harman, 2011) However, this dualism between withdrawal and 
presence is the essential binary of Harman’s philosophy and one taken from 
Heidegger. It is here that Harman finds the nature of being that inspires his 
ontology. Being to Heidegger, (to Harman’s mind,) is that which rejects 
presence, it is ‘something deeper than all specific beings.’ (Harman, 2007, p173) 
 
As Harman is keen to emphasise his diversion from Heidegger, it is perhaps 
useful to incorporate another source for a more traditional reading of the tool-
analysis. For this purpose we will use Tom Greaves’ Starting with Heidegger. 
(Greaves, 2010) 
 
Heidegger uses the word Dasein to describe humans’ beingness in the world, 





its existence within it, but also through its usage of the equipment that the world 
provides or that Dasein has invented to help navigate it. (Greaves, 2010, p38-41) 
It is a ‘context of involvements,’ (Greaves, 2010, p41), that Dasein doesn’t notice 
as they go about their existence. Greaves gives the example of going fishing, 
when not only is the ‘fishing tackle’ necessary but also the rivers or lakes the fish 
live in, the plants oxygenating the water so the fish can survive there, the 
environmental conditions and the environment itself (Greaves, 2010 p40.) 
Therefore, we begin to see the extent of the ‘equipment’ that surrounds Dasein, 
but this symbiosis between Dasein and the world raises a question, articulated 
below by Greaves, that is, how does the world make itself apparent to Dasein? 
 
‘If Dasein is caught up in the whole of its surroundings, where there are 
primarily no items of equipment but only the whole involved tackle of 
ready to hand by means of which it handles and negotiates its 
surroundings, how is it that any part of this whole ever shows up within 
the world?’ (Greaves, 2010, p42) 
 
The equipment is so ready-to-hand, so embedded in the system in which Dasein 
has found itself, that the equipment has withdrawn. (Heidegger, 1927, p18) 
What happens, to make us, as Dasein, more aware of our surroundings? The 
answer is that there must be the potential for things within this system to 
change for this to be the case; for the equipment to emerge from the background 
and become present to us by no longer performing as we expect it to. (Greaves, 
2010) 
 
This happens in stages, Greaves tells us in his book, using the example of a 
fishing line. In the first instance the line snaps, but Dasein has a replacement 
line, stronger and thicker so it is quickly replaced and withdraws from notice. 
But perhaps the line is missing, or perhaps the fish simply can’t be caught. 
(Greaves, 2010, p40) When something becomes isolated or removed it becomes 
‘present-to-hand’ for instance if it was removed for theoretical study. Finally, it 
is important to note that these are not fixed statuses, there is fluctuation in the 
equipment between being withdrawn or not (Greaves, 2010, p43) 
 
The tool analysis is often exemplified with a hammer; when we have to hammer 
a nail we pick up and drive in the nail with fluidity. The hammer itself has been 
circumvented by its usage; we don’t really see a hammer but paraphrase it and 
the action we use it for: It has become one with its assumed usage, or withdrawn 
behind it, and we see ‘that with which we drive in a nail.’ (Greaves, 2010) It is 
here classed as ‘ready-to-hand’ or Zuhandenheit. However, were the hammer to 
break, to not be able to adequately perform its role, then we notice the hammer. 
Its ‘un-readiness-to-hand’ is what we notice, or rather it becomes ‘present-to-
hand’ or Vorhandenheit. 
 
The crux of Harman’s reading of Heidegger is that we can extrapolate 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘tool being’ i.e. of equipment that withdraws and emerges, 
and apply it across all being, (Harman, 2002, p16) and this means across all 







Heidegger´s ‘dual structure [of revealing and concealing] belongs to every 
entity, and is not a statement about the ups and downs of human activity’ 
(Harman, 2002, p4) As Sparrow’s reading of Harman rightly concludes: ‘Every 
object whatsoever is always at the same time a tool in action and a ‘broken’ tool.’ 
(Sparrow, 2014, p128) 
 
If we think back to the point Harman was making by identifying over and 
undermining strategies: that there is always more to an object than what is 
present to us, and that this depth is not accessible by analysing it in microscopic 
detail (undermining) or by examining its influence, (overmining.) There is 
always more to it than can be paraphrased. We can never exhaust its reality by 
listing its qualities or by putting it in context; there is a withdrawn reality to 
every object. (Harman, 2011b) 
  
Another characteristic of Harman’s philosophy, one that distinguishes him from 
other speculative realists. For instance, he criticises Meillasoux for keeping the 
human / world relationship at the centre of philosophy whereas for Harman: 
‘Even inanimate objects fail to grasp each other as they are in themselves; 
finitude is not just a local spectre haunting the human subject, but a structural 
feature of relations in general, including non-human ones.’ (Harman, 2011, p4) 
 
So, any relation he identifies should be applicable across all his ontology, should 
be able to be extrapolated as one that exists between all objects. As an example, 
to underline the withdrawal of objects, Harman imports Islamic Occasionalist 
philosophy to prove his point. When fire burns a white sheet of cotton it is not 
the whiteness of the cotton that catches fire, nor is it the texture of the sheet that 
is aflame, the fire has only made contact with the flammability of the cotton. 
(‘Harman, 2011b, p73) Objects interact with the facets of other objects 
selectively, and interaction with one such facet doesn’t exhaust the realty of that 
object, there is always a hidden depth to it. As Sparrow says, 
 
‘Harman’s critical point against Heidegger: the withdrawal of objects 
from presence is not the effect of human interaction alone, but is what 
occurs whenever an object interacts with the phenomenal surface of any 
other object. Which is always. Nothing can unearth the object’s concealed 
tool-being; it is hopelessly, absolutely invisible. It is absolutely real.’ 
(Sparrow, 2014, p129) 
 
So, every object in his system is perpetually in a state of ‘tool-being’, each one 
having a ready-to-hand profile that he designates as the Real Object and this is 
true of everything, humans, furniture, NGOs and car-manufacturers. All of them 
have a withdrawn reality that we cannot parse without a reductive gesture, i.e. 
overmining, undermining or duomining them. (Harman, 2011b) 
 
As fellow ontologist Tristan Garcia explains this is also why every entity is 
equally an object. There is no reason to suppose a difference between the 'real' 
and the imagined because the split is elsewhere in his ontology between the Real 
and the Sensual, in Garcia's words: 
 
"Since, for him an ontological difference exists between the real object, 





is no need to assume that there is an underlying difference between 
material or immaterial objects, sensory or non-sensory objects, conscious 
or unconscious objects." (Garcia, 2013, p15)  
 
This notion of withdrawal is relevant to us as we could easily overlay the idea of 
objects with a withdrawn reality of onto the idea of an artwork with an 
ineffability we cannot parse. Harman’s solution to how this withdrawal might be 
bridged will instruct us in how to make the artwork effable. 
 
This is the first part of Harman’s metaphysics. He, also, posits that all objects 
within his system, ergo the world, contain four poles or profiles the first one of 
which is the Real Object which he has co-opted from Heidegger’s tool analysis. 
The other three poles contained by all objects are: Sensual Object, Sensual 




The Sensual Object 
 
Harman concludes the passage on the tool-analysis within his own primer on 
Heidegger with the following passage: 
 
‘This brilliant tool-analysis is perhaps the greatest moment of twentieth-
century philosophy. Its primary target is obviously Husserl. What comes 
first are not phenomena that appear to consciousness. Phenomena are 
only rare cases of visible things emerging from a dominant silent 
background of equipment.’ (Harman, 2007, p63) 
 
Harman believes Husserl was the target as, according to Harman, Husserl is 
only interested in how things manifest themselves to human consciousness. 
This means sequestering the reality of objects so that they needn’t to be 
interrogated by his philosophy. The outcome of which is that Husserl is unable 
to provide a definition for the being of these objects. (Harman, 2007, p42) 
Whereas Heidegger has started with the ‘beingness’ of these objects and 
explained their phenomenological occurrence afterwards. (Pivocevic, 1970, 
p112) 
 
That is not to say though that Harman is interested in discrediting Husserl as he 
takes almost as much from Husserl for his metaphysics as he does from 
Heidegger. Harman’s roots are in the phenomenological tradition, and he has 
found inspiration for his own Ontology in Husserl’s concept of intentionality. As 
Peter Wolfendale says, ‘his is a metaphysics of intentional relation, and his 
account of intentionality is fundamentally culled from the phenomenological 
tradition and its methodology of immanent description.’ (Wolfendale, 2014, 
p31) 
 
If every object has a withdrawn centre that is hidden from our access, it also has 
visible profile to us, what we might call its ‘present-at-hand’ profile, this is 
referred to by Harman as the Sensual Object. This Sensual Object is what 
Husserl would have called the ‘intentional object’; that is something as it 





an object seen by any other object: The world as it appears to us is the Sensual 
world, and Sensual world is phenomenological; 
 
‘Phenomenology walls philosophy off from science by asking us to forget 
every scientific theory about how the world works, and to focus instead 
on a patient, detailed description of how the world appears to us before 
we invent any theories. In our everyday experience, we do not hear sound 
waves, but simply hear a door slamming; the sound waves are just a 
scientific theory, no matter how solid this theory may seem.’ (Harman, 
2007, p4) 
 
As one of the progenitors of phenomenology, Husserl was concerned with this 
‘world as it occurs to us’, consciousness is always conscious of something else.  
This world is what Husserl (and Bretano before him) referred to as the 
intentional world, the world as we see it, and there is substantial overlap 
between the Intentional World of Husserl and the Sensual World of Harman.  
 
As he did with Heidegger’s concepts of withdrawal and emergence within the 
tool-analysis, Harman grafts Husserl’s concept of intentionality onto his objects. 
Or, in the words of Sparrow: ‘Harman expands the concept of intentionality in 
his own work so that intentions are not just something enacted by humans.’ 
(Sparrow, 2014, p118) 
 
For Husserl these objects only existed in our consciousness, in our 
intentionality, and not outside of that. This is a form of ‘Idealism,’ according to 
Harman (Harman, 2011) and Harman develops the Real profiles of his objects 
to counter this.  
 
Like, for Husserl, for Harman the Sensual Objects we encounter within this 
world are all representations of reality. The difference being that there is what 
might be called a ‘hard reality’ behind these representations. These are the Real 
Objects Harman has taken from Heidegger. The Sensual Object we see is just 
one side of an object, it has another side or profile which is the Real Object: 
‘There is not a world of appearances (sensual objects) and a world of concealed 
tool-beings (withdrawn objects). There are just two dimensions of the same 
world, the world of objects. And we, too, are examples of those objects.’ 
(Sparrow, 2014, p137) 
 
As Sparrow says this binary is at the crux of Harman’s philosophy. An object has 
its Real profile and its Sensual profile. Its Sensual profile is what other Real 
Objects encounter, they never encounter another Real Object as that is always 
withdrawn.  
 
And Harman gives this intentionality to all objects, so the Real table encounters 
a Sensual profile of myself just as it encounters a Sensual profile of the pencil 
resting upon it.  As Sparrow puts it: ‘Harman expands the concept of 
intentionality in his own work so that intentions are not just something enacted 
by humans.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p118) 
 
So, the Sensual object is what we see, but it doesn’t always look the same to us, 







Harman finds this part of his fourfold in Husserl as well. What is key for 
Harman as it was for Husserl, is that as we approach an object, a tree for 
example, though it may look differently depending on time of day or season, we 
draw these different Sensual Qualities together to create an independent 
Sensual Object.  
 
Husserl referred to these qualities as adumbrations, they are the surface-effects 
that might alter the way something looks to us, does not prevent us from 
acknowledging its existence as a whole. (Harman, 2011b, p24-26) We recognise 
the object as independent of its Sensual Qualities as those can change, whereas 
the object continues to exist for us. We see objects in the world not colours and 
textures: ‘We do not actually see a can of sliced fruit, but only see one side of the 
can at a time, while the existence of the rest of the can is merely assumed.’ 
(Harman, 2007, p4) 
 
So, the Sensual Qualities are distinct from the Sensual Object and this is true of 





If we return to an object, for example a dog, that looked differently at different 
times of day, or if it stood at different angles, or had its hair groomed differently, 
even if all these surface-effects were stripped away it would still be an individual 
dog, different to other dogs. Working again with Husserl, Harman claims that 
we are able to intuit that is an individual due to some eidetic features we cannot 
quite grasp. (Harman, 2011b, p28) This cognition means that there must be 
qualities that are withdrawn as the Real Object is. Harman labels these the Real 
Qualities of an object. He knows that they must exist as individual dogs, or other 
objects, exist.  
 
The key difference with Sensual Qualities is they require a beholder; someone to 
notice the dog has its hair groomed differently, whereas the real qualities ensure 
the existence of different dogs should no beholders exist. (Harman, 2012, p6) 
 
 
The Fourfold: A Summary 
 
To recap; as we have seen Harman borrows a lot from phenomenology, most 
frequently from Husserl and Heidegger, whilst making clear that they both 
make the mistake of prioritising the world of the human mind. 
 
He critiques Husserl for his idealism; for leaving all objects as intentional, as 
existing only in the mind of their observer, for Harman the objects are real, are 
‘out there’ but only their intentional (or sensual) versions, are available to us or 
other objects. 
Harman critiques Heidegger for limiting his famous tool-analysis to just 
inanimate objects as it is all objects that contain a withdrawn and a revealed 





Despite the world being full of Real Objects, these Real Objects only ever 
encounter the Sensual Object or Sensual Qualities of another object. To give an 
example, if I am the Real Object, then the rest of the world is withdrawn from 
me, what I actually see of it is the Sensual Objects that it contains. These are the 
Sensual Profiles of the hidden Real Objects, thrust out in the Sensual world. The 
tree I see is a Sensual tree, the frog, a Sensual frog, and how they vary in 
appearance, how the light changes the appearance and aspect of the tree are 
because of its Sensual Qualities. But it is the same for the Real Frog which only 
encounters a Sensual tree or Sensual version of myself and the Real tree and 
Sensual frog etc. 
 
Harman often relies on a volcanic metaphor to illuminate this distinction, the 
Real Object and its Qualities are the magma that flows beneath the Earth’s 
surface, the lava the Sensual Object and its Qualities when they appear to us. 
 
But furthermore, the Real Object is also withdrawn from its own Qualities, both 
Real and Sensual, as these Qualities might have no relation to one another; for 
instance, the Real Table might be red and aluminium but the Quality that is the 
tensile strength of the metal does not have the Quality of redness. But the 
contrary is true, they can contain elements that may have no bearing on the Real 





Within the Fourfold there are a number of possible relationships that might 
occur between the profiles. Harman classes the study of these as Ontography. I 
have worked through these with a diagram in Appendix One as it is not directly 
relevant to the study.  
 
But there is one of the relations that proves crucial to us. This is the one that 
occurs between a Real Object and its Sensual Qualities, it is how Harman 
explains how change can occur within the metaphysics he has defined. He calls 
this relation ‘Space’. (Harman, 2011b, p100-101) 
 
Harman uses this relation to explain what might have been a problem for his 
ontology; how all these withdrawn autonomous units interact. When a Real 
Object fuses with its Sensual Qualities, what occurs is Allure. This is when we 
catch a rare glimpse of the Real Object, this is an aesthetic process according to 
Harman and indeed does occur in artworks. I will explain this process in detail 





So, following the philosophical investigation outlined in this chapter we are 
cognisant of the formation and structure of Harman’s ontology. I have shown 
that objects are the root of his philosophy and how, if we seek to reduce them, 
by over, under or duo-mining their existence we are unable to account for their 





Husserl we have a framework for understanding Harman’s concepts of 
emergence and withdrawal.  
 
I have yet to reveal in detail how exactly Harman accounts for change, but as 
Harman finds this explanation within artworks and artwork encounters it 
makes more sense for the moment to detour into art writing and examine it 
through the prism of Object Oriented Ontology. 
 
Moreover, as we also want to analyse when writing about an artwork fails, it is 
germane to look at these fallacies in detail, so we might avoid falling into the 
same trap. From this analysis I will develop a methodology for better writing 
about painting, and a formula for capturing the sensorial experience of an 




































In this chapter I will show how writing on painting and writing about painting 
often serve to overmine or undermine what Harman might term the object-
quality of specific paintings and what I call the singular echo. I split them into 
three categories: The Undermining Artist, The Overmining Critic, and The 
Duomining Theorist.  In this section I critique over contextualisation, but also 
the opposite move that provides a straight-forward description of artworks.  
 
Following the examples given in the introduction we can conclude that the 
visual is seen to be of a different conceptual order to language. This is a valid 
insight, as, (and as I’ve already articulated through analysis of Harman,) all 
objects are withdrawn – each making-up its own ‘order’, if you will.  So, the 
issue of how to ‘account’ for any one object in another order, which means in 
this case; how to write about painting, is vexed.  
 
This chapter examines the different solutions that are proffered to this problem 
and explains why or how they are inadequate.  
 
That the issue of describing painting is vexed, is understood to mean that the 
painting is ineffable. There are two ways of dealing with this ineffability. Firstly, 
artists and writers simply don’t try to describe the appeal of a work, they ignore 
the singular echo. Or secondly, the ‘different order’ of painting, is taken to mean 
that all we can do is describe a work, with a focus on material – including 
colour, surface, etc - and painterly effects – including facture for example. But in 
looking for content greater than the materiality of the work, another group, say 
critics or theorists, commit the error of over-interpretation, (Sontag, 1964) The 
singular echo is lost behind their own fallacious construal of what else the work 
might signify. 
 
I identify a vicious circle in relation to these methods, terming it the analytical 
roundabout. A link between this roundabout and the popularity of Speculative 
Realism is posited. 
 
I conduct this analysis of writing about art through the lens of Harman’s 
ontology because, if it also undermines, overmines and duomines its subject, 
something that’s Harman’s philosophy avoids, might we transpose Harman’s 
solution for avoiding these traps onto the problem so as to provide a template 






In this chapter we will overlay Harman’s understanding of over/undermining 
onto the problematic of writing about painting. To begin with it would be 





1) The encountering of something (stimuli) I think should be painted 
2) The act of making a painting of that stimuli 
3) The encounter with an artwork (spectating) 
4) Writing a text about an artwork 
 
This chapter’s focus is writing for art so deals primarily with Encounter 4. As we 
shall see below Harman is attracted to art as template for philosophy as, 
according to him, it never over or undermines its subject or at least the object it 
is representing. Following this we can say that in Encounter 2 when as an artist 
I am painting the stimuli I cannot over and undermine the object I am 
representing. An understanding of Encounters, 1 and 3 is also possible through 
Harman’s philosophy, and will be explicated in Chapter Three. 
 
Following the previous chapter, we have seen that contemporary thought tends 
to paraphrase objects away from their essences. They are either over or 
undermined or both simultaneously as is the case when they are duomined. We 
might ask if this is the same with the art object?  
 
Actually, Harman ties his philosophy very closely to art and the aesthetic. At the 
end of the Third Table text, (that I introduced in Chapter One,) Harman 
concludes that art offers a way to describe objects without paraphrasing them. It 
is artists who can provide us with the closest thing to the Third Table, the real 
table. 
 
‘On the one hand art does not function by dissolving white whales, 
mansions, rafts, apples, guitars, and windmills, into their subatomic 
underpinnings… …On the other hand they also do not seek the first table, 
as if the arts merely replicated the objects of everyday life or sought to 
create effects on us… …Instead, there is the attempt to establish objects 
deeper than the features through which they are announced, or allude to 
objects that cannot quite be made present.’ (Harman, 2012b, p14) 
 
That is to say, they are not providing a scientific theory to describe the table, the 
second of Eddington’s tables. But nor are they providing the first of these two 
tables, the table of the Humanities. For Harman art and aesthetics are special 
because they are able to reach deeper than other forms of knowledge, getting 
closer to the hidden reality of things. 
 
In fact, on numerous occasions Harman endorses an aesthetic approach to 
philosophy. (Harman, 2012b) This can be seen as paradigmatic of his ontology. 
He believes that the artwork is a form of knowledge that is irreducible but 
nevertheless accessible as knowledge / a knowledge-provider. As he has it; 
 
‘Works of art and architecture are misunderstood if we reduce them 
downward to their physical components or upward to their socio-political 
effects, despite occasional attempts within those disciplines to do just 
that.’ (Harman, 2016b, p12) 
 
I think however that we can say with some conviction that there are more than 
just occasional attempts to reduce them downward or upward and this is the 





‘Interpretation … presupposes a discrepancy between the clear meaning 
of the text and the demands of (later) readers. It seeks to resolve that 
discrepancy. The situation is that for some reason a text has become 
unacceptable; yet it cannot be discarded. Interpretation is a radical 
strategy for conserving an old text, which is thought too precious to 
repudiate, by revamping it. The interpreter, without actually erasing or 
rewriting the text, is altering it. But he can’t admit to doing this. He 
claims to be only making it intelligible, by disclosing its true meaning. 
However far the interpreters alter the text … they must claim to be 
reading off a sense that is already there.’ (Sontag, 1964, p6) 
 
What Sontag has identified as over-interpretation is coherent with Harman’s 
notion of a description of an object taking us away from the essence of it. 
Instinctively we think we know that, for instance, writing about a particular 
artwork missed the nub of it, but in this chapter, we will answer with specifics 
the following question; How does art writing over, under or duomine the art 
object?  
 
In answering this question, we will expand upon the three fallacies: 
Biographical, Descriptive and Contextual that were referenced in the 
introduction. Though there is not a perfect synchronicity it is useful to think of 
these categories in the terms that Harman has just outlined and helps us 
identify when writing about painting will Undermine, Overmine or Duomine the 
artwork.  
 
We will incorporate a third meter, a text of James Elkins that I believe has 
useful parallels with my categories and the reductionist strategies identified by 
Harman but is art-specific. The essay of Elkins is Thoughts on the State and 
Future of the Image (2003). In this essay Elkins gives three reasons why we 
might want to ask what an image is? To illustrate how disparate our notions of it 
might be, he brackets these three reasons into three fields within the arts; the 
studio art environment, art criticism / art history / art theory; and visual 
studies. 
 
In combining our diagnosis with that of Harman and Elkins we will divide the 
analysis that follows into three sections: The Undermining Artist, The 
Overmining Critic, and The Duomining Theorist. Though obviously each actor 
can commit each reductive strategy, artists overmine, theorist undermine etc. I 
have bracketed them this way as it reflects the most common occurrence of the 
problem.6  
                                                          
6 As a brief, but important, aside. 
 
In his essay James Elkins offers the apology that visual culture theorists might make, that perhaps post-
colonial sensitivity has made them reluctant to suggest a generalised empirical account of how the 
visual operates for all. (Elkins, 2003, p67) He says, ‘it may also have to do with a sensitivity to the way 
concepts are culturally constructed, which involves a mistrust towards trans-historical philosophic 
conceptualizations.’ (Elkins, 2003, p67)  
 
I am in accordance with Elkins on this, but we might wonder if Harman would not be. In Immaterialism 
(2016) he appears to be bemoaning criticism of these very conceptualisations when he says the theory 






The Undermining Artist 
 
In the case of The Undermining Artist the work that is analysed is explained in 
terms of its materiality, and in the case of a painting this is via reference to its 
                                                          
history and the Romantic conception of genius,’ as if anything spawned by Romanticism were inherently 
false.’  (Harman, 2016b, p55) 
 
It is precisely the ‘great man’ that Linda Nochlin laments in her canonical essay Why Have There Been 
No Great Women Artists? (Nochlin, 1971) We could mobilise this essay when thinking through the 
biographical fallacy, I branded in the introduction. In this text she identifies the misconception or ‘the 
naive idea that art is the direct, personal expression of individual emotional experience, a translation of 
personal life into visual terms.’ (Nochlin, 1971, p147)  
 
In fact, she would seem to conceive of the work of art as this study does when she separates it from 
categorisation in the following passage; 
 
‘The making of art involves a self-consistent language of form, more or less dependent upon, or free 
from, given temporally defined conventions, schemata, or systems of notation, which have to be 
learned or worked out, either through teaching, apprenticeship, or a long period of individual 
experimentation. The language of art is, more materially, embodied in paint and line on canvas or paper, 
in stone or clay or plastic or metal it is neither a sob story nor a confidential whisper.’ (Nochlin, 1971, 
p147) 
 
I am accordance with Nochlin here and am careful to stress that any re-reading of Linda Nochlin doesn’t 
imply that I disagree with a feminist revision of art history. Politically I am in agreement with her . But 
we will see that in Seurat's Grande Jatte: An Anti-Utopian Allegory, I think she misreads the work of 
Georges Seurat, in subjecting it to a deconstructivist analysis, and she seems to contradict some of the 
strategies she disavows above. 
 
In this situation Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick provides succour. In the introduction to Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Pedagogy, Performativity (2003) she is careful to say that her work is not an attempt to devalue the 
work of Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida in critiquing the heteronormalizing nature of language, 
(Kosofsky Sedgwick, 2003, p4-9) but could be read alongside it as a companion that provides ‘a relative 
lightening of the epistemological demand on essential truth,’ (Kosofsky Sedgwick, 2003, p6) 
 
She uses the term beside for how she would situate her own critical enquiry, beside as opposed to 
beneath, behind or beyond, as it implies instead a planar relation (Kosofsky Sedgwick, 2003, p8) and 
therefore fitting for an investigation based on a flat ontology to appropriate. 
 
As the title Touching Feeling suggests, like us Kosofsky Sedgwick is asking for a less constant textual 
engagement with the subject, and instead something more haptic, spatial and intuitive. And though we 
won’t be following her in taking a Foucauldian position for our analyses, we can follow her in stating 
that this is not a project to displace other important critical practices but to perhaps provide detail 
where they have generalised. Like her I want to deepen our knowledge of those engagements outside of 
political analyses, as she says here; 
 
‘to address aspects of experience and reality that do no present themselves in propositional or even 
verbal form alongside others that do, rather than submit to the apparent common sense that requires a 
strict separation between the two and usually implies an ontological privileging of the former.’ (Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, 2003, p6) 
 
So, when Nochlin is identifying the impact of class system Seurat found himself in, on his work, we can 
recognise the sincerity of the gesture and the importance of the work. But want a more nuanced 





surface, the manner in which the paint has been applied, and in only doing this 
fails to account for the overall experience of the painting.  
 
In the first instance it will be useful to concentrate on one artist to exemplify 
these ‘reduction’ strategies. The artist chosen is Georges Seurat, though it might 
be considered something of an ‘open goal’ for undermining to choose an artist 
who is famous for Pointillism; what we could call a ‘particle-based’ painting 
technique. And as expected we encounter undermining in the following two 
examples, the first from an exhibition catalogue; 
 
‘Impressionist brushwork, which had made use of open flecks and 
allowed for spontaneity, now appears disciplined, subsumed into the 
regime of the colored dot and its strict sequencing. A sober precision, 
which includes even geometry, shape and line, is combined with the 
depiction of intangible and yet very potent light.’ (Boehm, 2009, p87)  
 
The painting here is undermined as its style is described as ‘disciplined’ and 
‘sober’ and though we are told that an ‘intangible’ light is captured, no attempt 
is made to describe this light. The description of that which is intangible is what 
we are hoping to find in art writing. 
 
We can find our second example of undermining in the writing of Bridget Riley, 
this following excerpt is concerned with a preparatory painted study for one of 
Seurat’s best-known works, La Grand Jatte: 
  
‘Seurat uses the three primaries of light: red-orange, green, and blue-
violet for his canvas. Such honing-in demanded a greater precision in 
colour application, and so the pointillist touch arrives. The preparatory 
work… makes it quite easy to follow the evolution from the freely hatched 
brush-stroke, still used to lay in the underpainting, to the dot, that 
uninflected and non-referential mark. It is easy to see that the manner in 
which it draws no attention to itself while carrying out a task discretely 
would have appealed to Seurat.’ (Riley, 1992, p178) 
 
Both these examples undermine the paintings they are referring to. That is not 
to say they are bad pieces of writing, or even uninteresting, but I believe that 
they are predicated on the notion that all we can describe about the effect of a 
painting or an artwork is the matter that forms them, that visual sensation 
cannot be paraphrased but simply explained. The singular echo of an artwork is 
not found in describing its style or how the materials have been applied. 
 
Undermining is what we called in the introduction The Descriptive Fallacy. It 
also chimes with the reason for wanting to define an image that Elkins posits in 
the category studio art environment.  
 
‘In the studio art environment, it is often assumed that the visual exists in 
a cognitive realm separate from language, logic, and mathematics.’ 
(Elkins, 2003, p66) 
 
Elkins is referring here to the brusque dismissal of textual analysis that many 





cognitive realm to the other modes of thought, why bother defining its appeal – 
in language, writing, etc. They have surrendered to the idea that the appeal of a 
painting is ineffable so they don’t try and describe a painting’s appeal. This fits 
with the fallacy I have described as Descriptive, they undermine its appeal by 
describing it in quotidian language; this red shape is there, or in painter’s jargon 
as Bridget Riley does again in the following quotation, herself relying heavily of 
art critic Félix Fénéon’s undermining of Seurat;  
 
‘Here already are the five colour sources of his method which Félix 
Fénéon listed later: the ‘solar orange’ for sunlight, and its 
‘complementary’, strong blue in the shade; greens and yellows as the 
‘local colours’ of the vegetation; fleeting reds and violets as ‘ambient 
complementary colours’; a small portion of ‘reflections projected by 
neighbouring objects´, and a great deal of those inflected half-lights 
explained as ‘the feeble portion of coloured light that penetrates beyond 
the surface and is reflected after having been modified by partial 
absorption’.’ (Riley, 1992, p176) 
 
This is interesting to read as a painter, and I can think about how Seurat creates 
the visual effects that he does but it, again, fails to account for the overall 
experience of the painting,7 And I don’t think that we need to accept that the 
singular echo of the artwork can’t be described – Harman offers a solution here, 
one that is the task of this thesis to explicate.  
 
As noted it is not only artist-writers, or artists in studio discussion, who do this, 
critics also prompt the undermining attitude, as David Joselit does when he says 
the following; 
 
‘Here is a strange fact, which is both so obvious and so threatening to art-
historical analysis that it is habitually overlooked: every artwork is 
indescribable. And since we can neither grasp a painting in language nor 
exhaust it in experience, how can we assign it meaning?’ (Joselit, 2016, 
p11) 
 
The problem is that I believe this can lead to a quasi-mysticism about the 
ineffability of art and though I can understand why artists want to avoid this, 
the method they have chosen, that is describing the work’s physical appearance, 
is a form of undermining, one which is normally a response to the challenge of 
withdrawal (ineffability, untranslatability, etc.), but this is an inadequate 
response. Atomising art in this way denies the encounter that is the whole 
object, the singular echo of the painting.  
 
The following taken from a Hilton Kramer essay, Seurat, one hundred years 
later, (1991), (though not by him,) demonstrates this ably: 
 
‘Seurat knew many things, the sacred laws of common sense, which we 
neglect no doubt because they are too simple. 
 
                                                          
7 This might elsewhere be termed the gestalt but gestalt theory is a ‘red herring’ as this will undermine 





That it is not instinct that composes, but intellect; that instinct—genius—
proposes and the lucid mind disposes, composes, translates the impulse, 
the imperfectly formed, sketchy need that we call inspiration…. 
 
A painter may intellectualize, and Seurat was not averse to doing so. But, 
ultimately, we know that certain works are possessed of that radiance, 
that sublimity, those resonances that no formula can measure, explain or 
dissect, but that we feel, that excite us, transport us, make us forget 
everything else. There are certain canvases by Seurat that have this 
magic. 
—Amédée Ozenfant, in Cahiers d’Art, 1926 
 
Which, as already noted, is frustrating because the implication is that we 
shouldn’t try to write about whatever it is that provides this ‘magic.’ This thesis 
does not dispute that magic exists, that there is a singular echo emitted by the 
artwork, rather we dispute that this is ineffable.  
 
And, if we think through Harman and how he explains causation in his ontology 
we can approach this problem from a different angle. 
 
 
The Overmining Critic 
 
The overmining critic can operate in a number of manners but what links these 
manners is that the writing ignores the singular echo of the artwork and places 
it instead in a larger schema. We begin this section with the writing of Isabella 
Graw trying to define the nature of painting as a medium. Later in the chapter 
we shall see Heidegger making the same error, perpetuating what Sontag calls a 
‘highly dubious theory’ in Against Interpretation: 
 
‘Interpretation, based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is 
composed of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an article for  
use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories.’ (Sontag, 1964, 
p10) 
 
Contemporary critic and curator Isabella Graw has tried to define what makes a 
painting a painting. This is perhaps surprising, given the contemporary context 
in which it has been written, if we look back at the Peter Osborne quote used in 
the introduction, contemporary critics have eschewed notions of medium 
specificity. (Osborne, 2013, p3) 
 
To be clear Graw is aware of the dangers of medium specificity, and she calls her 
own concept a ‘medium-unspecific notion of painting.’ (Graw, 2012, p45) 
Nevertheless, she has still chosen to advance a definition on the assumption that 
paintings are different from other art-forms, other ‘mediums.’ She wants to, 
 
‘try to develop a medium-unspecific notion of painting that is 
nevertheless able to capture its residual distinctness even under the 






She works toward this definition across two books. ‘Thinking through Painting: 
Reflexivity and Agency beyond the Canvas’ followed by ‘Painting beyond Itself: 
The Medium in the Post-medium Condition.’ Across the two texts she mobilises 
semiotics to understand an indexicality inherent in painting: (Graw, 2012 & 
2016) That a painting shows the trace of its author. In the first text she posits 
that painting is ‘a form of production of signs that is experienced as highly 
personalized’ (Graw, 2012, p45) Following Hegel she claims that;  
 
‘only in painting are aesthetics and subjectivity strongly interconnected… 
In my opinion, the unique dynamic developed by paint on a surface 
already provides the groundwork for the understanding that, here, we are 
also dealing with a model of subjectivity in the sense of an independent 
life.’ (Graw, 2016, p63) 
 
This doesn’t mean that the painting then has powers to ‘think’ away from the 
artist who creates it, we need to be more precise than that. A painting offers a 
viewpoint of the world in both senses of the word. Firstly, we could say, after 
Vasari, that a painting is a window onto the world, and there is little 
questionable in the assertion that painting offers this kind of viewpoint. 
Through Graw we see that we need to think beyond this, that this window also 
represents a subjective viewpoint, and we are under its influence as we look out 
of it. The painting is in effect telling us what it thinks.  
We are familiar with the idea that a novel may contain characters that represent 
views different to those of the reader and writer, but the objectness of a painting 
seems to give it more agency. She claims that a ‘Painting is a highly-valuable 
quasi person.’ (Graw, 2016) She is cognisant that performance art might seem to 
be more linked to the artist responsible as they are obviously visible when the 
artwork is viewed. But painting is different as an object is produced that 
contains the supposed trace of the author, 
 
‘While paintings seem to somewhat contain the artist, they can’t be 
reduced to this person. What prevents the reduction of this painterly 
product to its maker is its specific materiality… Both product and person 
signify one another but they don’t collapse into one another.’ (Graw, 
2016, p91) 
 
And though she is clear that it is not actually possible to really find the artist in 
the work it is possible to make the viewer think that it is possible, to fabricate 
this effect, 
 
‘Painting is, in other words, a highly differentiated language that consists 
of a number of techniques, methods and artifices, which allow for the 
fabrication of the impression of the author’s quasi-presence as an effect.’ 
(Graw, 2016, p93, her emphasis) 
 
So, in her identification of the ‘specific materiality’ of the painting distinct from 
its context, we have found resonances of Object philosophy. It is also there in 
the almost animistic agency she gives to painting. Moreover, there are also 
echoes of Graham Harman in her identification of irreducible components that 
make up a painting. She is talking precisely about the absent artist who has left 





saturated with what one imagines to be the person of the artist but it can’t be 
reduced to this person.’ (Graw, 2016, p93) 
 
She is very certain that the mark of the painter-author is there, even if it is a 
mark of self-erasure, and gives the examples of Wade Guyton and Gerhard 
Richter’s squeegee abstracts. As she has it, 
 
‘One could establish the following rule: the more negation there is of 
handwriting, the more this negation will be considered to be the 
handwriting of the artist.’ (Graw, 2016, p96)8 
 
But we can conclude that in Harman’s terms both of Graw’s texts overmine. 
There is much to recommend Graw’s attempts to delimit a concept of painting. 
But in doing so she overmines whichever painting she has chosen as exemplar of 
her theory as her theory is about painting not a painting, it is about painting as a 
medium.  
 
If we were to reword the first quotation of hers we used, it is the distinctness of 
a painting that this study is concerned with. The singular echo of a painting and 
how that affects the viewer.  
 
This is an accordance with Elkins’ second reason, that the fields of art history, 
theory and criticism tend to work with received opinions of what an image is. 
(Elkins, 2003, p66) In addition, Elkins claims art history ignores much of what 
is visible about a painting. It should be interested in the whole surface, but 
instead; 
 
‘the discipline of art history tends not to notice small surface details, 
textures, marks, and facture unless those things have overall significance 
(as they do, for example, in Impressionism), or unless they add to 
representations, iconographic elements, or otherwise legible semiotic 
elements… In other words, a lot of what makes any given painting a 
painting is not articulated in art historical texts. In that sense, the image 
enters the text of art history as a radically simplified object.’ (Elkins, 
2003, p66) 
 
And though Graw has attempted to avoid this by referencing the technique of 
the artist, in doing so she has missed the painting as specific object. The surface 
of the painting, the painting-as-object is being overmined so that it may be 
described in a way that ignores some of its elements. By explaining her concept 
of painting as medium by referring to the squeegee technique of Richter as his 
recognisable ‘signature’, she has inadvertently concluded that every painting 
that Richter has created using the squeegee is interchangeable. The singular 
echo of an artwork is not found in the equipment used to create it. 
 
 
                                                          
8 As we shall see in more detail shortly this would put her in conflict with Linda Nochlin’s views on 
Seurat. Nochlin says; ‘For Seurat, with the dot, resolutely and consciously removed himself as a unique 
being projected into the work by means of a personal handwriting. He himself is absent from his stroke.’ 






The Duomining Theorist 
 
Returning to Seurat and Nochlin we find an example of what Harman calls 
duomining in an essay of hers, Seurat’s La Grande Jatte: An Anti-Utopian 
Allegory. In this text she finds  
 
‘Seurat’s method would seem to allegorize modern techniques of mass 
production, and to produce thereby effects of distancing far from either 
Impressionist and Expressionist signifiers of subjectivity and 
involvement in art production or from the harmonious generalization of 
surface characteristics of classical modes of representation.’ (Nochlin, 
1989, p181) 
 
Nochlin is duomining the painting here by referring to the pointillist technique 
of its construction purely as effect, that is to an expression of separation 
between the viewer and subject of the painting. By reducing the painting to its 
particle-based method, she is undermining it, while simultaneously overmining 
by claiming Seurat is echoing the nascent industrialisation taking place in 
contemporary (to him) society through usage of said method.  
 
This is problematic as the sensual aspect of the work is ignored instead it is 
bundled into a sociohistorical reading of the work, in Nochlin’s account the 
transportive potential of the painting is ignored, its visual construction and 
effects are either taken for granted or perhaps thought of as ineffable. In fact, 
when we look at a painting by Seurat we can’t separate the way it was made 
from the whole object that is the painting and the experience of it. As Sontag 
says, 
 
‘Interpretation takes the sensory experience of the work of art for 
granted, and proceeds from there.’ (Sontag, 1965, p13) 
 
I believe we need to spend longer thinking about this ‘sensory experience,’ what 
I have termed the singular echo. Nochlin takes the same approach as previously 
when she describes the way the dots are in fact referents to: 
 
‘Rather, in these machine-turned profiles, these regularized dots we may 
discover coded references to modern science and to modern industry 
with its mass production; to the department store with its cheap and 
multiple copies; to the mass press with its endless pictorial 
reproductions; in short, a critical sense of modernity embodied in 
sardonic, decorative invention and in the emphatic, even overemphatic, 
contemporaneity of costumes and accoutrements.’ (Nochlin, 1989, p173) 
 
Here Nochlin has taken us far beyond La Grand Jatte, the painter’s technique 
has been instrumentalised into a critique of modernistic alienation, the sensory 
experience has been lost. 
 
In the same essay Nochlin praises Meyer Schapiro’s writing on Seurat. Calling 
his writing ‘perhaps the most perceptive article written about La Grande Jatte,’ 
(Nochlin, 1989, p174.) But in this piece Schapiro emphasises that Seurat’s lower 





the time lead him to his rational or sober painting technique. (Nochlin, 1989, 
p174) The relevance of this to the sensory experience of looking at La Grand 
Jatte, is limited, in fact it distracts. 
 
In conclusion we can say that those fallacies that we referred to, in the 
introduction as Contextual or Biographical, Harman would class as overmining 
or duomining. In trying to situate the work within a historical or conceptual 
context, or a personal history of the artist the writer misses the specificity of the 
work as it becomes a signifier of something larger. I would bracket ‘The 
Biographical Fallacy’ as failing for similar reasons; making the work fit into the 
author’s life story rather than analysing the painting as is. This is, of course, a 
reiteration of Barthes’ famous critique Death of the Author (1967), at least in 
part. 
 
‘The Descriptive Fallacy’, as is now clear, is an instance of undermining: That by 
describing the brush marks or the use of colour we are closer to the piece. 
Though the formal qualities of a painting are what we admire about it, what 
draws us to it, describing these does not translate into an account of the 
experience of the painting. Reducing the object that is the painting to its 
physical constituent parts brings us no closer to the ‘real’ painting, we simply 
undermine it. But committing the ‘Contextual Fallacy’ and explaining how the 
painting fits into a movement or epoch, or overmining, the painting, leaves us 
similarly adrift of the singular echo, the ‘real’ painting. 9 
 
 
The Analytical Roundabout 
 
As our earlier aside hinted, these strategies of reduction (over, under, and duo 
mining) tend to occur in reaction to one another. Particularly if we follow them 
in a specific order. 
 
If we start off with overmining; a writer committing the biographical fallacy by 
describing what a painter was experiencing in their life at the time they were 
making a work as if that could explain it, (whereas they were simply trying to 
make the best painting they could at the time.) Critics felt they needed to rectify 
this problem, Roland Barthes wrote in Death of the Author about how criticism 
can distract itself with biographical details, 
  
‘Criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire’s work 
is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his madness, 
Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the 
man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through 
more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single 
person, the author ‘confiding’ in us.’ (Barthes, 1967, p143) 
 
Barthes could be writing against Meyer Schapiro here, when Schapiro says ‘One 
misses in all this both a personal sense of the expression and of van Gogh’s 
feelings of ‘rejection’ by his own parents and by his learned teachers who had to 
                                                          
9 Further application of these fallacious forms of art criticism is discussed in Appendix One, ii with 
particular reference to Heidegger’s essay The Origin of the Work of Art and the responses to it by Meyer 





come to doubt his fitness as a Christian preacher and missionary.’ (Schapiro, 
1994, p149) 
 
But in looking away from the author and instead towards the art object qua art, 
then we find writers thinking about the nature of art, the environment of the 
artist. And then as Simon O´Sullivan says in the book used to define encounters 
in the introduction, this leads onto failure by the following means, ‘That in 
thinking about art, in reading the art object, we missed that which art does best.’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2006, p40) It is O’Sullivan’s opinion that this missing of what art 
does best, which we have called its singular echo, can largely be explained by 
either; ‘Marxism (or the ‘Social History of Art’) and the propensity to historically 
explain, or interpret, art through recourse to its moment of production.’ Or 
‘deconstruction (or the ‘New Art History’) and the propensity to stymie 
manoeuvres such as the first, whilst still inhabiting their general conceptual 
framework.’ (O’Sullivan, 2006, p40)10 
 
Both factors result in the artwork simply being a tool for another reading, as 
Sontag puts it in On Style, this type of criticism ‘in effect treats the work of art 
as a statement being made in the form of a work of art.’ (Sontag, 1965, p21, her 
emphasis) 
 
That is to say, the critic is in effect instrumentalising the artwork to match their 
own agenda. But this isn’t the same as the way an artist would look at the work, 
as she says; 
 
‘Such a treatment has little to do with what actually happens when a 
person possessing some training and aesthetic sensibility looks at a work 
of art appropriately. A work of art encountered as a work of art is an 
experience, not a statement or an answer to a question. Art is not only 
about something; it is something. A work of art is a thing in the world, 
not just a text or commentary on the world.’ (Sontag, 1965, p21) 
 
In a different essay, Against Interpretation, she says; ‘Our task is to cut back 
content so that we can see the thing at all.’ (Sontag, 1964 p14) I believe it is 
because of the over-contextualisation with biographical or sociohistorical details 
that leads some to respond with a prosaic description of the effects of the 
artwork. What might be described as a humble formalist reportage that knows it 
is impossible to capture the sensations of the painting. The undermining artist 
is a stance adopted in response to the overmining critic or the duomining 
theorist. The latter’s textualisation of artwork has frustrated artists who see the 
materiality of art as fundamental to its nature and distinct from language. The 
following extract from an essay by abstract painter Alan Gouk gives a sense of 
that frustration: 
  
‘Painting is not ‘structured like a language’, nor does sculpture share a 
syntax with language, nor does music. Hans Keller in his last book 
                                                          
10 The Schapiro text(s) on Heidegger that are examined in Appendix One, part ii could be thought of as 
axiomatic of the ‘Social History of Art’ reason, and Derrida’s response to Heidegger, Schapiro, and Van 
Gogh’s shoes of ‘New Art History’. As O´Sullivan says, ‘We might say that with the first factor there is an 
appeal to origins as final explanation, whilst with the second the very notion of an origin is put under 





Criticism, says that music is not a  language since it is cannot be 
translated (and as yet no written language can be deciphered  unless it 
has links to another known language). Therefore structuralist and post-
structuralist linguistic theory and literary criticism are irrelevant to the 
analysis of painting. All figures of  speech, and the metaphoric, 
metonymy, synecdoche, trope etc., – indeed meta-anything, should be 
banished from critical discourse as a gross misapplication of language if 
applied to visual art… …The allure of subjectivity biased, obscurantist, 
pseudo-scientific French literary theory for nice-but-dim art theorists has 
wreaked untold damage to the tenor of art-critical discourse.’ (Gouk, 
2013) 
 
It is expressed more fluently and less indignantly by Sontag in Against 
Interpretation; 
 
‘None of us can ever retrieve that innocence before all theory when art 
knew no need to justify itself, when one did not ask of a work of art what 
it said because one knew (or thought one knew) what it did. From now to 
the end of consciousness we are stuck with the task of defending art. We 
can only quarrel with one or other means of defense. Indeed, we have an 
obligation to overthrow any means of defending and justifying art which 
becomes particularly obtuse or onerous or insensitive to contemporary 
needs and practice.’ (Sontag, 1964, p4-5) 
So, it would seem when in front of the ineffability of the artwork the spectator 
qua writer is presented with a choice, though all choices are predicated on this 
ineffability, and take it as a given. The critic as art-historian chooses to write 
about the biography of the artist, thinking that “perhaps if we know what the 
artist was experiencing when this work was made we can assume that this is 
what generates the singular echo. If the artist was getting divorced then it is the 
divorce that gives this work its appeal.”  
The theorist, rightly disappointed by the absurdity of this conclusion, and 
uninterested in the emotional life of the artist instead looks for a more grounded 
analysis to accompany the artwork, and finds it in politics. But this again misses 
the singular echo, takes its ineffability for granted.  
The artist, understanding the world haptically, is frustrated by all these words, 
the textual interpretations that cloud the very thing that appeals about the 
artwork, namely its materiality, chooses to describe that instead, and lists the 
facture and decisions taken by the artist. But again, this misses what appeals 
about the artwork, that which is ‘ineffable,’ the artist claims that there is just 
something magical about it. Faced with this magic, the biographer looks for a 
moment within the life of the artist… and the analytical roundabout continues to 
turn. 11 
                                                          
11 In performing this critical analysis, we have provided an answer to the question raised in the first 
chapter; namely why Speculative Realism has become so popular in Art Schools. Keeping the analytical 
roundabout in mind it is easy to see how Art Schools being ‘early-adopters’ of Speculative Realism. New 








As we have found, there is an accord between Harman’s diagnosis of the 
ontological failings of contemporary philosophy and my own disappointment 
with the textual analysis of painting. 
 
We have seen through the concept of ‘the analytical roundabout’ that these 
textual analyses begot one another, with each one seeking to ameliorate the 
failings of the one preceding it, but each one missing that which specifically 
appeals about the artwork, remaining out of reach of the analysis.  
 
But there is cause for optimism here; that if Harman proffers a method for  
understanding painting as an OOO object, if I can uncover how withdrawn 
objects communicate within his ontology I can follow him and speculate on how 
the withdrawn painting can be communicated with. From this I can delineate a 
method for interpreting paintings, including writing about painting. Doing so 
must neither undermine nor overmine them, and then this methodology can be 
transcribed and used as a template for better writing about painting. 
 
It is in art that Harman finds the solution to this aforementioned lacuna in his 
ontology, how objects communicate and to account for change, specifically, in 
















                                                          
emphasises its tactility and tangibility. It is a return to the haptic after the cerebral nature of post 
structuralism, this is explicit in the introduction of Carnal Knowledge: Towards a ‘New Materialism’ 
through the Arts edited by Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt who like Elkins attribute some blame to 
cultural studies, ‘The framing of art as a primarily social and ideological in nature occurred within the 
broader context of the rise of cultural studies, post structuralism and postmodernism.’ (Bolt, 2013, p4) 
  
Art was now Cultural Production in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, (1993), art was now a product of 
‘social discursive practices.’ (Bolt, 2013, p4) ‘Thus, through the colonization of the arts by cultural 
theory, arts’ very materiality has disappeared into the textual, the linguistic and the discursive. 
According to this conception, art is constructed in and through language. There is nothing outside of 
discourse and language is its vehicle.’ (Bolt, 2013, p4) 
 
Or as O’Sullivan puts it, ‘it might be argued that this radicality has in some cases become a new kind of 
orthodoxy and that its conceptual resources are less relevant to many modern and contemporary 











In this chapter I think through Spectatorship via the prism of OOO, debunking 
the notion of an artwork without a spectator that was one interpretation of how 
art might operate in an OOO universe. Likewise, a separate interpretation; that 
of the modernistic spectator of Greenberg and Fried is revealed as equally 
fallacious. I incorporate Harman’s writing on Greenberg and comparisons 
Harman has made between Greenberg and Heidegger. I examine Fried using 
another writer on art and OOO, Robert Jackson. The flaws in the notion of a 
post-Modern or relational spectator are also outlined. Following this I explicate 
how the spectator in OOO really operates, following Harman I do this with 
reference to Jose Ortega y Gasset and his essay on the metaphor. The crux of 
which is that when we read a metaphor we become the metaphorical agent 
within it. So, when we encounter an artwork we fuse with it, try to become it. 
This interaction takes place within a third object; the object that is the artwork 
encounter. Based on this revelation I am able to explain Harman’s concept of 
vicarious causation. What is crucial, despite what one might expect when 
dealing with an ontology of withdrawn autonomous units, is the thing that 
encounters them. In the case of a painting that is the spectator. This 
simultaneously completes a gap in Harman’s ontology, in accounting for 
change, and gives instruction on how we might write about the singular echo of 





At the end of the last chapter we were trapped in a cycle of dissatisfying art 
criticism, that I termed the analytical roundabout, when trying to describe the 
‘draw’ of an individual painting. On this ‘roundabout’ avoiding one type of 
criticism meant we trapped ourselves in another, to avoid overmining in a 
biographical fashion meant overmining or duomining through contextual 
means, avoiding both of these meant undermining the painting with prosaic 
description. 
 
But we can use the philosophy of Harman to get off this roundabout. This not 
only assists us in our aim of writing about the singular echo of an artwork, but 
also provides a novel approach to a discussion of spectatorship.  
 
 
A Contemporary Art Without Spectators 
 
In wanting to push beyond ‘correlationism’ – that is believing that humanity can 
only think what it can experience (as explained in Chapter One) speculative 
realism and its derivatives have tended to be bracketed as posthumanism as 





after humanity. Though this is understandable it is fallacious as beyond 
humanity and without humanity have very different implications. 12 
 
However, this is far from the case and, perhaps alarmed by this trend, Harman 
has used his more recent publications to dissuade people from this opinion; 
most explicitly in his 2016 book Immaterialism: 
 
‘Yet it is often wrongly assumed that OOO, with its focus on objects, must 
reach those objects by expelling or exterminating humans. Many of the 
misleading questions addressed to OOO make this same false 
assumption: ‘What would an art without humans be like?’; ‘What would 
an architecture without humans look like?’ The point is not to subtract 
humans from any given situation but to focus on the way that humans 
are themselves ingredients in a symbiosis rather than just privileged 
observers looking on from the outside.’ (Harman, 2016, p54) 
 
So here we see that Harman makes the viewer vital to an artwork, we needn’t 
imagine the OOO artwork as a viewer-less piece. But more than this, according 
to Harman, it has to be a viewer cognizant they are looking at art, revealed in an 
interview with Christoph Cox and Jenny Jaskey, Harman is pushed further on 
the point of whether the artwork ‘works’ without a spectator and he reveals that 
in OOO the artwork doesn’t even exist as such if the spectator isn’t interested in 
it, we shouldn’t even think of it as an artwork when it isn’t being observed. 
 
‘The question is whether an artwork continues to be an artwork when no 
one is looking at it. My instinct is to say ‘absolutely not,’ that its reality is 
generated not only by the presence of an observer, but even an observer 
who is capable of understanding it.’ (Harman, 2015 p105) 
 
Clearly then the idea of an artwork just existing ‘artworkedly’ if you will, is not 
possible in a philosophy such as Harman’s, requiring as it does not only a 
viewer, but a viewer who understands they are looking at art. But this ‘capable’ 
audience leads to another misconception, one that imagines that because of its 
emphasis on objecthood, OOO would follow Clement Greenberg and Michael 
                                                          
12 As mentioned in footnote 5 in Chapter One we might consider dOCUMENTA 13 in 2012 as a ‘high-
watermark’ for a post-humanist viewpoint within the arts, the director Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev 
explicitly said that the focus of the show was the ‘question as to whether we can imagine a universe 
that’s less anthropocentric, a world of thought and active life that’s not based especially on humans.’ 
(Christov-Bakargiev, 2012) Alongside Harman other writers who submitted notebooks, included Karen 
Barad and Donna Haraway and there were artworks such as artist Pierre Huyge’s Untilled.  
 
Untilled included a natural environment that replenished through processes of decomposition and 
fertilisation. As might be expected, these natural processes took place whether or not there was a 
viewer present: ‘Events such as pollination and compostation continue to happen whether or not I 
choose to view or participate in the exhibited work.’ (Weir, 2013, p29) 
 
Andy Weir wrote about the potential for artwork to exist without viewer, and Untilled can be 
considered the apotheosis of this position of the artwork without a spectator. Though Weir does not 
mention Harman directly, it might be thought that this is what an artwork inspired by OOO would look 
like. In an ontology in which all the real constituents are withdrawn from one another would not the 






Fried and endorse what might be termed a Modernist approach to 
spectatorship, with a high-brow audience of connoisseurs. In fact, this isn’t the 
case but as we shall see Harman has engaged on more than one occasion with 
Greenberg and Fried. He has used them to define and clarify his own position, 
therefore this relation is one worth examining in more detail. 
 
 
Modernism and The Spectator 
 
‘Who is this Spectator, also called Viewer, sometimes called the Observer, 
occasionally the Perceiver?’ (O’Doherty, 1976, p39 – 41)  
In Inside the White Cube Brian O’Doherty contextualises and questions the role 
of the spectator. At the time of writing (1976) he was primarily responding to 
Modernism and he critiques the architectural decisions that led to the existence 
of the white cube gallery space that we are so familiar with. (O’Doherty, 1976, 
p14) These white ideal spaces come with ‘some of the sanctity of the church, the 
formality of the courtroom, the mystique of the experimental laboratory joins 
with chic design to produce a unique chamber of esthetics.’ (O’Doherty, 1976 
p14) O’Doherty continues, parodying the sanctity of the space that inadvertently 
reifies any object within it, not just the art object. 
‘The outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed off. 
Walls are painted white. The ceiling becomes the source of light. The 
wooden floor is polished so that you click along clinically, or carpeted so 
that you pad soundlessly, resting the feet while the eyes have at the wall… 
…the firehose in a modern museum looks not like a firehouse but an 
esthetic conundrum.’ (O’Doherty, 1976, p15)  
This rarefied space, in which the (art) object is king would seem like the obvious 
place that an ontology of autonomous units with a withdrawn reality would be 
positioned. We might conflate the notion of an object with a withdrawn reality 
with a belief that each artwork has its own particularity, its own ‘aura.’ We only 
need read Walter Benjamin’s essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction to find a description of ‘aura’ that seems to fit with Harman’s Real 
Objects: ‘Withdrawn’ objects that can never be fully accessed no matter how 
they are approached, their autonomy resolutely defended by Harman from 
paraphrasing or reduction, from undermining or overmining.  (‘Harman, 2011b) 
Artworks existing autonomously,  
‘The definition of aura as ‘a unique manifestation of a remoteness, no 
matter how near it may be’ …The essence of remoteness is that it cannot 
be approached. Indeed, unapproachability is one of the chief qualities of 
the cultic image. By its very nature, it remains ‘remote no matter how 
near’.’ (Benjamin, 1936, p41) 
Harman acknowledges this perceived sympathy with Modernism in an article, 
Art without Relations, published in Art Review in September 2014: ‘In 
defending an art concerned with objects deeper than their relation to humans, it 





autonomy of the artwork.’ (Harman, 2014, p103) But this is not actually the case 
as we shall see, by following Harman as he distinguishes his position. 
 
The Real Object of Modern Painting – Heidegger, Greenberg  
Harman begins by establishing Greenberg’s position: ‘Greenberg is viewed as 
the champion of formalism, of artworks sealed off from their socio-political 
surroundings and even from the private intentions of the artist.’ (Harman, 
2014b, p251) And he praises Greenberg’s writing on many aspects, it often 
avoids the traps of some art criticism we saw in the previous chapter. Harman 
says formalism is useful in aesthetics as; ‘it preserves the artwork from being 
reduced to its biographical origins or its usefulness as propaganda for the 
favoured political views of the moment.’ (Harman, 2016, p151) 
It is widely known that Clement Greenberg argued for medium specificity, he 
believed that, in his own words,  
‘Each art had to determine through its own operations and works, the 
effects exclusive to itself. By doing so it would, to be sure, narrow its area 
of competence, but at the same time it would make its possession of that 
area all the more certain.’ (Greenberg, 1960, p1) 
Greenberg argues that the limit of a painting’s scope is its flatness and it should 
revel in that flatness, rather than trying for illusory depth. This was the triumph 
of Modernism over its forebears, concerned as they were with realism. In 
Greenberg’s words, 
‘Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, using art to 
conceal art; Modernism used art to call attention to art. The limitations 
that constitute the medium of painting—the flat surface, the shape of the 
support, the properties of the pigment—were treated by the old masters 
as negative factors that could be acknowledged only implicitly or 
indirectly. Under Modernism these same limitations came to be regarded 
as positive factors, and were acknowledged openly.’ (Greenberg, 1960, 
p2) 
In this article, Harman finds equivalence between Greenberg’s position and a 
Heideggerian one. He does this first by using Greenberg’s antipathy to 
academicism as reflecting a belief in the expanded potential of the medium, 
rather than simply the surface on which an image, i.e. the content of the 
painting, is added. 
‘Art avoids academicism when its content manages to reflect or embody 
the possibilities of its medium, rather than presenting content as an 
isolated figure whose ground or medium can be taken for granted.’ 
(Harman, 2014b, p260) 
He moves on from this, allying this belief in an invisible depth within a medium 
with Heidegger’s concept of art outlined in the latter’s essay ‘The Origin of the 





despite his concern with the flatness of the canvas, there is a sense in which 
Greenberg is primarily interested in depth: in making the invisible deep 
conditions of any medium somehow visible in the content of the art.’ (Harman, 
2014b, p260) 
Harman criticises Greenberg for the same thing we saw him criticise Heidegger 
for, (a criticism we expanded to include Isabella Graw); that the surface of a 
singular artwork according to Greenberg and Heidegger (and Graw) is 
irrelevant (says Harman.) 
‘For Greenberg as for Heidegger, the flat background is the same no 
matter what content is deployed to hint in its direction. In this respect 
both authors make the surface too shallow and the background too deep, 
with the artwork’s form conceived too holistically and its content too 
dismissively.’ (Harman, 2014, p105) 
For Harman what we see when we look at a painting, what he would call the 
‘sensual features’ of this individual art object, are what is most fundamental to 
it, not that it is an example of the practice of painting, but that it is ‘its own’ 
object, and what itself is a painting of. Harman is giving priority to what is in 
front of him. In his words: ‘The problem with modernist theory was not that it 
decontextualised art and made it too autonomous, but that it rooted autonomy 
in the features of the medium rather than the internal fascinations of content 
itself.’ (Harman, 2014, p104) 
 
Michael Fried 
So, it is not the medium specificity that Harman holds as being key to the 
artwork, but we might wonder if it is possible to align OOO with another tenet of 
Modernism; the autonomy of the artwork? That is, an artwork freed from the 
associations and contextualisation of Postmodernist readings. Within 
Modernism, this is a position best exemplified by Michael Fried in his essay Art 
and Objecthood. In this text Fried argued against what he saw as art’s drift from 
objecthood to fluid artworks that were activated by the viewer, containing a 
form of user-generated content. (Jackson, 2011, p137) He lay the blame for this 
drift at the feet of Minimalist Art, which he described as being tainted by 
theatricality. By theatricality he meant it was activated or completed by the 
viewer’s presence: 
‘I want to call attention to the utter pervasiveness – the virtual 
universality – of the sensibility or node of being that I have characterised 
as corrupted or perverted by theatre. We are all literalists most or all of 
our lives. Presentness is grace.’ (Fried, 1967, p168) 
His position in neatly summarised by Robert Jackson as such; 
‘Meaning and reception is not to be found within the Minimalist work 
itself, but instead the work operates for the beholder’s circumstance. The 
work can only function for beholders and is only constructed with 





like a gap in a system needing to be filled, so that the aesthetic effect can 
properly function. The inclusion of the beholder’s experience processing 
the artwork is integral to the artworks expression. In contrast, Fried 
champions artworks which fundamentally ‘ignore’ the role of the 
beholder.’ (Jackson, 2011, p141) 
Jackson has tried with some success in a pair of articles for Speculations journal 
to synthesise Fried into OOO and vice versa. Using Art and Objecthood 
alongside other writings by Fried, Jackson claims: ‘It is my conviction that 
Harman’s object-oriented philosophy provides the metaphysics adequate to 
Fried’s criticism and, conversely, that Harman’s philosophy warrants a 
radicalised Friedian approach to art.’ (Jackson, 2014, p348) 
As noted, this is where we would expect to find the OOO artwork. Jackson’s take 
on Fried states that the viewer’s absorption by the work is not equivalent to the 
nullification of the spectator, as it asserts the primacy of the object. 
‘For Fried, the aesthetic encounter is defined by critically showing how 
the beholder’s representation of the work trumps its material basis, its 
thingliness. As soon as either the material basis of the work itself or the 
beholder’s presence is deliberately made explicit (that is, the work is no 
longer needed and becomes contingent purely on the beholder to exist), 
theatricality ensues and absorption is cut short.’ (Jackson, 2014, p349) 
So, for Fried and Jackson, when the theatricality of the artwork encounter is 
manifest, engagement with the artwork is lost. But when the viewer is absorbed 
by the artwork they ‘forget themselves.’ This is a misreading of Harman as we 
see below, as it is the very theatricality of the encounter that makes it absorbing, 
with the viewer performing a theatrical act of mimesis, (Harman, 2016, p249) 
and the spectator needing to be self-aware that they are viewing art (Harman, 
2016, p249). 13 
Harman deals directly with Fried and according to Harman, Fried has misread 
the encounter between the spectator and the artwork. It is not about what the 
artwork can do for the viewer but what an artwork / viewer combination can do 
for the viewer. He acknowledges and disputes Fried’s position in Art and 
Objecthood.  
‘Fried was right to call for an art without literalism, but wrong to see the 
human as solely a literalising agent. While the artwork must have a depth 
beyond how it is encountered by the spectator, the human is less a 
spectator than a co-constituent of the artwork itself, since nonfascinating 
art simply fails in a way that nonfascinating science does not.’ (Harman, 
2014, p101) 
                                                          
13 I have some sympathy for Jackson as Harman is continually redefining his position, extrapolating and - 
perhaps -disassembling as he goes. Extorting others to continue his work. (‘Harman, 2011b). This is 
actually something that Jackson refers to in his own text, If Materialism is Not the Solution Then What 
Was the Problem?, ‘Navigating any contemporary philosophical system is hard, as it is navigating a new 
computer language or cityscape. No-one really knows what it can do, at least not without 






The Postmodern Spectator 
So, by adopting a position contra Fried and allying himself with what the viewer 
finds in the art object it would seem Harman is endorsing the route of 
postmodernism, itself borne out of minimalism. Adopting the position of the 
viewer that Michael Fried bemoaned; a self-conscious spectator aware of and 
analysing their relationship to the artwork whilst looking at it. 
But the ‘relational’ aspect of Postmodern art in which artist and spectator 
collaborate in an art situation of indeterminate length (Bishop, 2012, p3) is 
similarly rejected by Harman as it adds a layer that further distracts.  As he says, 
‘The supposedly isolated physical object that we encounter is not isolated 
at all, since, after all, we are encountering it. It already belongs in a 
relational context with me, the perceiver. In short, this supposedly 
isolated object is always already over-contextualised through it relation 
to me, and hence it is overkill to seek even more context by going outside 
that object to find an even broader framing mechanism that ultimately 
includes the gallery system, or capitalism, or some other even more 
massive context… The real frame is what lies in the thing, deeper than 
any possible direct access to it, so that the thing can only be approached 
obliquely.’ (Harman, 2015, p105) 
Reassuringly, we can say he agrees with us that each artwork generates its own 
singular echo, and that contextualising it quiets, muffles or silences that echo. 
Harman is strident in his insistence on the role of the spectator, in his words the 
artwork ‘needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, not on the basis of the 
false principle that human beings and objects must be purified from each other 
in order for art to be art.’ (Harman, 2016, p216) 
 
An Object Oriented Spectator 
To return to the Cox and Haskey interview, the most interesting part of 
Harman’s responses is not regards where the spectator is, or if artworks exist 
with or without a viewer, but his take on what actually happens when we look at 
artwork, founded on his idiosyncratic take on mimesis. He says; 
‘Though mimesis usually is taken to mean producing a copy of a real 
world outside the mind, my philosophy suggests that this will never be 
possible. But what if instead of producing a copy, mimesis meant that we 
ourselves tried to become an object other than ourselves, as if intellectual 
life were simply a giant school of method acting’ (Harman, 2015, p110) 
As this notion is so crucial to this thesis I want to quote him at length here, this 
is taken from a conference speech he gave at MACBA, Barcelona in March 2012;
  
“My philosophy is a realism in which reality by definition is completely 





are uncanny and can only flicker from the depths of the night like ghosts, 
without ever becoming present in the daylight. I’ve claimed that reality 
can only ever be known obliquely, indirectly, elusively, but today´s 
discussion suggests that when we do this we are not just hinting at 
something that lies outside us but actually imitating or mimicking or 
embodying a reality that never becomes present, by becoming a new 
thing and taking on its array of qualities. The usual distance from the 
world that we have in normal everyday language and perception is ended 
by our sincere involvement in some artwork or joke or unusually vivid 
mood and we become that thing. Instead of hopelessly burrowing toward 
unknown things beyond our grasp we produce translations of those 
things for which we ourselves provide the reality principle. I become the 
burning tree or I become the dance.” (Harman, 2012c) 
So, what is happening is that the viewer and artwork are combining in one 
object, as the viewer is trying to mimetically capture the qualities of what it is 
they are seeing. Elsewhere Harman has been clear that ‘my interaction with 
express trains or roses forms an object, an immediate unity between me and the 
object perceived.’ (Harman, 2005, p201-2) The combination of these two 
statements means that we can deduce that the ‘mimicking-spectator forms a 
union with the artwork creating a third object.  
The notion of a ‘beholder’ is fallacious as that separates the viewer from the 
artwork when they are actually one and the same thing, you can’t have one 
without the other. This is where Fried (and ergo Jackson) were mistaken. 
‘This is the reason we can’t accept Fried’s simultaneous rejection of the 
literal and the theatrical. It amounts to excluding in the same stroke both 
human-as-beholder and human-as-ingredient from the proper sphere of 
aesthetics.’ (Harman, 2016, p222) 
Harman doesn’t reject the term theatrical as his form of mimesis is a theatrical 
gesture on by the viewer. Harman understands the theatrical as being 
performative and the viewer must take up a performative role when 
encountering an artwork. They play a part within the artwork, as the artwork 
must include the encounter between viewer and object. (Harman, 2016, p224) 
This finding resonates, as an echo does. Furthermore, as an echo is something 
we can be inside, the aptness of this term is underlined. We can now think that 
the singular echo of the artwork is the object, the encounter and what is 
produced by it, in and by the spectator. 
So, to reiterate the spectator forms a third object with the artwork. The 
spectator has not been eliminated but immersed in this new object. We could 
say that the modernistic perspective on spectatorship sides with the artwork, 
that then absorbs the viewer. The post-modernistic or relational perspective 
sides with the viewer, activating the artwork. The OOO perspective gives both 
equal footing, artwork and viewer are joined by the encounter in a new object, 





This immersion is key to understanding the four encounters we isolated as key 
in the introduction to this thesis, and what O’Sullivan doesn’t include in his 
discussion of them, that the encounter-er is immersed in whatever they are in 
encountering. 
We can now think through this by returning to Harman’s philosophy, firstly 
with his work on Ortega y Gasset and secondly with his concept Vicarious 
Causation 
 
Jose Ortega y Gasset and Metaphor 
Harman acknowledges the role and influence of Spanish philosopher Ortega y 
Gasset in the inspiration and formation of his ontology, specifically an essay 
written as introduction to a collection of poetry in 1914.  There isn’t space in this 
thesis to include detail analysis of this essay, instead it is included in Appendix 
One, part iii.  
The thrust of Ortega y Gasset’s chooses the following metaphor,  
The thrust of this essay is that the metaphor, (taken from a poem by Valencian 
poet Lopez Pico,): ‘A cypress ‘is like the ghost of a dead flame,’ has forced us into 
the state of ‘cypress’, we have made it into an action, a verb, we cypress. 
‘In other words, I will have to find a way to force the word ‘cypress,’ with 
its nominal value, to become active and erupt, assuming that of a verb… 
…We simply sense an identity, we live executantly this being, the cypress-
flame.’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p144-145) 
Harman endorses fully Ortega y Gasset’s account of metaphor and he would 
present this new object formed by the metaphor as part of his ontology. This is 
the third object of the artwork encounter. He has also rethought this encounter. 
Writing in his most recent book, Dante’s Broken Hammer, an OOO analysis of 
Dante’s Inferno, Harman returns to the Ortega y Gasset text on the Metaphor 
that has been so influential to his philosophy, going further this time to say:
  
‘And this brings us to a point that I did not yet grasp at the time of 
Guerrilla Metaphysics. Namely, in the case of metaphor it is not a 
combination of the real cypress and the sensual flame-qualities, since the 
real cypress is necessarily absent from the scene… 
Since the real cypress cannot be on hand to mate with the sensual flame-
qualities, this falls to the only real object on the scene: I myself.’ 
(Harman, 2016, p193) 
That is to say it is not the poet or reader producing the metaphor but actually 
becoming it, underlining that this is what the third object, the object of the 






What is fundamental here in the development of his ontology, is how the initial 
flame and cypress of the metaphor have become separated from their qualities. 
It is important to remember that the original metaphorical tree and flame are 
objects in Harman’s schema so analysis of how they might shift in appearance 
and form is valid, and therefore any patterns distinguished here between these 
objects are transferable to the relations between what we might consider ‘more 
real’ objects. The two originators of our flame-cypress feeling have been 
disassembled to create our new object. The bond that existed between the real 
thing and the way it manifests to us, its sensual qualities, has been fractured, 
this provides the structure of the relation ‘allure’ from Chapter One. Harman 
believes the structure of allure, (itself taken from what Harman calls aesthetic 
experience,) gives us a clue into the metaphysical reality of the world. Which, to 
reiterate, is normally in a state of ‘sincerity’. 14 
Although metaphor is an exemplar of allure, allure doesn’t only operate in 
metaphor, humour, beauty, charm, cuteness are all forms of allure according to 
Harman, in which we become more aware of the qualities of something rather 
than the object itself. This awareness of that thing, our (sometimes literal) 
attachment to it, creates a new object, a third object, on the interior of which is 
our intention and that which attracted us. Our intentionally has become its own 
object, containing parts of us, the Real Object, and whatever it is we are 
beholding. This new object must be approached like all other objects in 
Harman’s ontology and described obliquely. 
This is why Harman says an artwork needs an attentive viewer as without this 
there is no intentionality and no spectating. And Harman has used this 
‘aesthetic’ experience, to explain how all these withdrawn objects interact within 
his philosophy. Harman believes that ‘real-world’ causation follows an aesthetic 
template which he sees as paradigmatic of change at large, therefore he claims 
philosophy is first aesthetics as it operates as aesthetics does. (Harman, 2012) 
We will examine this in more detail below. 
 
Vicarious Causation 
As we saw in the conclusion to Chapter One in developing his metaphysics 
Harman encountered a problem: How can one Real Object affect another. 
Working through Harman’s take on spectatorship and the metaphor we have 
discovered the template he developed to account for change, it has to be 
addressed obliquely as he says: ‘We cannot know the world directly, whether 
through undermining, overmining, or duomining, but must approach it 
obliquely in the manner of Socrates or Picasso.’ (Harman, 2013b, p48) 
He uses the aesthetic encounter or the metaphor of Ortega y Gasset as 
analogous processes and he coins the term Vicarious Causation as his term for 
this oblique approach. We can now hypothesise how this might operate in a 
non-aesthetic meeting. 
                                                          





One Real Object can only encounter another Real Object via its Sensual profile, 
that is to say ‘vicariously.’ So, if we imagine Harman in a forest wandering 
amongst the trees, they would all be Sensual versions of the Real trees that were 
withdrawn. But, were Harman to make contact with the tree and snap a branch 
off of it he would be touching the Sensual Object but the branch would also be 
lost from the real object. Somehow, the Sensual Object tree is the means by 
which the Real Harman is able to touch the Real Tree. The Sensual Object of the 
tree becomes the meeting between two Real Objects; the third object within 
which they meet, the object of the encounter. As he has it, 
‘To say that formal cause operates vicariously means that forms do not 
touch one another directly, but somehow melt, fuse, and decompress in a 
shared common space from which all are partly absent. My claim is that 
two entities influence one another only be meeting on the interior of a 
third, where they exist side-by-side until something happens that allows 
them to interact.’ (Harman, 2007b, p190) 
This reiterates what we have just learnt when analysing Harman on 
spectatorship, furthermore the space where this takes place is also an object: 
The key to vicarious causation is that relations themselves are also objects, 
composed of the same four profiles as anything else. So, when a real object 
encounters the sensual profile of another, this is within another object: the third 
object, ‘Two vicariously linked real objects do form a new object, since they 
generate a new internal space.’ (Harman, 2007b, p207) 
Sparrow introduces the notion of translation as a way of understanding this, 
‘Harman’s solution is to say that objects only ever make aesthetic contact. 
Their interactions are always a product of translation or metaphor. 
Morton concurs: translation is a superior way to think what causality is 
all about.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p167) 
As we took our notion of the ‘singular echo’ from the literature of translation, I 
think we can double down on this notion of it being a process analogous to 
translation. So, when we read a text in another language, say Spanish, as we 
translate it in our heads into English we become the phrase that we are creating, 
it contains elements of us and our understanding of the two languages and 
obviously, (assuming we’ve translated it correctly,) the meaning of the original 
text as well. Furthermore, people often say they are someone else when 
speaking in other languages and this bears thinking about when considering the 
new object that is created during the process.  
And we have the third object that needs analysing, that contains parts of both 
objects, in our case the artwork and the viewer.  
‘This new object is the result of a vicarious relation whose existence 
remains unexplained, but whose reality is undeniable. The new object has 
both phenomenal and metaphysical aspects, neither of which can be 
ignored by philosophy.’ (Sparrow, 2014, p132) 





‘At the heart of every intention is a relation between a real object (me) 
and a sensual one (whatever I intend). Two real objects cannot make 
contact directly, given their total withdrawal from each other. Likewise, 
two sensual objects can make contact only through the medium of the 
beholder, since both have no existence except as correlates of my own 
involvement with them… the only kinds of objects able to make direct 
contact are those of opposite polarity, the real and the sensual. It follows 
that the links that hold the world together make up a chain of alternating 
real and sensual objects. Yet at the same time, the intentional act is also 
one, since I form a composite union with what I intend, just as two 
magnets snap into one, or multiple chemical elements form a molecule.’ 
(Harman, 2016, p247) 
This intentional act is the third object, a composite of, in the case of this thesis, 
spectator and artwork. 
Elizabeth Povinelli summarises Harman neatly in an essay, The World is Flat 
and Other Super Weird Ideas, 
‘Although we cannot know objects and thus reality, and trying to know 
them reproduces the correlational fallacy, we can know that they are 
objects because… we can encounter the truth of the theory through 
aesthetic experience… Because the human-world relation does not 
fundamentally differ from other object relations, all object relations are 
aesthetic relations. Thus not only are all existents (objects) made to be 
the same kind of things, but all relations between objects are also the 
same.’ (Povinelli, 2016, p109) 
To give one final example, in his book Dante’s Broken Hammer, Harman 
analyses Dante’s The Divine Comedy in combination with phenomenologist 
Max Scheler, Harman uses the concept of love as another metaphor for the third 
object which can help us visualise it. (Harman, 2016, p168 – 173). 
If we think of our love for someone, then this love is an object in its own right, 
containing us and qualities of the beloved. The reverse would also be true, the 
Love that someone has for us contains them and qualities of us.  
‘the lover and the beloved (in ethics as in art) as a single unit irreducible 
to either term, or to a mere side-by-side existence of both.’ (Harman, 
2016, p215) 
To return to the terms of Harman’s ontology, the lover is the real object, the 
beloved the sensual object, both of which are joined with the third object, which 
is the love of the real object for the beloved.  
 
Conclusion 
We have learnt that despite what we might expect, without a viewer there is no 
artwork. But conversely, without an artwork there is no viewer. The OOO 





engage them. Once these two components are in place then both spectator and 
artwork are joined together inside a third object. The spectator is the Real 
Object, entangled by the Sensual Qualities that have appealed to them.   
The lover is bewitched by their beloved, inside the third object that is their 
attachment thinking about what so attracted them. The viewer is staring at the 
painting trying to become its diagonal composition in the third object that is the 
artwork encounter. 
So, we now know that for Harman the act of viewing an artwork results in a 
viewer imitating the artwork inside an object that is this event we have called 
the third object after Harman. I believe this third object is the key to 
understanding spectating, and the singular echo that art writing misses. It is 
clear that to describe it we must describe the spectator as well as the artwork, 
which means some of ourselves, as that is within the third object. We explore 
this in more depth in the next chapter; like all objects in Harman’s ontology, the 






























Having reached the conclusion in the previous chapter that the viewer and 
artwork are fused together into a third object, the conclusion must be that it is 
through a description of this that we will be closest to describing the singular 
echo. In this chapter I will provide a means of describing it. We will see that by 
following Harman this means responding obliquely, and this means 
aesthetically. Ekphrasis is the practice of responding with aesthetic writing to 
artwork, most often this means poetry and I work through Stephen Cheeke on 
this subject. I find traditional ekphrasis lacking as it tends to concentrate on 
what it is looking at, so to speak, and not on the artwork encounter that we have 
decided we must focus on. In terms of describing this encounter / third object I 
extrapolate potential methods based on the following sub-categories: metaphor, 
personal narrative, abstraction, intimacy before an extended section 
incorporating comparisons between science-fiction and abstraction. I end by 
tentatively outlining an ethics inherent in a third object worldview.  
 
Introduction 
As we have seen through the last chapter in Harman’s take on spectatorship we 
are inside a third object when encountering an artwork. In doing so we have 
filled the gap in his ontology15 and explained in more detail how he accounts for 
change. In terms of the artwork we have the viewer meeting the artwork inside 
the third object, trying to become their own representation of it, a personal 
experience. As Harman says, 
‘I have argued, against Fried, that this requires the beholder to replace 
the vanished object of aesthetics with its own theatrical assumption of the 
object’s role, as if wearing a mask that need not be seen by others, but 
only by oneself.’ (Harman, 2016, p249) 
So, the beholder is activating the artwork in their own head, underlining that 
the viewing of an artwork is an event in itself; the creation of the third object. 
This fits our own terminology of the singular echo as like the third object, the 
echo is something that the viewer is inside. Therefore, we are left with the 
artwork encounter being as much about the third object created as it is about 
the artwork. This is how we capture the singular echo and, in my view, it is 
                                                          
15 The other gap or question most often asked of this factor of his ontology is regards infinite regression, 
that is if contact with an object leads to another object then the contact between that newly created 
object and another object would again lead to another object. Harman’s response is to say that if you 
don’t have this you either have finite regression; there is point at which we have said we’ve reached the 
‘truth’ or no regression at all, and in everything is present always, in a state of immanence. (Harman, 





fascinating. It is a weird combination of the particularity of artwork and duality 
of the encounter. 
Now we should return to the questions that inaugurated this study, the 
encounters that I wanted to analyse, 
1.  The encountering of something (stimuli) I think should be painted 
2.  The act of making a painting of that stimuli 
3.  The encounter with an artwork (spectating) 
4.  Writing a text about an artwork 
 
Numbered here we can think of Encounter 2 being reliant on Encounter 1 and 
likewise Encounter 4 relying on Encounter 3.  
 
What is interesting if we think through these encounters following Harman’s 
philosophy then it is within a third object that these encounters take place. This 
leads me to ask what if encounter 2 was about making a painting of the third 
object in which encounter 1 took place? And equally what if encounter 4 was 
about writing a text about the object in which encounter 3 took place? 
 
Harman and the Third Object 
To return to the brief description of my practice I gave in the introduction, it 
would be relevant to address this is Harmanesque language. When I encounter 
something that I want to paint, and as I said this could be hearing a phrase or 
seeing a pile of card on a table or noticing the composition in a painting by 
someone else, I and this object are enclosed in a third object. If we were to 
imagine myself looking at the table; I, as Real Object, am encountering the card, 
(the Sensual Object.) Because of the way this card is lain across the table, a 
painting is suggested to me. This relation between Real Object, (me,) and 
Sensual Object, (card,) would normally be classed as a sincere16 one and if 
reflected on by me, this reflection becomes an object in its own right. But were I 
to try and explain that encounter in words, it would be impossible to paraphrase 
as the Real Object that is this encounter withdraws from access. Nevertheless, I 
and the Sensual Qualities of the card that attracted me are enclosed in a third 
object, the relationship between us charged by the process Harman designates 
as allure. 
And when I start to paint the pile of card I am not trying to paint it photo-
realistically or perhaps not even interested in making it apparent that it is card. 
I am not trying to paint the card so much as trying to paint the desire to try and 
paint the card, to capture the moment of fascination with it, when I saw it as 
something more than a pile of card. So, the notion that I am actually trying to 
paint the object I was in when I encountered the card, or whatever stimuli I am 
studying makes sense to me. 
 
Abstraction, both visually, (in terms of what I am representing) and 
conceptually, (in terms of painting about a sensation) is an important factor in 
the process of my painting practice. Though I may start with an encounter with 
                                                          





the kind of recognisable object, I want to take it somewhere unrecognisable, 
though still recognisably ‘real’. Simultaneously of this world but otherworldly. 
Abstraction is an important strategy for me, but as we have seen with Amy 
Sillman quote, abstraction doesn’t mean foregoing representation. In her words, 
 
‘I also think that you have to believe that when you’re making private, 
poetic work, you are not doing something different from the world, you’re 
in fact finally, if you get it right, making something that is realistic to the 
world, even if it’s abstract. Because that represents the world accurately. 
And that world can be an inner world. For instance, in my it is a realistic 
representation of thinking.’ (Sillman, 2007, p27)17 
 
The Singular Echo 
If we were to think about the task of writing about painting in the same way as 
painting, we see that it must be the object that is the encounter that must be our 
focus. The singular echo of the artwork turns out to be the encounter with the 
artwork. As noted this makes sense as an echo is something you can be inside, it 
surrounds you, it is an event like the artwork encounter. So, it is not the artwork 
itself that should be written about in this case, following the example set by my 
painting practice, containing both object and viewer. The viewer becomes the 
painting, or at least in their heads, providing the ‘reality principle.’ 
As I have shown, this third object is a composite of both myself as spectator 
providing the ‘reality principle’, activating the work, and the sensual qualities 
that drew them to the artwork and consequently formed this painting–spectator 
hybrid, that is the third object.  
‘In the case of aesthetics, the shift to the real happens when the sensual 
object and its qualities are split, and the beholder becomes the theatrical 
support for those qualities, as in metaphor; when this split fails to occur, 
the result is non-art.’ (Harman, 2016, p248)  
In the case of spectatorship, we know that it involves the viewer (as real object) 
looking at the artwork. They are joined by the sensual qualities of the art object 
that have bewitched the viewer, attached to the viewer as the cypress-flame 
metaphor did, as the viewer somehow imitates the art object.18 
We will also avoid undermining, overmining and duomining as we aren’t trying 
to describe the painting directly, as we will fail for the reasons seen in Chapter 
Two, instead we are describing the encounter, the sensual echo, which as an 
attentive spectator we are a fundamental ingredient.  
We can find support from Susan Sontag in reaching these conclusions. We can 
return to part of a citation in Chapter Two that emphasises the experiential 
                                                          
17 We don’t need to limit our approach to abstract work, but it might seem the more obvious place for 
it. Abstraction has another significance for this study as we shall see later in the chapter. 
18 In the next chapter I give the tarnished silver leaf of the painting The Battle of San Romano as 





nature of the artwork encounter: ‘A work of art encountered as a work of art is 
an experience.’ (Sontag, 1965 p21) 
She continues in a manner that Harman would mirror forty years later. She 
claims that works of art: 
‘Present information and evaluations. But their distinctive feature is that 
they give rise not to conceptual knowledge (which is the distinctive 
feature of discursive or scientific knowledge- e.g., philosophy, sociology, 
psychology, history) but to something like an excitation, a phenomenon 
of commitment, judgement in a state of thraldom or captivation. Which is 
to say that the knowledge we gain through art is an experience of the 
form or style of knowing something, rather than a knowledge of 
something (like a fact or a moral judgement) in itself.’ (Sontag, 1965, p21 
– 22) 
Here, as Harman does, she is saying that the knowledge created by art is unique, 
but also her phrase ‘an experience of the form or style of knowing something, 
rather than a knowledge of something’ we can read as explaining that the 
artwork encounter is like Harman’s take on mimesis about the encountering of 
something as something but that it is an active, participatory experience: what I 
am painting about is the experience of wanting to paint not what is being 
represented. But this also means we can think of Encounter 1 in my list as being 
a quasi-artwork encounter, even if it is not an artwork acting as stimuli. If non-
art objects also omit the singular echo this has political implications that form 
the embryo of the ethics I will outline at the end of this chapter. 
Sontag continues in a manner that seems to pre-empt Harman’s insistence on 
an attentive spectator. 
‘…Hence, too, the peculiar dependence of a work of art, however 
expressive, upon the cooperation of the person having the experience, for 
one may see what is ‘said’ but remain unmoved, either through dullness 
or distraction. Art is seduction, not rape. A work of art proposes a type of 
experience designed to manifest the quality of imperiousness. But art 
cannot seduce without the complicity of the experiencing subject.’ 
(Sontag, 1965, p22)  
I think that we can see in Sontag that Harman has identified an area of interest 
within the study of spectatorship, that of the encounter of the third object. I 
believe that this is key for thinking about how we should write about painting. 
But now we have theoretically posited that the third object exists and have 
decided that it is here we want to direct our attention, we reach a conclusion. If 
we keep strictly to Harman, and his tenet that objects can only be approached 
obliquely, then the closest we can get to the executant reality inside of the third 
object is by responding to it aesthetically. (Using Harman’s definition of 
aesthetic, this means with an artwork.) 
And in advocating the aesthetic as the best response to the aesthetic we find 






In Writing for Art: The Aesthetics of Ekphrasis Stephen Cheeke provides a 
useful overview of Ekphrasis that we will examine in a little depth. It starts 
following Foucault’s notion of irreducibility and the quote I used in the 
introduction, it sets out the gap between the literary and visual. 
‘Critical writing everywhere also sounds the warning: how can poetry 
hope to represent, describe or reproduce painting? How can literary 
language find a parallel or an analogy with art? How could we conceive of 
a poet being successful in his or her attempt to write about visual 
representation?’ (Cheeke, 2008, p1) 
And Cheeke is an advocate for the critical capabilities of an aesthetic response. 
He and Harman would be in accordance on that; ‘The best poems for paintings 
are themselves works of art, offering a commentary upon or an interpretation of 
an artwork that is simultaneously open to interpretation or appreciation as an 
artwork in its own right.’ (Cheeke, 2008, p3) 
But the examples of ekphrasis he gives aren’t for the artwork encounter, they are 
for the artwork itself. We do not just want ‘the verbal representation of visual 
representation’ (Cheeke, 2008, p4) but the verbal representation of visual 
experience. That is, we want a verbal representation of the experience, the 
event, the encounter of viewing the painting, not just a description of whatever 
the painting is depicting. 
Cheeke’s analysis is founded on Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s distinction in 
Laocoon, in painting being a spatial form and poetry a temporal one: ‘Poetry 
opens up the static image to the temporal schema of language to the ‘sequential 
elements of syntax.’ ‘ (Cheeke, 2008, p5) Keats ‘Ode to a Grecian Urn’ leads 
Cheeke to elucidate three paradoxes that operate in the poem/painting binary. 
Silence/speech, stillness/movement, time/eternity. (Cheeke, 2008, p46) He 
calls the moment of the painting the ‘for ever now’ the frozen moment: ‘The 
single moment or ‘now’, which presents no conceptual difficulty in a painting, is 
actually impossible to grasp in normal time.’ (Cheeke, 2008, p 61) And a lot of 
ekphrasistic poetry seeks to add ‘time’ to paintings: ‘Poems about paintings 
often seek to revive or reanimate the sequence’ (Cheeke, 2008, p61) 
In a later chapter on prose ekphrasis we find reference to The Museum Age by 
Germain Bazin that ‘the act of looking becomes a sort of trance uniting spectator 
and masterpiece.’ (Bazin, 1967, p265) Which sounds like a Harmanesque take 
on Spectatorship and then this leads Cheeke to conclude; 
‘Then the representation of that trance in art criticism requires a 
secondary form of verbal mystification for the reader to be able to 
participate in the original experience. 
The powerful prose description that seeks to reproduce this kind of 
experience in a reader might be represented as working then as a form of 
incantation or evocatory magic that replaces or stands in for the 





correct aesthetic response while mystifying the art object itself.’ (Cheeke, 
2008, p171) 
Which is a conclusion that would mirror the third object encounter, 
‘A prose description of especial potency like this is capable then of 
reorganizing the visual image so that we can no longer see what was there 
before it was written. The process recalls the ‘incessant conjunctioning 
between things as they are and things imagined’, which Stevens had 
argued was a common truth about all acts of perception.’ (Cheeke, 2008, 
p177) 
And this conjunctioning between things as they are would be the Real Object 
and things imagined, the Sensual Qualities. This leads to Cheeke finding a 
creative capability within mimesis as Harman did; ‘Ekphrasis then is an 
example both of the creative act itself – through the Greek mimesis, imitating, 
copying – and of the secondary critical act of commentary, description, 
revelation.’ (Cheeke, 2008, p185) We find this synthesis only through stretching 
Cheeke’s meaning to its limits, if we push his account of ekphrasis to say more 
about how the encounter might be written about.  
In an earlier chapter exploring the relationship of photography to ekphrasis he 
refers to Don DeLillo’s novel Mao II, in a chapter. But what he doesn’t draw 
attention to in DeLillo's novel is when Scott, (a character in the novel and 
acolyte of writer Bill Gray [the protagonist of the novel,]) says the following;  
‘When I read Bill I think of photographs of tract houses at the edge of the 
desert. There’s an incidental menace. That great Winogrand photo of a 
small child at the head of a driveway and the fallen tricycle and the storm 
shadow on the bare hills.’ (DeLillo, 1991, p51) 
Which is what excited me when I read the novel, this reference to the world 
conjured by the artwork but not deliberately spelt out. So, what is happening to 
Scott when he reads these novels is he is entering the world of Winogrand 
photography that though isn’t the subject of the novels it is how they feel, what 
they are evocative of. This is the third object of that novel for Scott. This line 
excited me as it seemed to mirror the way I believe successful artworks are 
encountered and experienced; they pick us up and place us in a new world. And 
it is this new world that I have found in Harman as the third object, and that I 
believe we should write about.  
Perhaps we can refer to the type of ekphrasis we are looking for as associative 
ekphrasis as it is what happens when the viewer associates with the artwork, 
both in the sense that it mingles with it within the third object but also because 
the third object also contains associations the attentive viewer brings with them.  
I think this is more akin to the ekphrasis of the artwork encounter, of the 
singular echo: An ekphrasis of the third object than the traditional topic 
explored in Cheeke’s book which is about a verbal description of whatever is 
depicted in the artwork, not least this denies Ekphrasis the potential of 





Speculative proposals for a method: Metaphor  
Perhaps we can look at some successful writing about painting for guidance. A 
very impressive writer on painting is the painter David Salle. The following is 
about painter Amy Sillman; 
‘Amy’s paintings, though populated with figures and figurative gestures, 
use the canvas as a workshop in which eccentrically shaped blocks of 
color are cobbled together in a kind of improvisational architecture, like 
memories of houses that you never actually lived in.’ (Salle, 2010, p173) 
 
The metaphorical final phrase of this quote is where it is most impressive. Salle 
risks that he might be misunderstood but the clarity of the simile means he is 
not. In Harmanesque language: The architectural structure within the Sillman 
painting has enmeshed Salle and he is imitating it in his mind, conjuring images 
of spaces he might have occupied. This is the singular echo of the painting, the 
third object he is inside.  This use of metaphorical language is a useful pointer of 
how we might write about the third object and as we are endorsing creative 




Speculative proposals for a method: Personal Narrative 
 
As a further example of employing metaphor or allegory, the following piece was 
written by the organiser of a Philip Guston exhibition, it utilises a personal story 
to give further depth to the encounter with his work: 
 
‘When I was a teenager, we lived on Reunion Island, off the coast of 
Madagascar, where my parents were missionaries. Walking in downtown 
St. Denis one afternoon, I heard sirens and saw smoke. The mosque was 
burning. The firefighters were in charge and there was nothing anyone 
else could do. Looking up, I saw men standing on balconies, facing the 
fire solemnly and quietly, holding open their copies of the Koran. This 
powerful and calm act struck me deeply. By holding open the holy book, 
these men were acting. Holding up the Koran could not stop the fire, but 
it inscribed this moment, putting it within a larger context. In some way 
it neutralized the destruction. 
 
The space between Guston’s late paintings and the viewer feels the same 
way. It is the courage that Guston demonstrates in and through these late 
transitional works that empowers them and moves the viewer to consider 
living more deeply. I have been no exception. The mundane is made holy. 
The flawed human is connected to the good. And the craziness that 
invades our lives is isolated and tamed because these paintings are true.’ 
 (Weber, 2000, p3) 
 
This use of a personal narrative like Salle’s use of metaphor is instructive. We 
can assert that this is what an oblique response to an artwork looks like, it is 
through the adoption of a storytelling or narrative form that the third object can 





my practical research. In the resultant texts I look to reflect the arrangement of 
intensities and moods I found within the artworks; its Sensual Qualities to use 
Harman’s terms, so that they might be read away from the artworks and allow 
the reader to re-enter the world of the encounter with the third object, to 
experience the singular echo of the artwork. 
 
Speculative proposals for a method: Abstraction 
If we think back to the list of things that John Hoyland gave as inspiring his 
work then anyone who knows his work will know that he isn’t a representational 
painter, he isn’t depicting these things, so he must be painting the experience of 
them. Hoyland also said about his work,  
‘Paintings are there to be experienced, they are events. They are also to be 
meditated on and to be enjoyed by the senses; to be felt through the eye. 
The way that they are perceived, as with nature, will be conditioned by 
the individual onlooker’s feelings, background and temperament. 
Paintings are not intellectual, they don’t describe events, don’t tell a 
story, they are not concerned with history, literature, science, theatre, 
mathematics, or movement; they are still. 
One discovers a painting as one might discover a forest with snow falling, 
and then suddenly, unexpectedly, come upon an open glade with sunlight 
penetrating the falling snow, simultaneously. 
Paintings are not to be reasoned with, they are not to be understood, they 
are to be recognized. They are an equivalent to nature, not an illustration 
of it; their test is in the depth of the artist’s imagination.’ (Hoyland, 1979)  
Within this framework I would argue that the only honest way that one can 
respond to this work is aesthetically. We are not adding narrative content to the 
painting but to the encounter. If Sillman is representing thinking in her painting 
(Sillman, 2007, p11) then we want texts that can represent as abstractly as she 
paints. 
 
Speculative proposals for a method: Intimacy 
I might further argue that one of the reasons that fiction is the most appropriate 
method of writing about painting is that I think the relationship between viewer 
and painting is an intimate one, as is the one between the reader and the novel.  
As Rebecca Solnit wrote in her essay Flight, 
‘Like many others who turned into writers, I disappeared into books 
when I was very young, disappeared into them like someone running into 
the woods… …Before writers are writers they are readers, living in books, 
through books, in the lives of others that are also the heads of others, in 





This is the singular echo of the book that the reader is living within. Therefore, 
perhaps fiction, more precisely the reading of it, is the best way of mirroring the 
singular echo of the painting. Within the same essay Solnit says the following, 
which neatly overlaps with Harman’s notion of the third object and 
spectatorship; 
‘The object we call a book is not the real book, but its potential, like a 
musical score or seed. It exists fully only in the act of being read; and its 
real home is inside the head of the reader, where the symphony resounds, 
the seed germinates.’ (Solnit, 2013, p63) 
The reader is in fact constantly performing ekphrasis by picturing the world 
they are reading, providing the reality principle to the world of the novel. They 
are the Real Object, in Harman’s words the reader is replacing the vanished 
object of aesthetics, as the Real Object has withdrawn. (Harman, 2016, p249)  
 
Science Fiction & Abstraction  
Within fiction, both speculative-fiction and science-fiction are particularly 
helpful and provide a cogent way to think through the third object. As our 
understanding of the third object was that it was akin to world creation, and as 
perhaps the most pronounced form of literary world creation Science Fiction 
should be a reference point; not only is a world evoked by the author, including, 
perhaps, different natural laws and technologies.19 
We can also see an instructive parallel between an abstract painting practice and 
a speculative fiction writing practice. If we return to Ortega y Gasset’s essay 
once again he addresses the subject of metaphor and as we have seen he 
articulates that he sees a metaphor as a microcosm of an artwork: 
‘I say the esthetic object and the metaphorical object are the same, or 
rather that metaphor is the elementary esthetic object, the beautiful cell.’ 
(Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p140) 
He means that the metaphor, in causing us to think different, to think as cypress 
as we saw in the last chapter, performs as an artwork but on a micro-level. And 
we can compare this with the following by canonical writer of science fiction 
Ursula K. Le Guin:  
‘The artist deals with what cannot be said in words.  
The artist whose medium is fiction does this in words. The novelist says 
in words what cannot be said in words.  
Words can be used thus paradoxically because they have, along with a 
semiotic usage, a symbolic or metaphorical usage…  
                                                          
19 There are doubtless links between Speculative Realism and Science Fiction to be further explored and 
within the last year Speculative Realism and Science Fiction by Brian Willems was published, (though not 






All fiction is metaphor. Science fiction is metaphor. What sets it apart 
from older forms of fiction seems to be its use of new metaphors, drawn 
from certain great dominants of our contemporary life - science, all the 
sciences, and technology, and the relativistic and historical outlook, 
among them. Space travel is one of these metaphors; so is an alternative 
society, an alternative biology; the future is another. The future, in 
function, is a metaphor.’ (Le Guin, 1969, xvi-xvii) 
We can see why. Artwork functions like a metaphor, so does the future in 
fiction, as indeed does fiction itself. Speculative Fiction like abstraction is 
expressing what we cannot articulate with ‘realism’ about what existence feels 
like, this is what writer Kim Stanley Robinson meant, when he said “the realism 
of our time is science-fiction” (Robinson, 2017) at a talk I saw in Barcelona. That 
science-fiction is closer to our everyday reality than the realism of literary 
fiction, and we can say the same about abstraction over the realism of a photo-
realistic painting. Abstract painter Alan Gouk says in an essay entitled The 
Language of Painting: 
‘Whatever it might be, there seems to be ‘something’ to abstraction, some 
innate knowledge of something yet to be understood. If there wasn’t then 
we (us abstract artists) wouldn’t be so captivated by the experience of 
making and looking.’ (Gouk, 2013) 
That which is yet to be understood by the painter, is functioning as the future in 
fiction does and feels more real to us. By the same equation, writing about the 
third object encounter of the artwork, metaphorically describing its singular 
echo, brings us closer to the artwork than writing about the artwork itself. 
Therefore, many of the third object texts written for the accompanying practical 
research, are what would be classed as speculative or science fiction; they are 
describing new worlds, different to our own, much as I think of my abstract 
paintings as doing. This follows my painting practice as I believe that the 
creation of the third object is a new ‘thing’ that needs to be encoded / decoded 
in the same way as science fiction and abstraction. To return to Simon O 
Sullivan, when he writes about Gerhard Richter’s abstracts, we find our 
conclusion mirrored almost exactly:  
‘Almost as if such art is a fragment of a future world projected backwards 
in order to call that world into being.’ (O’Sullivan, 2006 p145) 
Harman has provided a credible philosophical justification, a framework for 
thinking through the problem of writing about art. As hopefully indicated above, 
this framework can provide bountiful results. Of course, it can never be 
empirically verified as scientifically correct. Harman’s response to criticism of 
founding his philosophy on aesthetics, which he describes as generating ‘angry 
sarcasm from certain neo-rationalist philosophers’ (Harman, 2016, p178) is that 
though we can explain what something is or does, or both, and that this is how 
we attain knowledge, it doesn’t follow that such knowledge ‘exhausts the reality 





overmine or duomine our subject. An artwork does none of these as it 
approaches its subject obliquely.  
In the aforementioned essay by Elizabeth Povinelli she writes well about the 
appeal of OOO but is clear to also state that it requires a certain openness on the 
part of the viewer / reader / interlocutor to accept some of its tenets. She is 
talking about the three films by the Karrabing Film Collective, (of which she is 
part,) that although they contain a message or meaning and therefore could be 
read textually, they have an aesthetic content that allows them to allude to other 
truths. The quotation below emphasises that a certain level of faith is required 
from an adopter of this philosophy. 
‘But as these texts circulate through the world, they also produce an 
aesthetic experience (or let’s just say they do). They produce a sense 
experience of a purposiveness without purpose (or let’s just say there is)- 
an object that is simultaneously alluring to universal truth and alluding 
to any capture of its essence in thought (as categorical or relational 
truth). This may be due to how, in the various stories, the central object is 
obscured rather than revealed by its encounter with other objects 
(including discourses). The narratives do not to attempt to subsume their 
objects in a categorical concept or even a singular relational logic, but 
instead allude to an entire assemblage of attributes and qualities that are 
expressed and withdrawn, actual and emergent, when the object comes 
into contact with other objects.’ (Povinelli, 2016 p111) 
 
Ethics 
I want to conclude by situating my practice within an even wider context, 
looking for an ethical position within the intimacy of it. As previously noted with 
reference to Rebecca Solnit, one of the reasons that fiction is an appropriate 
method for writing about painting is that the relationship between viewer and 
painting is an intimate one. Fiction puts the spectator in the same frame of 
mind as when viewing a painting. In reading W.J.T. Mitchell, who has written 
about the power and agency of images in other contexts. I have found 
endorsement for this point in his essay the Intimacy of Abstraction. 
‘In this role, abstraction (especially when displayed outside the context of 
the blockbuster show) continues to be an absolute necessary antidote or 
counterspell to the aesthetics of distraction, the visual noise offered by 
mass media and everyday life.’ (Mitchell, 2006, p235) 
I also think that this hints towards the sympathy I believe exists between science 
fiction and abstraction, it is an otherness, the unreal, that offers disruption, 
whilst still being about reality. 
‘The sort of contemplative, concentrated seeing demanded by abstraction 
needn’t be associated with a regression to empathy, sentimentality, and 
(heaven forbid) private, bourgeois subjectivity. The democratizing of 





to a space of intimacy in which new collective and public subjectivities 
might be nurtured.’ (Mitchell, 2006, p236) 
This direction towards democratising spaces of personal abstraction is 
important and useful to consider here. And to think this further, I actually 
believe that the time taken over these small encounters can be adopted as an 
ethical approach in that they, in keeping with flat ontologies, encourage a 
conscientious approach to life. This kind of ethics is something that Jane 
Bennett has attempted to articulate within New Materialism. As Tom Sparrow 
write about Bennett: 
‘this kind of approach would involve a theoretical or critical modesty that 
parallels the ethical demand for modesty implicit in the object-oriented 
perspective, as she views it. After all, it seems that in addition to 
correlationism and the linguistic turn, public enemy number one for SR 
and OOO, as well as new materialism, is human hubris.’ (Sparrow, 2014, 
p177) 
And though Harman is critical of New Materialism Materialism is Not the 
Solution (Harman 2014c), I believe we can follow Jane Bennett in this; 
‘Texts are bodies that can light up, by rendering human perception more 
acute, those bodies whose favored vehicle of affectivity is less wordy: 
plants, animals, blades of grass, household objects, trash.’ (Bennet, 2015, 
p235)20 
Bennett, who has both contributed to and commented on, the ‘non-human’ turn 
in philosophy, advocates a ‘Vital Materialist’ approach. There are profound 
philosophical differences between her position and Harman’s; she situates these 
vital bodies within relational networks, that Harman wouldn’t recognise; he 
would see these networks as autonomous objects in their own right; and would 
emphasise that objects are more than their impact on others. (Harman 2014c) 
However, there are similarities in their respective philosophies. Bennett begins 
her book Vibrant Matter with a series of things that convinced her to pursue the 
topic and with a description of encountering some trash in Baltimore. Affected 
by it in the manner of a third object encounter;  
‘But they were all there just as they were, and so I caught a glimpse of an 
energetic vitality inside each of these things, things that I generally 
conceived as inert. In this assemblage, objects appeared as things, that is, 
as vivid entities not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) 
subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics. In my 
encounter with the gutter on Cold Spring Lane, I glimpsed a culture of 
things irreducible to the culture of objects. I achieved, for a moment, 
                                                          
20 As another literary comparison, Bennett’s text puts me in mind of Calvino’s Six Memos for the Next 
Millennium: ‘Think what it would be to have a work conceived from outside the self, a work that would 
let us escape the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to enter into selves like our own but 
to give speech to that which has no language, to the bird perching on the edge of the gutter, to the tree 





what Thoreau had made his life’s goal: to be able, as Thomas Dumm puts 
it, ‘to be surprised by what we see.’’ (Bennett, 2009, p5) 
And she mirrors Harman in suggesting that there is a new combined object / 
perceiver created in this interaction: ‘But what if the swarming activity inside 
my head was itself an instance of the vital materiality that also constituted 
trash?’ (Bennett, 2009, p10) 
Keen to refute claims that New Materialism could be endorsing objectification 
in a traditional sense, that is, that people or animals are nothing more than 
objects or goods, available to be instrumentalised as such, Bennett 
acknowledges that ‘there are of course differences between the knife that 
impales and the man impaled, between the technician who dabs the sampler 
and the sampler, between the array of items in the gutter of Cold Spring Lane 
and me, the narrator of their vitality.’ (Bennett, 2009, p9) But she advocates 
that we view these relationships as flat rather than hierarchical.21  
‘To note this fact explicitly, which is also to begin to experience the 
relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, 
is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility.’ (Bennett, 2009, 
p10)  
I concur that this is an important step to thinking more ecologically because, as 
Bennett says, ‘we are daily confronted with evidence of nonhuman vitalities 
actively at work around and within us.’ (Bennett, 2015, p234) 
And I think we can push Harman’s account so that we don’t privilege these 
experiences to art / certain objects. We think about the third object encounter 
that leads to a painting as being the same as the third object encounter with a 
non-art object. This is contra Harman who says;  
                                                          
21 There isn’t sufficient space in this thesis but if we wanted to look for further comparisons between 
painting and an Object-Oriented or New Materialism position we might look at some of the scholarship 
of still life painting. Itself originally the lowest in the hierarchy of genres, (Bryson, 1990) still-life adopts a 
non-hierarchical relationship between things. Norman Bryson writes very well about the genre of Still 
Life in Looking at the Overlooked (1990) and uses the term Rhopography borrowed from Charles 
Sterling; ‘Rhopography (from rhopos, trivial objects, small wares, trifles) is the depiction of things which 
lack importance, the unassuming material base of life that ‘importance’ constantly overlooks.’ (Bryson, 
1990, p61) 
I think we can describe Object philosophy or New Materialism as a rhopographical venture, like still life 
it forces us to attend to that which might be ignored 
‘Still life takes on the exploration of what ‘importance’ tramples underfoot. It attends to the 
world ignored by the human impulse to create greatness. Its assault on the prestige of the 





‘If all relations were equally significant, then every entity would become a 
new thing in every trivial instant of its existence, since our relations with 
objects are ever on the move.’ (Harman, 2016b, p44)22 
So, I’m pushing beyond Harman here, but, I think legitimately.  Why shouldn’t 
every entity be a new thing in every trivial instant? Tristan Garcia takes this 
perspective. We can understand ‘third object thinking´ as a state of mind that 
allows us to experience the work or world as such and we can push ourselves to 
apply this state of mind to our whole existence; a template for more 
conscientious ecological approach.23  
If we return to Sontag’s On Style we find further endorsement of the art 
encounter as an educational exercise; ‘The overcoming or transcending of the 
world in art is also a way of encountering the world, and of training or educating 
the will to be in the world.’ (Sontag, 1965, p30-31) As a form of moral training, 
as it instructs us in how to take a conscious approach to life rather than 
unthinkingly existing or following orders (Sontag, 1965, p25); 
‘Art performs this ‘moral’ task because the qualities which are intrinsic to 
the aesthetic experience (disinterestedness, contemplativeness, 
attentiveness, the awakening of the feelings) and to the aesthetic object 
(grace, intelligence, expressiveness, energy, sensuousness) are also 
fundamental constituents of a moral response to life.’ (Sontag, 1965, p25) 
                                                          
22 French philosopher Tristan Garcia would probably hold the above to be true, (Garcia, 2010.) A pair of 
articles discussing the philosophy of the other and their different approaches to ‘time’ are readable in 
Parrhesia Number 16. (Garcia, 2013) (Harman, 2013).  
23 The idea that there is a political element to the thinking ‘aesthetically’ isn’t a new one. Stephen 
Cheeke found something similar in Ode to a Grecian Urn, 
‘There is (the poet might claim) something self-enclosed and unparaphrasable about the 
beauty of the Grecian urn, something surplus to description, irreducible. The feeling this 
produces is one that belongs to a unique catergory of emotion (an aesthetic one). But this does 
not mean that it is a state of feeling or affect unburdened by thought. On the contrary, it 
involves the steadfast contemplation and cognitive apprehension of difficult paradoxes and 
truths.’ (Cheeke, 2008, p48)  
 
Cheeke also finds it in the Wallace Stevens poem Blue Guitar, ‘In other words, Stevens the artist does 
not want to claim poetry as a refuge or escape from ‘reality’, but rather as existing in a vital and 
alchemical relation to the world-as-it-is, with an agency and capacity to transform things as they are.’ 
(Cheeke, 2008, p127) 
 
And we find a similar perspective in O’Sullivan: ‘This is a programme for an expanded notion of art 
practice and for living our lives as an art practice.’  (O’Sullivan, 2006, p34) 
Though this isn’t surprising as Jane Bennet acknowledges her debt to Deleuze (Bennet, 2009). O’Sullivan 
sees the ethics in the aesthetics, calling it Ethicoaesthetics, the ethical dimension of taking an aesthetic 
approach to life,  
 
‘This is not a programme of escapism, even less the outline of a utopian metaphysics. Rather it is a call 
for attention to be focused on the actual, if only to unlock the potential becomings, the virtualities 
encapsulated within every moment. It is here that the ‘in-between’ nature of art practice again becomes 






There was again, within recent scholarship on translation something 
analogous24. Kate Briggs in This Little Art writes on the democratising potential 
of the ‘at home’ translation, and then the sharing of knowledge that might 
follow. (Briggs, 2017, p219-220) And the time taken for learning, for testing, for 
finding-out will be valuable, as will be the knowledge that is passed on. (Briggs, 
2017, p220)25 This is time for self-growth, for understanding how we might exist 
as empathetic individuals.  
The time taken over the production of texts or paintings serve then, as 
preparation for living empathetically. To return to Amy Sillman, 
‘The work that we do is dependent on the idea of the self as a 
spokesperson, whether it’s through the body, the imagination, or the 
intellect. It seems to me that idea of ethics in general and empathy comes 
out of the idea of the individual. That’s not the kind of a bankrupt 
bourgeois individualism that exploits.’ (Sillman, 2007, p19) 
The key to this ethics is the ‘attentiveness’ that Harman says is required of the 
spectator. This attentiveness allows the viewer to ‘trigger’ the artwork 
encounter. This attentiveness to one’s surroundings needs to be adopted for all 
encounters, so as to navigate the world less destructively.  
This tentative ethical position was developed whilst thinking through my 
practice and in the next chapter I will outline an overview of the practical 
research I have undertaken, the translations I have made. These are both the 
translations from artwork encounter to text and from stimuli-encounter to 
painting. I examine the form of ekphrasis for a background on aesthetic textual 
responses to artwork before proposing my own method based on metaphor, 










                                                          
24 This comparison with translation is a fruitful one and I believe provides opportunity for further study.  
25 If we are looking for existing political movements that we could attach this too, perhaps Italian 
Autonomist Marxism, which is bottom-up and relies on self-organising smaller groups rather than being 
part of a larger structure. Or the ecofeminism of Yayo Herrero, with its insistence on allowing for periods 












In this chapter I adopt a more personal tone and give an overview of the 
practical research I have undertaken. I begin by briefly recapping the 
philosophical work undertaken, and its implications, namely that the correct 
response to the third object is an aesthetic one, and the methodology that this 
assertion lead me to adopting, namely the writing of fiction. 
 
This chapter also acts as an introduction to the publications that accompany this 
thesis and some analysis of these fictions is included here, I outline the 
framework I gave myself for writing the text The Battle of San Romano, 
following my third object encounter with the painting of the same name. I also 
provide an introduction to four of the paintings I have made and the two 





Following the philosophical investigation outlined in this thesis we have seen 
that in order to capture what I termed the Singular Echo of the artwork, we 
must focus on the artwork encounter. Through scrutiny of the philosophy of 
Graham Harman we have deduced that a third object is formed during this 
artwork encounter. This third object is composed of qualities of both the viewer 
and the art object and has its own reality, the task at hand now, is to determine 
how this object must be described.  
 
In setting out his philosophy, Harman promises greater access to objects in 
themselves, asserting that philosophy must become more like the arts to gain 
this access. He is clear on this in the text The Third Table, and if we return to 
the passage quoted at the beginning of Chapter Two of this thesis we can see 
why: 
 
‘On the one hand art does not function by dissolving white whales, 
mansions, rafts, apples, guitars, and windmills, into their subatomic 
underpinnings… …On the other hand they also do not seek the first table, 
as if the arts merely replicated the objects of everyday life or sought to 
create effects on us… …Instead, there is the attempt to establish objects 
deeper than the features through which they are announced, or allude to 
objects that cannot quite be made present.’ (Harman, 2012b, p14) 
 
That is to say that the artistic or aesthetic response is the correct way to 
approach an object as it neither over nor undermines it. Instead making the 
object present to us through allusion. This is the only way Harman allows access 






“The world is filled primarily not with electrons or human praxis, but 
with ghostly objects withdrawing from all human and inhuman access, 
accessible only by allusion.” (Harman, 2012b, p12) 
 
 
This Third Object then is one such object, and like all objects must be 
approached obliquely, through allusion, and described aesthetically. 
 
The potential forms of this aesthetic response are manifold, and I have made a 
number of paintings responding to such encounters. Helen (Appendix Three, p. 
xiv) is one such painting and the process of its creation is described in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
  
However, this thesis is concerned with how to better write about painting, so 
what then is an ‘aesthetic response’ in writing? How can we best write 
allusively?  
 
In Chapter Two I examined writing about art and painting that I thought 
disappointed, either because it responded too ‘matter-of-factly’ to the artwork, 
or because it included the artwork in a larger schema, be that philosophy, 
sociology or the artist’s oeuvre. These textual responses all seemed to miss that 
which is singular about the artwork in question, and following our analysis of 
Harman we can say that this is because they chose to write about the artwork 
rather than the encounter, and because they tried to describe it rather than 
writing allusively. 
 
In the previous chapter we looked at the potential of ekphrasis, and though we 
could certainly define a poetic response as an aesthetic one. It doesn’t seem 
allusive if the art object is simply described in more florid language, moreover as 
we saw the encounter with the artwork is ignored.  
 
It is my contention that we must endorse a fictional response to the third object, 
i.e. a fictional response to the artwork encounter. Firstly, I understand fiction to 
mean that which allows the invention of the unreal, or that which didn’t happen. 
I believe that access to this alterity is vital, the writer has to have the freedom to 
do whatever they want in order to best capture what is singular about the third 
object. That might actually mean adopting an essayistic prose style, but then 
writing about something that wasn’t there, or that they didn’t see, if it better 
captures the nature of the encounter. Secondly, as it also allows the writer to 
take a multifarious approach to their subject, they can write in different 
registers.  
 
And I say fiction rather than poetry as there is an implicit length to fiction, as 
well as an implicit fabrication, that isn’t there, (for me at least,) with the term 
poetry. 
 
Personally, this meant for me writing in a style that would be classed as 
Speculative Fiction, or Science Fiction. My conclusion was that, as this third 
object is a new object, existing in a different world to our own, a method that is 
practised at unfolding different worlds, such as science-fiction, was the most 






Writing this kind of fiction allowed me to craft new worlds, with their own rules, 
narratives, characters and relationships. Within these worlds I was able to 
reflect the arrangement of intensities and moods I found within the artworks, so 
they might be read away from the artworks and allow the reader to re-enter the 
world of the encounter. 
 
The implementation of Science fiction as my chosen form was one of five-
pronged methodology I adopted, outlined in the speculative proposals for a 
methodology I made in the last chapter. These were Metaphor, Personal 
Narrative, Intimacy, Science Fiction and Abstraction. 
 
All of these can be thought of as different ways of approaching the third object 
and believe they can be used separately or together to create a Third Object text 
for the encounter. 
 
Actually, the methodology I advocate is to combine these methods, to pick and 
choose, to write a personal narrative that the describes the encounter with the 
artwork but to describe the artwork metaphorically, to describe it as a 
completely different object, to abstract the way it looks, to get close to it, to 
think about how it makes you feel, to think of something else, or someone else, 
that makes you feel like that, and then describe that instead. To invent a new 
language, as I did in Morta Della, to try and speak like the artwork.  
 
That the way to capture that which is singular about the artwork is to write 
something singular in itself: Primarily because it retains the ‘magic’ of the 
encounter, or what I have the called the singular echo of the artwork-encounter 
by emphasising its alterity. 
 





So, to return to the four encounters I set out in the introduction to the thesis: 
 
 1. The encountering of something (stimuli) I think should be painted  
3. The encounter with an artwork (spectating) 
 
Are both encounters that we can think through OOO and deduce that both 
encounters lead us, (beholder,) to merge with the object we are encountering. As 
we have seen Harman has said: ‘The aesthetic unit contains the object and the 
spectator to an equal degree, and cannot be obtained by fumigating one or the 
other out of existence.’ (Harman, 2016, p215) The ramification of this is that the 
other two encounters, namely; 
 
2. The act of making a painting of that stimuli 
4. Writing a text about an artwork  
 
Are actually better conceived when being about the encounter, rather than the 





not the object that is encountered: It is not the stimuli I have chosen to paint but 
the moment of encountering it that is the subject. Likewise, it is not the artwork 
that should be written about, as the artwork will always slip a definition, it 
cannot be paraphrased in words. In the same manner photographing or even 
painting photo-realistically the thing that has inspired a painting, would not be 
sufficient to capture its appeal.  
 
This is the third object / singular echo. 
 
I will talk about my practice in terms of this third object, how I create paintings 
that are a description of the collision between the real object that I am and the 
sensible objects that ‘stick’ to me in any encounter with any given stimulus. 
Abstraction and science fiction will play a role in this discussion – as both are 
models for world building.  
 
It would seem contradictory to follow Harman in believing aesthetics offer a 
refreshing template for philosophy, but then insist that the creative work I 
produced must follow a didactic structure. After all one of the reasons I was 
attracted to Object philosophy was because of statements such as the one of Ian 
Bogost; ‘characterisation of an experience though supposedly objective evidence 
and external mechanisms leads us farther from, not closer to, an understanding 
of the experience of an entity.’ (Bogost, 2012 p63) 
 
Likewise, I am not going to submit the work I made to the kind of analysis that I 
dedicated a chapter (Chapter Two) to decrying.  
 
However, there are some parameters developed organically through the writing 
of the texts, through my practical research that is, that I can explicate here. And 
there is a framework that I worked through that it will be useful to share. 
 
During my study I have wanted to approach the application of philosophy to 
practice, from a number of sides. I have wanted to use it dynamically; to 
influence what I will produce, and this has primarily been in the form of writing; 
in the fictional texts I have produced for object-encounters. However, I have 
also used Harman retroactively, to consider artwork and my painting practice 
through the prism of OOO and found that similarly insightful. The key takeaway 
from this process was: If I thought about what sparked a painting off in my 
mind, if we think that the process began with me seeing something and thinking 
I should paint it, OOO helped me realise that it was this moment that I was 
actually trying to paint; the moment of wanting to make a painting and not the 
thing I was witnessing. 
 
The notion that I am actually trying to paint the object I was in when I 
encountered the stimuli, made sense to me. And to follow my painting practice 
when it comes to writing about a painting I need to describe the moment when I 
become enmeshed with the qualities of the painting that entrapped me.  
 
As my study has encompassed both painting and writing, and indeed the 
curation of a group show, I have separated the following chapter into sections 
on each of these modalities. As I have said the writing was most influenced by 





retrospective, in terms of how I think about it. I am going to work through the 
writing first, followed by the painting and then the exhibitions. 
 
I have chosen to include images of my paintings, but not images of the artworks 
/ encounters / things that I have written the third object texts for. (Though I 
have given a brief description of them.) I have taken this decision as it seemed 
in keeping with the nature of the study and the inspirations for the third object 





Introduction to the Third Object texts 
 
Following Harman, I looked to an aesthetic approach for my method for writing 
the third object texts and found inspiration within my painting practice. I 
decided to write about a subject in the manner that I painted about a subject: 
Thinking through the philosophy of Harman I realised that when I encounter 
the stimulus of a painting (the thing that I see and want to paint), I am not 
trying to paint that stimulus, but instead am trying to paint the desire to try to 
paint that stimulus.  
 
If the moment of encounter with the stimuli of a painting, is the same 
phenomena that makes writing about painting difficult, to follow my painting 
practice I need to describe the moment when I become enmeshed with the 
sensual qualities of the painting that entrap me. This is how I would best 
describe being inside the third object or how to capture the singular echo of the 
artwork. This is the very real impact that my understanding of Harman’s 
philosophy has had on my writing practice. 
 
As I have shown, this third object is a composite of both myself as spectator, 
activating the work, and the Sensual Qualities of the painting or encountered 
artwork. As well as containing the Sensual Qualities of the artwork, I as the Real 
Object, providing the ‘reality principle’ am there. It followed that I, as spectator, 
would have to be represented somehow in these texts, me performing mimesis 
of whatever it was I was encountering.   
 
This mimesis means that it is a new object, non-existent in our world, that has 
been created by the encounter. As we thought through this concept with 
abstraction it seemed appropriate that the texts should have this tenor, if 
follows that if this is a new world, one that hadn’t previously existed, science-
fiction was the most appropriate way of writing about this object. 
 
A question I had to answer; what was more important to me? The art object that 
provoked the action or the text I was writing. In keeping with the ‘aesthetic’ 
approach, (following Harman’s definition of aesthetic,) I was endorsing, I 
wanted to push the text as far as possible to make it a ‘good’ text, otherwise I 
don’t think the response would’ve been honestly ‘aesthetic’. 
 
This means that the texts do differ in tone, as they were sometimes approached 





text, The Battle of San Romano and the pieces Morta Della and The 
Polycephalus will be addressed in a section below on the two exhibition I 
organised to present my research. Before that I will work through more general 
points in accompaniment to the collection. 
 
In each text I tried to harness the hypothesis of the third object a little 
differently, for example referring to the object encountered more directly; 
including biographical and autobiographical detail; writing in the third person 
plural, etc.  
 
Often, I would start with what might be termed the ‘intensities and moods’ of 
what I was looking at; to think composition in abstract terms. These were the 
Sensual Qualities that struck me, that I found within the artworks, and tried to 
imitate in text so they might be read away from the artworks and allow the 
reader to re-enter the world of the encounter.  
 
I used these intensities and moods to build the world of the particular third 
object I wanted to describe, making them real, or providing the reality principle 
in Harman’s words by having characters explore this world. 
 
In some cases, I used the space of the text to bring in some of the wider issues of 
the study, for instance, in The Zoo, written for the paintings of Olarn 
Chiaravonant I write about the differences between poetry and painting limited 
by Lessing, that is their temporal and spatial qualities. The Zoo was also 
important as I used a secondary work; The Master of Go by Yasunari Kawabata 
to create another frame for the text. My interpretation of Harman’s philosophy 
meant that I took the book that I was reading at the time, as part of me as Real 
Object. I took the book that I was reading into the third object, in formed part of 
this new object alongside the other parts of me and the observed paintings. I 
moved the traditional discussion on the differences between painting and 
writing to a board game to give myself a new arena in which to talk about it; the 
board of the game became a ‘neutral’ space to interrogate this difference, by 
providing a control or comparison for both. If in He Collects Writing I reflected 
on the imaginative act, here I used the space of the text to examine the act of 
trying to find difference in the literary and the visual. Reflecting overtly in the 
text on traditional distinctions of space and time, with painting providing the 
former and poetry the latter. Introducing the board game gave me a third form 
to reflect on this, the encounter between two players within the game, reflecting 
the enmeshing of spectator, artwork within the third object. I was also 
interested, contra Lessing in the spatial qualities of the text, both by creating a 
memorable space, a space like those I find in the abstract work of the painter 
Chiaravonant, whose work was the subject of the text, but also in the text as a 
place for discussion. This text is interesting, or perhaps problematic, for another 
matter, that I am writing about a number of paintings, a series of 
Chiaravonant’s work. This might seem hypocritical given the weight I placed on 
the need to write texts for a specific, individual, artworks, but I wanted to test 
the buoyancy of my strategy in other ways. I looked for a common Singular Echo 
across all the work, finding it in the shapes that looked both organic but 






The text The Plant, The Wolf, The Great Aunt was written for the encounter 
with a houseplant, following the associations to wherever they might lead. I 
wanted to write about a non-art object to see if this changed the way I wrote. 
Perhaps inevitably as I was writing about something without creative content, I 
put more autobiographical details into the story. This would fit with the 
framework of the third object theory of spectatorship; as there are perhaps less 
Sensual Qualities to a houseplant than to a painting by Uccello, as an artist is 
creating a sensorial experience, something that makes temporary palliative for 
the anguish and blindness that we have to live through.’ (Sillman, 2007, p54) 
Whereas a plant seems more quotidian and then the spectator places more of 
themselves within the echo. There is less of the encountered object, (in this case 
the plant,) taking up space within the third object. In fact, this story felt so 
different I decided to leave it out of the collection of third object texts I have 
self-published as a research outcome, though it can be read at the end of this 
thesis in Appendix Two. 
  
 
The Battle of San Romano 
 
This three-part prose-poem was written for the Uccello painting of the same 
name. This is the only third object text that has the same title as the object it is 
written for. The original triptych is scattered so the three panels are now in 
different countries, one is The National Gallery, London, one the Louvre in 
Paris and one the Uffizi, Florence.  
 
Though I was interested in providing an ‘oblique’ text for the painting I did 
describe directly things within the paintings, it’s Sensual Qualities. This began 
with the sepulchral quality of the light;  
ethereal and extra-terrestrial.  
The following lines from the text also describe elements within the painting, 
there were gaps of light in the hedge winking in front of him like stars in 
the firmament. 
Under the nearest hedge he could see what he thought was a turtle, but 
it might also have been a rock. 
In the distance blots of shrubbery peppered the fields, growing slowly, 
steadily, reluctant to expend too much energy under the blast of the sun. 
There were no birds in the picture.  
hemispheres of three oranges, still on the vine. 
 
At other times, I was reflecting on and alluding to the mood of the panels.  
restrained, an old- fashioned party perhaps.  
Rural in atmosphere, like dark pastoral tales,  
Flags hung  
melancholy face  
 
The following was written for the panel in Paris, 
creased, tired 
rolled up, travelled, evening falling through his features. 
 
As this is the panel in the Louvre, this is also a reflection of the institution’s 





The sky was cropped 
 
Refers to the Medici family cutting the top off the panels, so they might fit better 
in their residence. As well as referring to the physical condition, I ended with 
some of the history of the paintings, 
‘Yes, that’s right; we’ve all ended up living in different countries.’ 
   
I aligned the three texts so that they correspond to the orientation of the original 
panel, the London panel is left aligned, Paris right and Florence centre. I also 
chose to include them in the order I saw them, rather than the order in which 
they would’ve been arranged when originally painted. This is the beginning of 
me providing the ‘reality principle’ which continued with me personifying the 
three panels in three distinct brothers, (obviously related as they are brothers,) 








During the three years of doctoral research preceding my ‘writing-up year’ I 
made 73 paintings, thumbnails of all of them are in Appendix Three. The first 61 
were a continuation of a series I had already begun that I called APATSS, (All 
Paintings Are The Same Size,) and was 100 paintings that were either 30 x 25 
cm or 25 x 30 cm, the other 15 paintings I will address in the exhibition section 
below.  
 
APATSS was a series of work in which I wanted to document the urge that I 
thought ‘paintable’, every painting came from a moment that I saw or felt that 
something should be painted as I couldn’t describe in words. It would be a 
taxonomical record of these moments.  
 
The decision to limit myself to one size was a complex one but many of my 
concerns regarding why to stick to this size were related to the concerns of this 
thesis. Firstly, using the same size implied an equivalence between the ‘sources’ 
of the painting, it doesn’t matter if I am inspired to make a painting by the 
oeuvre of Leonardo Da Vinci or by a page from a magazine I find in the street. It 
is a flat ontology of these moments. The size of these paintings is also an 
intimate size, in the last chapter I have already compared the intimacy of 
reading with Mitchell’s’ notion of the intimacy of abstraction. 
 




(Appendix Three, p. xiv) 
 
When I visited the Prado and was beguiled by the dynamic composition of the 
painting ‘The Abduction of Helen’ by Tintoretto, the painting withdrew, (to 





compositional quality; the diagonals of the ships smashing together at the base 
of the paining with the lines of the masts above it captured me. In fact, I would 
struggle to describe the action of the figures within from memory as I was totally 
disinterested in that when I looked at it. The third object that had formed here 
contains me as Real Object and the Sensual Quality that is the diagonal 
composition, attached to me as I perform the mimetic act that Harman 
describes, and this is what I was trying to paint in my picture Helen. But I 
brought more to this third object than my presence, I brought my own 
memories of Venice, and I realised I wanted my painting to have its liquidity 
and precariousness (structurally speaking.) I adopted a rheumy uncertain 




(Appendix Three, p. vi) 
 
This ‘irreducible’ moment that inspired a lot of my paintings could be described 
as Helen was above; that an encounter with something has hidden behind its 
composition. Or the formal elements that have composed whatever it is that I 
have seen have leered forward and for a moment I am disarmed by what I am 
looking at. It is perhaps simple to think of being struck by the composition of a 
painting, after all the composition is an innate part of it. But the experience I am 
talking about also happens with anything I could see, so when I visited Madrid 
and went walking. The elements that struck me were the artificially coloured 
and shaped forms within the natural landscape at dusk. And resulted in the 
painting shown. It is worth noting that I made preparatory drawings for this 
painting to better isolate what it was about the encounter that arrested me. 
Refining the shapes that I wanted to use within the artwork, working up my 
relationship with the Sensual Qualities. 
 
The Sensual Qualities that strike the spectator are dependent on the artists’ 
facture, back history, education etc. and the spectator themselves. As we have 
already seen though, the specificity of the spectator and the artwork make these 
encounters indissociable but in making work for the encounter rather than what 




(Appendix Three, p. viii) 
 
This third object or pre-painting encounter can also be triggered by a phrase, 
when I read Crash by JG Ballard, the following sentence caused me to start. ‘As I 
took her arm she stared through my face at the dark branches of the trees over 
my head.’ (This was the title I used for the show I curated in Italy.) 
 
The mental image I had as I read the story was disrupted by the way this 
sentence is worded, the head of the narrator is looked through to something that 
is simultaneously above and behind. The implication is that the woman taken by 
the arm is somehow seeing the branches behind the narrator at the same time as 
his head. Interestingly here the third object I merge with is one created within 





according to Harman’s metaphysics, so this is still possible in this analysis. It 





(Appendix Three, p. v) 
 
Evening Class is a painting of a plant. The title actually draws on the three 
disparate qualities that I was joined with when I looked at the plant. 
 
It is so-called because it is the type of activity and painting one would undertake 
if one were doing an evening class in painting, and as I am someone who has 
taught and studied in a number of art schools I can’t really look at house plants 
without seeing them as a still-life prop, (though I did try a different direction in 
the third object Text, The Plant, The Wolf, The Great Aunt.) And I decided that 
it would be painted with a vernacular realism, typical of a part-time painter; the 
type who would enrol on an evening class. 
 
I am not only encountering the physical or perceptual characteristics of the 
plant but also associative connotations, such as the plant makes me think of 
evening classes, these associations are those that activate when I encounter the 
plant. I wanted to reflect this in the painting style I adopted. 
 
But also, I had the plant in my bedroom so would often see it in the evening or 
at night, so I wanted to paint the background darker with the touches of 
fluorescent green behind the leaves to capture the way waxy leaves can 





In the ‘writing-up year’ of my thesis I have organised two exhibitions to present 
my research. AS I TOOK HER ARM SHE STARED THROUGH MY FACE AT 
THE DARK BRANCHES OF THE TREES OVER MY HEAD and Cap Gros.  
 
 
AS I TOOK HER ARM SHE STARED THROUGH MY FACE AT THE 
DARK BRANCHES OF THE TREES OVER MY HEAD 
(Appendix Three, p. xxv - xxvi) 
 
I wanted to curate and organise AS I TOOK HER ARM SHE STARED 
THROUGH MY FACE AT THE DARK BRANCHES OF THE TREES OVER MY 
HEAD to answer the following question: If my research thus far had been into 
writing about painting, then I wanted to approach it from the opposite angle; 
how do we paint about writing? I invited five other painters; Christiane Bergelt, 
Olarn  Chiaravanont, Rasmus Nilausen, Catherine Parsonage, Ross Taylor 
whose work seemed to me to have a direct relationship with words or writing or 
reading. This might be because of what I knew about them personally, about 





make new work for the exhibition or choose pieces that seemed relevant to the 
concept.  
 
To accompany the exhibition I wrote a text, The Polycephalus. As I was writing 
for an exhibition rather than an individual artwork I built this text differently to 
the others. The world of this particular narrative was further inspired by 
interviews conducted by email with the five other artists in the months 
preceding the exhibition. Indeed, their answers built into how I understood the 
shape the exhibition would take so the exhibition and the text grew 
symbiotically. We began these interviews with the question of how to paint 
about writing and continued from there. Their answers to my questions, my 
questions, shared jokes, salutations, asides, references, were then all pasted into 
one document that I collaged into a cogent whole, adding very little, to create 
the story. As well as document of and for the exhibition this whole becomes a 
general reflection on the practice of painting.  
 
The exhibition became a bit like the inside of my head, as in the months leading 
up the exhibition I interviewed the painters involved and simultaneously I 
selected the work of theirs I wanted to exhibit. During the show the only text 
available to visitors to the gallery was The Polycephalus, giving me a chance to 




(Appendix Three, p. xxvii - xxviii) 
 
As my research had incorporated both textual and painted responses to third 
object encounters I wanted to find an object to encounter and respond with both 
a fiction and paintings. I chose the Romanesque artwork of Catalunya. 
(Appendix Three, p. xvii - xxiii) 
  
I worked more systematically here, in that I did a number of drawings in Museu 
Nacional d'Art de Catalunya, Barcelona, (where most of the artworks are,) 
alongside making notes that resulted in the text Morta Della. I was interested in 
how the process of painting and writing this third object were different, if they 
were. This proved to be true and I was drawn to different Sensual Qualities 
when I was there as a writer than as a painter. As a writer I wanted to capture 
the violence, and humour in what I was looking at. The phrase ‘rictus grin’ 
would be one way of describing the tenor of the murals. To a twenty first century 
viewer there is something absurd about the fantastical animals that are depicted 
there. As a painter the Sensual Qualities that drew me in, the details that I did 
drawings of, were the hands, the eyes, the visuality, not its effect. 
 
To this end I made a risograph publication containing prints of the drawings 
alongside the text. (I have submitted a copy of the publication.) I think perhaps 
one impact of writing the text meant there was even less narrative content in my 
paintings, or it is included more idiosyncratically. 
 
I produced a subsequent 15 paintings from the drawings I made. Eight of these 
paintings were included with the publication Morta Della in an exhibition at 







Though I have been reluctant to give a thorough explication of the practical 
work I have made, because by doing so I would invalidate the very reason I 
began this study; that seeking to paraphrase an artwork with a critical analysis 
misses the singular echo of the artwork and leaves the reader further from the 
artwork, I have shown in this chapter that the practical work I have made is 
clearly linked to my understanding of the issues of the philosophical thesis.  
 
Furthermore, I wouldn’t have approached the writing in the manner I did were 
it not for the philosophy of Harman which lead me to think through my writing 
practice with my painting practice. 
 
The three forms painting, writing and philosophy, became more and more 


























In the introduction to this thesis I explicated a problem common to much of the 
writing about art, namely that it is misses what might be called the nub of the 
artwork; that about the artwork which appeals most to us.  I diagnosed that the 
‘root-cause’ of this failure to capture the nub is that the writers of these texts 
believe that this nub is simply too elusive, that it cannot be caught, that art is of 
a different order to language, and therefore the nub is ineffable. This failure or 
lack is most egregious when reading the description of an individual artwork. 
Rather than trying to describe the appeal of said artwork, writers instead tend to 
bundle it into an oeuvre or a movement or a biography or a sociohistorical 
trend. If the individual artwork is approached it is described prosaically, 
because as previously noted, that which appeals is thought to be of a different 
order and therefore indescribable in words. The variety of these ‘failures’ was 
examined in depth in Chapter Two. 
The nub; that which has been missed I called the singular Echo. The ‘singular’ as 
I was keen that writing addressed the appeal of artwork, (singular,) and that it 
was attempted on a ‘case by case’ basis. I wanted writing that would reflect the 
intimacy of an encounter with an individual artwork. I took the notion of the 
echo from the literature of translation, as it is the echo that Walter Benjamin 
believes the accomplished translator must listen for.  
Translation proved a key analogy with the task of writing for art, with its 
emphasis on intimacy and on finding a new form for what is singular about an 
artwork. The translator of the artwork can find the words to make the ineffable 
effable by focussing on the artwork encounter. The writer on art must be a 
translator of an artwork’s singular echo. A translator rather than a transcriber of 
formal or material qualities. A translator rather than a utiliser of an artwork’s 
context, instrumentalising it for another purpose. A translator rather than a 
cod-psychologist, looking for biographical clues within an artwork. 
I reached this conclusion through reflection on my own practice alongside 
analysis and investigation of the Object Oriented philosophy of Graham 
Harman. I worked through his ontology until I arrived at what I term his ‘third 
object thesis’ of spectatorship, in which the spectator and artwork are fused 
together in a third object, that might be thought of as the artwork encounter. It 
became clear that being able to describe this third object would mean being able 
to capture the singular echo of an artwork. 
When faced with the task of describing this third object I elucidated fiction as 
the only proper response and outlined a methodology and framework for the 
writing of such fiction.  
These fictional responses were compiled in a collection that accompanies this 
thesis. Two of the stories had their own specific supplementary publications that 





were printed for two exhibitions that I organised to publish my research. One, 
Cap Gros, showed paintings made in response to the third object I formed with 
the Romanesque artwork of Catalunya. The other AS I TOOK HER ARM SHE 
STARED THROUGH MY FACE AT THE DARK BRANCHES OF THE TREES 
OVER MY HEAD I curated and organised in Yellow, (a project space for 
painting in Varese, Italy.) The show featured six painters; Christiane Bergelt, 
Olarn Chiaravanont, Rasmus Nilausen, Catherine Parsonage, Ross Taylor and 
myself: Artists whose work seemed to me to have a direct relationship with 
words or writing or reading.  
 
Summary of the thesis 
In the first chapter of this thesis I introduced the philosophy of Harman, its 
roots and terminology that I have then used throughout the thesis. I focussed in 
detail on his concepts undermining, overmining and duomining; these are how 
Harman classes that reductive strategies that objects have previously suffered at 
the hand of philosophy. As part of this work, I showed later how Harman’s 
solution to object encounters, to change - his so-called thesis of ‘vicarious 
causation’ - is also key to understanding how experience operates, specifically 
how experience-as-painter, and experience-as-spectator functions. In this 
chapter, I used Harman’s influences, namely the phenomenologists Heidegger 
and Husserl to explain his worldview. I believe his concepts of withdrawal and 
emergence are better understood with knowledge of Heidegger’s tool analysis 
and Husserl’s concept of intentionality. From this base I explained the Fourfold 
structure that Harman believes exists within all objects and highlighted the key 
relations within it for the rest of the study, the relation that Harman classes as 
Allure. 
In Chapter Two I have shown how opinions on painting and writing about 
painting often serve to overmine or undermine the object-quality of specific 
paintings. I critiqued over contextualisation, but also the opposite move that 
provides a straight-forward description of artworks. I identified a vicious circle 
in relation to these methods that I termed the analytical roundabout and, 
showed that Harman provides a way ‘off’ this ‘roundabout.’ I showed that the 
failings of these forms of writing led to the popularity of Speculative Realism 
within a strain of contemporary art debate, and education.  
The work I did in Chapter Three, showed that despite the assumption of a post-
humanist flavour to Harman’s philosophy his take on spectatorship is 
fundamentally different to this: Focussing instead on a radical interpretation of 
mimesis is offers significant novel resources for spectator theory and a 
philosophy of art writing. The process of painting, and spectating were viewed 
through the lens of Harman’s ‘third object thesis.’ In so doing I showed how 
Harman’s perspective on spectatorship is different to other well recognised 
models - Heidegger, Greenberg, Fried - and through this take on mimesis a 
methodology for ‘adequate’ art-writing was developed. I did significant work 
here identifying this ‘third object thesis’ within the ever-changing and evolving 





published 2005 to his redefining of his position on Ortega y Gasset in Dante’s 
Broken Hammer, published 2016, via a recording of his paper at a choreography 
conference in 2012 at MACBA in Barcelona, in which he explained his 
realisation of the implications of his model on spectatorship.  
I used Harman to provide a definition of painting and, therefore, of the 
encounter with painting. Painting and encounter, are as we saw, indissociable 
from this perspective, are joined in a third object.  
Describing this third object, that is the encounter between viewer and artwork, 
that contains elements of both, fused together, allows a writer to describe the 
singular echo of an artwork. In Chapter Four I divined strategies for this task of 
describing the third object. I stayed faithful to the tenets of Harman’s 
philosophy, which meant that as an object in its own right, the third object had 
to be approached obliquely, this meant it had to be described aesthetically, 
which mean fiction became the most appropriate method for writing about an 
artwork. 
I then thought through the third object in relation to fiction, specifically 
Science-fiction. I developed a series of speculative techniques and strategies for 
producing these third object writings, incorporating four modes; metaphor, 
personal narrative, abstraction and intimacy. I considered traditional forms of 
ekphrasis in contrast to my own ekphrasis for the artwork encounter, that I 
termed associative ekphrasis. I worked through Stephen Cheeke’s analysis of 
traditional ekphrasis explicating the fundamental point of divergence, that 
traditional ekphrasis concentrates on a physical description of the artwork that 
is its subject. But found convergence, if Cheeke’s concept of ‘conjunctioning’ was 
stretched a little, so that it might mean trying to take in the whole (artwork) at 
once. Then the deterritorialization that follows would be thought as part of the 
sensorial experience of that artwork encounter, and it is this that I am providing 
my ekphrastic responses for. 
At the end of the Chapter Four, despite my critique of contextual-political 
readings of artworks, as forms of overmining, I identify an alternative aesthetic 
ethics to my third object thesis drawn from the writing of Jane Bennet and 
Susan Sontag and based on a notion of living more consciously, rooted in the 
non-hierarchical nature of a flat ontology and my painting practice.  
In Chapter Five I have shown that despite not wanting to undermine my 
research by ‘explaining’ my artwork in detail that the philosophical and practical 
research were interlinked with one contributing to the other. I recapped the 
implications of Harman’s thought on the four encounters I identified as being 
fundamental to this study, but also on art criticism in general. I made the caveat 
that a total explication of my practical research would be fruitless, but I was able 
to give the framework I used when writing the third object texts and mobilised 
the terminology of Harman to explain my painterly decisions. I explained in 
detail the influences of the painting on the text, The Battle of San Romano, 
(written for the painting of the same name.) I also included analysis of the two 








This thesis has laid an effective strategy and philosophical framework for 
writing creatively as art criticism and performing practice as research. The more 
specific findings, though justified philosophically, are personal to me, but I 
believe that the framework I have outlined before that is applicable and usable 
by many. 
As noted in the introduction I am a voracious reader of fiction. To quote 
Rebecca Solnit again:  
‘Like many others who turned into writers, I disappeared into books 
when I was very young, disappeared into them like someone running into 
the woods… …Before writers are writers they are readers, living in books, 
through books, in the lives of others that are also the heads of others, in 
that act that is so intimate and yet so alone.’ (Solnit, 2013, p60) 
I see myself very much in here; disappeared into books and the world of words, 
as into a wood. Leaving the forest only when I encounter that which seems to 
me to defy language, and contriving to make a painting of it, almost in 
testament to the fact that there is life outside of these ‘woods.’ 
It is a strange and pleasant coincidence that Benjamin also used the forest or the 
woods as his metaphor for translation. These woods though are impenetrable, 
and the writer cannot enter, must listen for the echo of their words. The words 
that sound right in echo to them, and only to them, because as we have seen it is 
an intimate relationship. 
And like an intimate relationship this is a very personal project, how could it be 
anything else when I am fictionalising my own encounters in words and paint. 
But it is very personal project that has been sieved through a very impersonal 
process, doctoral study and analysis of contemporary philosophy. And I am 
passionate about the results, both in terms of the practical work I have made in 
painting and writing, but also the philosophical work I have done; creating a 
framework for a rigorous defence of practice as research. 
And I do believe that it is in the sense that this is a ‘personal’ project that there 
is a kernel of an ethics, a blueprint for ‘attentive’ living. This is firstly because it 
emphasises a more considered kind of existence as I have already shown in 
Chapter Four but also because it relies of the strength of subjective responses to 
artworks. This is a multidimensional subjectivity as theorist Donna Haraway 
would put it. (Haraway, 1988, p586)  
These third object texts do not pretend to be objective, they know that 
knowledge is situated, and accept they can only be partial, but they encourage 
others to do the same; to empathise with who or what surrounds them, to listen 
for the singular echo that is emitted. 
‘All these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite 





and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from 
another’s point of view, even when the other is our own machine.’ 
(Haraway, 1988, p583) 
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Further analysis of Harman and his influences 
 
i. Harman’s Ontography 
 
 
Here I provide further details of the intricacies of Harman’s ontology, the relations 
that exist between the four poles delimited in Chapter One; the study of which 





Within the Fourfold there are a number of possible relationships that might occur 
between the profiles. Harman classes the study of these as Ontography. I will work 
through these, explaining their significance to Harman, but without interrogating 
them too fully as they are have not proved relevant to the rest of the study. However, 
I am including them here so as to give further context should it be necessary. 
 
The diagram at the end of this section is taken from Peter Wolfendale’s book, Object-
Oriented Philosophy: The Noumenon’s New Clothes, that though a polemical 
critique of Harman’s philosophy, does contain the clearest diagram, showing all ten 
possible links. 
 
The four most important relations (Harman, 2011b) to Harman are the tensions, 





Harman’s evaluation of Heidegger’s tool analysis provides him with one of his 
tensions; that between a Real Object and its Sensual Qualities; that the Real Object 
has Sensual Qualities that are omitted from the withdrawn Real Object, a Real Object 
that is autonomous from whatever encounters it. Harman calls this Tension, Space. 
The way one may think of a city without being in it or visit it and not exhaust it is 
how Harman begins to define Space. As a site of relation and non-relation. 
 
As the Real Object is withdrawn we cannot know it, but as it is distinct it must 
contain Real Qualities. This then is another tension, that between a Real Object and 
its Real Qualities, that is what distinguishes it from others, or the world at large, how 
we know we are not gesturing toward an abyss or an underlying plasmatic essence. 
For this Harman relies on Leibniz’s Monads and an assertion by Leibniz that though 
each Monad must be individual it must also contain qualities so as not to be 
interchangeable with another. This tension is that which makes things themselves, in 
whatever form that may be, Harman calls this tension Essence. 
 
We cannot ‘ever exhausts the reality of another, never makes contact with the darkest 





As we might expect as it concerns the Sensual Object and therefore the 
phenomenological world, Harman finds the other two tensions in Husserl. As noted 
Sensual Objects differ from all the ways in which they appear to us in the form of 
their Qualities. Their Qualities are present within the Sensual Object but also 
separate from it, the object simultaneously has them and exists without them, we see 
a tree, not greens and browns that it consists of. Harman calls this tension Time. 
That is to say Harman asserts that Time is the tension between a Sensual Object and 
its Sensual Qualities. An object appears in a number of different guises to us, 
disguised or occluded by light, it might look different in the morning or afternoon, 
today or tomorrow: ‘In all phenomenal experience, there is a tension between 
sensual objects and their sensual qualities. The ocean remains the same though its 
successive waves advance and recede.’ (‘Harman, 2011b, p26) 
 
The other tension is between the Sensual Object and it’s Real Qualities. Harman 
agrees with Husserl that there must be something real beneath the Sensual Object 
that we perceive when we look at the world, something tying the thing together, as it 
were. Harman follows Husserl in labelling this Eidos, we can intuit that there is 
something that distinguishes this object but as these Qualities are Real they are 
withdrawn so we can only intuit them, never know them completely. As Sparrow puts 
it: ‘Sensual objects possess real, that is, necessary, qualities beyond the contingently 




Radiations and Junctions 
 
Harman further brackets together the links he believes to be related. There are three, 
those that exist between Qualities, that orbit the Sensual Object that he classes as 
Radiations. The remaining three links exist as Junctions, these are how the Real 
Object may encounter other objects. This cannot be the case with Qualities as they 
exist only in relation to an Object, where the Qualities of one Object to form a 
relation with the Qualities of another Object we would be left with another Object. 
 
So the three Radiations are as follows: 
 
Sensual Quality with Sensual Quality is Emanation as they are emanating from the 
Sensual Object 
Real Quality with Real Quality is Contraction as though these Qualities are linked to 
the Sensual Object they withdraw from it and each other. 
Sensual Quality with Real Quality is Duplicity as both belong to the Sensual Object 
that might have little relation to one another beyond this. 
 
 
And the three Junctions are: 
 
The link between Sensual Object and Sensual Object is Contiguity; as they are related 
as being in the same Sensual World that a Real Object is experiencing and mediated 
by that Real Object. (Harman, 2011, 134) 
The link between Real Object and Real Object is Withdrawal because as explained all 




The link between the Real Object and the Sensual Object, which he labels Sincerity. 
As such as it is the only example of two objects encountering one another; this is real 
lived experience, as we know, we as real objects exist in a world containing the 
sensual profiles of other Real Objects. 
 
 
Change: Fission and Fusion 
 
So how do Objects change rather than remaining the static entities that have been 
described; how do Objects isolated from any interaction become something 
different? Harman is very clear that one point which distinguishes his Ontology from 
those sciences and philosophies that he accuses of overmining the object is that they 
cannot explain change. If all of an object is used up in its contextual relations then 
there is nothing kept back that might induce change; if all the facets of something are 
interlocked with the world as it is, then nothing ‘moves’. (Kimbell & Harman, 2013) 
He has to prove that his work provides answers to the question of change. 
 
To begin his explanation Harman incorporates ideas of Fission and Fusion, and pairs 
off his tensions, giving two of them to Fission and two of them to Fusion. Fission are 
those between a Sensual Object and its Real and Sensual Qualities, I.e. Time and 
Eidos. And Fusion are those between a Real Object and its Real and Sensual 
Qualities. i.e. Space and Essence. Harman explains this distinction as follows, as the 
Real Object is permanently withdrawn, even from its qualities; it is both more and 
less a sum of its parts; that for it to join with its qualities involves Fusion. As the 
Sensual Object is permanently connected to its qualities, as they are necessary for it 
to appear in the world, and how it appears in the world, any change here would 
involve Fission. 
 
Harman goes further into explaining these stages of Fission and Fusion, delineating 
and naming the different types of which can occur. The Fission that occurs as part of 
Time, (the tension between a Sensual Object and its Sensual Qualities,) Harman 
labels Confrontation. This is when that Object we are looking at loses some of its 
qualities, he uses the example of realising that the Sensual tree we saw had actually 
been used as gallows so Qualities such as its colour and texture are no longer of 
interest to us, we see the tree in a different light, (literally and metaphorically.) 
 
The Fission that splits the relation that is Eidos, (between a Sensual Object and its 
Real Qualities,) is Theory. Harman uses the example of the electrical current that we 
can deduce runs through the Sensual Object of the copper wiring we encounter. In 
making that deduction we have separated the Sensual Object from one of its Real 
Qualities I.e. Its conductivity. 
 
In Space as Harman defines it, when a Real Object fuses with its Sensual Qualities, 
what occurs is Allure. These is when we catch a rare glimpse of the Real Object, this 
is an aesthetic process according to Harman and indeed does occur in artworks. 
Harman explains this process at length and with reference to metaphor and I will 
also return to this in some detail in my analysis of the third object in Chapter Three. 
 
The Fusion associated with Essence, (between a Real Object and its Real Qualities,) 




Qualities and brought together in a manner that changes the Real Object. Harman 












Diagram taken from Wolfendale, P. (2014) Object-Oriented 





ii. Van Gogh’s shoes and The Origin of The Work of Art 
 
As this thesis includes a significant amount of detail on Heidegger we will return to 
him here to analyse his essay The Origin of The Work of Art, both in terms of 
Harman but also in the context of Chapter Two, in which I apply Harman’s concepts 
of Over and Undermining to art writing.  
 
Heidegger writes well on art, searching for a proper way of understanding its 
ineffability. This proper method, one that we have distilled through Harman, is 
visible in Heidegger.  It is also interesting to uncover more of the roots of Harman’s 
philosophy in Heidegger. We will look briefly at his essay The Origin of The Work of 
Art, described by Peter Wolfendale as ‘masterful’ (Wolfendale, 2014, p81,) and 
Harman précised as: ‘While tools tend to be invisibly immersed in the world, in the 
artwork the tool’s entire world becomes visible along with it.’ (Harman, 2007, p110) 
As well as looking at the original Heidegger essay we will also analyse the response of 
Schapiro to Heidegger and Derrida to both Heidegger and Schapiro.  
 
In a statement that seems to correlate with what we read by Isabella Graw, Heidegger 
says that we cannot separate the artist from the artwork: ‘The artist is the origin of 
the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other… Art is the 
origin of both artist and work’ (Heidegger, 1950, p89) 
 
He goes on to say, in a manner that seems to foreshadow Harman’s criticism of 
overmining and undermining, that this essence cannot be derived from higher 
concepts, (an artwork’s essence cannot be discovered by overmining) nor can it be 
derived from analysing the characteristics of artworks, (it cannot be discovered by 
undermining either): 
 
‘And the essence of art can no more be arrived at by a derivation from higher 
concepts than by a collection of characteristics of actual artworks… …selecting 
characteristics from among given objects, and deriving concepts from 
principles, are equally impossible here, and where these procedures are 
practiced they are a self-deception.’ (Heidegger, 1950, p90) 
 
So, for Heidegger, as it is for Harman the work of art is a special case. In fact, in 
Harman’s summation of Heidegger’s feelings on the work of art, I think we can see 
Harman’s own view: ‘While tools tend to be invisibly immersed in the world, in the 
artwork the tool’s entire world becomes visible along with it.’ (Heidegger, 1950, p110) 
 
The thrust of the remainder of Heidegger’s essay is as follows, an artwork is a setting 
forth of truth; it does this by first asserting its independence and then disclosing 
truth. Heidegger revisits the concepts of revealing and concealing that are present 
throughout his philosophy and have been referred to above in explaining Harman’s 
concept of withdrawal. But rather than being classed as Zuhandenheit and 
Vorhandenheit, instead here ‘world’ is the concept of concealing and ‘earth’ of 
revealing. Both concepts are of equal importance, the first stage is the artist creating 
a viable ‘world’ within the artwork, one that the spectator will accept, this is its 
asserting of independence, then the ‘world’ as we know it opens up and allows us to 




of earth being revealed, this moment of revelation is truth. Truth is both the 
becoming and happening of, it’s revelation. (Heidegger, 1950 p115) 
 
So, for the work of art to succeed the spectator must see both something recognisable 
and meaningful, (‘world’), but that there is also some transcendental and/or mystical 
truth that is apparent to, (‘earth’.) (Heidegger, 1950 p116) As exemplar Heidegger 
chooses one of Van Gogh’s paintings of shoes and describes how the essence of these 
peasant woman’s shoes is revealed by the artwork. They have been painted in such a 
way so as to appeal to us, to sit well with us. But then a greater truth is revealed: 
Normally we don’t understand a pair of shoes by looking at them but by wearing 
them, what Van Gogh does though is render his painting in such a way that we 
understand the truth of these shoes and their context. (Heidegger, 1950 p101-102) 
Heidegger’s passage on the shoes is worth quoting in full because of its poetry, 
 
‘From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of 
the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the 
accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-
uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the 
dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of 
the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, 
its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow 
desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining 
worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more 
withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at 
the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it 
is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected 
belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.’ (Heidegger, 
1950, p101) 
 
But Meyer Schapiro believes this is fallacious. He says Heidegger has ‘experienced 
too little and too much in his contact with the work.’ (Schapiro, 1968, p138) He has 
projected his own associations onto the painting of the shoes (Schapiro, 1968, p138) 
 
‘Alas for him, the philosopher has indeed deceived himself. He has retained 
from his encounter with van Gogh’s canvas a moving set of associations with 
peasants and the soil, which are not sustained by the picture itself.’ (Schapiro, 
1968, p138) 
 
Schapiro’s fundamental criticism with Heidegger’s text is that he believes he is 
mistaken about to whom the shoes belong, they are actually Van Gogh’s. And Van 
Gogh is painting a form of self-portrait (Schapiro, 1968, p140). Schapiro returns to 
the subject in a subsequent essay written 26 years later, here he claims; 
 
‘One misses in all this both a personal sense of the expression and of van 
Gogh’s feelings of ‘rejection’ by his own parents and by his learned teachers 
who had to come to doubt his fitness as a Christian preacher and missionary.’ 
(Schapiro, 1994, p149) 
 
Schapiro like Graw and Heidegger believes that the artist is inextricably bound up in 
the artwork, but not the artist as creator that Graw focusses on, recognisable by their 




believe Schapiro is wrong on this. We don’t miss the knowledge of Van Gogh’s 
rejection by his parents when we look at his painting of shoes. Schapiro continues, 
‘These breaks are familiar to readers of van Gogh’s biography and letters.’ (Schapiro, 
1994, p149). In other words, this ‘missing’ relies on knowledge of external 
information, is not gleaned by an experience of the work, but by reading Van Gogh’s 
letters. The singular echo of an artwork is not found in an artist’s correspondence. 
 
But the viewer of the shoes, or critic of the painting, shouldn’t be required to read 
Van Gogh’s letters; that we should is implied by Schapiro’s critique of Heidegger. 
Schapiro overmines the painting by including it in what we know of Van Gogh’s life. 
Though we can’t deny that the hand of the artist forms part of the content of the 
work, we can deny that it is biographical information that it signifies. 
 
Jacques Derrida addressed the subject of Schapiro’s disagreement with Heidegger in 
The Truth in Painting. (Though, at the time only one of Schapiro’s essays had been 
written.) Here Derrida is excised by assumptions that both writers have made about 
the painting; how does the viewer know it is a ‘pair’ of shoes for instance? ‘Heidegger 
and Schapiro denied themselves the slightest doubt as to the parity or pairedness of 
these two shoes.’ (Derrida, 1987, p333) 
 
Derrida amusingly defends Heidegger from Schapiro’s accusations of projection, 
countering that they are both talking from their own backgrounds and beliefs instead 
of the painting and both therefore projecting. (Derrida, 1987, p307-314) Heidegger 
‘is still not speaking of the picture, even if it is a given picture in view that drives him 
to tighten the example around the shoes,’ (Derrida, 1987, p331). But the same could 
be said of Derrida; we are no longer talking about the painting, but about the 
correspondence around it. The painting as object has again been lost. Derrida has 
taken the existence of the painting for granted and has concentrated on the context. 
He has also overmined the painting by including it in his essay, using it to make, 
(however valid,) points about the situated nature of Schapiro and Heidegger’s 
knowledge. The singular echo of an artwork is not found in the essays that are 
written about it. Derrida offers no attempt to get to the singular echo of the painting; 
perhaps he too thinks that it is ineffable.  
 
 
The Real Painting and Harman 
 
It would be germane at this juncture to return to Harman here and to his opinion of 
Heidegger’s essay. He is not as complimentary as might be expected, he finds that the 
revelation of essence that Heidegger sees in the painting, is flawed as it a generalized 
essence; Heidegger finds the same essence within all art just as Graw does in all 
painting, rather than attending to the individual painting and its singular echo. As 
Harman says,  
 
‘Yet Heidegger’s earth is every bit as unified as his ‘being’, so that every 
artwork ends up pointing to the same hidden earth in all cases. Whereas 
normal experience is adrift in a realm of presence, the Heideggerian artwork 
seems to punch a hole in presence and gesture vaguely towards an irreducible 




images in the mind (jugs, temples, peasant shoes) that all hint monotously at 
the same earthy background.’ (Harman, 2014, p105) 
 
That is to say, whenever Heidegger claims that an artwork reveals depth, alludes to 
something deeper than that which the viewer encounters, it is always the same depth, 
whatever painting it is we, as viewers, may be looking at. So, Heidegger goes some 
way and is better, perhaps than Graw, et al. But, Harman pushes further, and this is 
why he is central to my thesis, he is more attentive to what I have been calling the 
singular echo.  
 
The ‘real’ painting like any other Harmanesque object has withdrawn, and therefore 
cannot be paraphrased, we have seen that attempts to do so miss the singular echo of 
































iii. Jose Ortega y Gasset and Metaphor 
 
As stated in the thesis proper, this essay had a profound effect on the gestation of 
Harman’s thought, here I work through it in detail.  
On reading the essay there is an obvious synchronicity with Harman and a 
philosophy of autonomous objects as Ortega insists on an ‘executant ‘I’’ within 
everything. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p133) Ortega affirms this ‘I’ by first separating 
lived experience from the experience of watching; the difference between having a 
headache and seeing someone else suffer with a headache is profound. One is a 
feeling of something, the other an image of something. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p133) 
He uses verbs and how they are conjugated to provide a template for thinking 
through this, so when we say ‘I walk’ this is thus the feeling of walking. Whereas ‘he 
walks’ is the image of it. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p132) After developing this 
conceptual framework for thinking through the ‘I’-ness of people he then applies it to 
objects and particularly a box he has in front of him on his desk. The redness of the 
box is as real to the box as pain is to him, and is as inaccessible to him as the pain of a 
fellow human, the box has it’s own I-ness. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p133-4).  
‘There is the same difference between a pain that someone tells me about and 
a pain that I feel as there is between the red that I see and the being red of this 
red leather box. Being red is for it what hurting is for me. Just as there is an I-
John Doe, there is also an I-red, and I-water, and an I-star. Everything, from a 
point of view within itself, is an ‘I.’’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p133-4) 
The difference between observing something and feeling it, further complicates 
things as it means that we cannot even think about the executant ‘I’ that it is 
ourselves, because by thinking of our state of mind we make an image of it. (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1914, p136) 
‘So we arrive at the following difficult dilemma: there is nothing we can make 
an object of cognition, nothing that can exist for us unless it becomes an 
image, a concept, an idea- unless, that is, it stops being what it is in order to 
become instead a shadow or outline of itself.’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p136) 
Into this world of non-cognition and the unknowable Ortega posits art as a way of 
understanding. Art is a language that presents things to us in the act of executing 
themselves. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, 138-9). Ortega is careful though not to conflate 
the idea that art seemingly reveals the inward executing ‘I’ of something, with an 
empathetic act of looking in which we ‘become’ the subject of our gaze. (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1914, p139) Instead, and it is here that Harman finds fraternity, an artwork 
creates a new object, distinct from its qualities, more than its physicality and more 
than the imagination. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p137) ‘The unavoidable premise that art 
is in essence the creation of a new object, born of the previous breakup and 
annihilation of real objects.’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p147)  
Ortega y Gasset moves onto to address the subject of metaphor and he articulates 
that he sees a metaphor as a microcosm of an artwork. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p140) 




with the following metaphor, taken from a poem by Valencian poet Lopez Pico: ‘A 
cypress ‘is like the ghost of a dead flame.’ Ortega removes the inessential from the 
metaphor and strips the ‘like’ that makes it a simile until he is left with the following; 
‘A cypress is a flame’. These two objects can be linked by a shared linear outline and 
if we concentrate on this, the appeal of the metaphor recedes as we concentrate on 
geometric observation. Ortega believes that there is something more than mere 
resemblance that interests us here, but this coincidental resemblance is important as 
it allows us to see them both simultaneously and we begin to notice what 
distinguishes them rather than unites them. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p142) To create 
the cypress of the metaphor, we annihilate the ‘real’ cypress, we replace it instead 
with the cypress of the metaphor, which he christens the beautiful cypress. As the 
metaphor makes us look at both objects we can’t exclude one in favour of the other. 
(Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p143)  
‘The annihilation of what both objects are as practical images. When they 
collide with one another their hard carapaces crack and the internal matter, in 
a molten state, acquires the softness of plasm, ready to receive a new form and 
structure.’ (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p143) 
We look through the flame at the cypress, and through the cypress at the flame, and a 
new object is created for us, as yet unformed. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p143) The 
cypress we are picturing has become fused with the flame through the acuteness of 
metaphor. Likewise, we have also fused with the cypress-flame in our mind and 
created a new object. Referring back to the difference between picturing an image 
and feeling. Ortega asks us what state are we in while we are thinking of this cypress? 
He asserts that the metaphor has forced us into the state of ‘cypress’, we have made it 
into an action, a verb, we live executantly this cypress-flame, we cypress-flame as 
verb. (Ortega y Gasset, 1914, p144-145) Referring back to the difference between 
picturing an image, and feeling, Ortega asks us what state are we in while we are 
thinking of this cypress? He asserts that the metaphor has forced us into the state of 
‘cypress’, we have made it into an action, a verb, we cypress. 
‘In other words, I will have to find a way to force the word ‘cypress,’ with its 
nominal value, to become active and erupt, assuming that of a verb… …We 
simply sense an identity, we live executantly this being, the cypress-flame.’ 














The Plant, the Wolf, the Great Aunt 
 
 
A third object text written for a house plant, not included in the collection, Stories for 
Paintings, self-published as part of this research. 
 
 
The Plant, the Wolf, the Great Aunt 
 
This weekend we will scatter the ashes of my Great Aunt, off of Higgar Tor, a 
landmark gritstone tor in the Peak District. Coordinates 53.3338’N, 1.6183’W. 
 
I will go this Saturday, August 27th 2016, with my father and my sister. 
 
Great Aunt makes me sound posh but she was simply my Grandmother’s sister. 
 
She used to say it made her sound older than she was, I remember her saying that to 
the parents of one of my school friends as she collected my sister and I from school 
one Tuesday evening in the 1980’s.  
 
We’d then go to her house and play ‘ball,’ a game of our own invention, or Halma 
invented in 1883 or 1884 by George Howard Monks.The pieces came in a box with an 
odd design on the front, with four coloured cone shaped pieces hovering like spectres 
of angels beneath the silhouette of a tree on a Prussian Blue night. 
 
My great aunt is intrinsically linked to my life as my oldest memory, from almost 33 
years ago, from the 29th October 1983, is of the day when my sister was born and I 
woke up, headed for my parents room, but was called into the other bedroom where 
my great aunt had been sleeping, arriving as my parents headed to the hospital at 
some point whilst I was sleeping. 
 
One trivial thing I remember about her is that it was she who explained to me that 
Araucaria is the Latin word for the monkey puzzle tree and this is why it was chosen 
by the famous setter of crosswords the Reverend John Galbraith Graham MBE. He 
who famously announced his own terminal cancer through clues and their answers in 
a crossword printed in the Guardian on 11th January 2013, Guardian cryptic No. 25, 
842. 
 
The Araucaria tree appears in the well-polished stairways of the introductory 
passages of Steppenwolf, under the contemplation of Harry Haller. I have read this 
introduction many times but not far beyond it. 
 
I am trying to read the book again, having re-bought it this year. I think one of the 
reasons I have previously struggled is because of the jolt of switching narrative 
perspectives. Going from the eyes of the bourgeois nephew of the landlady to the eyes 




I also think every time I read it I hope that Steppenwolf will be my age as I feel so 
sure I am going to find in him my image, every time then I am disappointed when he 
begins by complaining about being elderly. 
At some point though Haller and I will be contemporaries I hope, and I will be older 
than him, while he agelessly watches plants fidget in varnished atriums. 
 
My first girlfriend C read Steppenwolf and loved it, I think I might have given her my 
previous copy when we split up. I remember her being surprised when I said I liked 
walking down the middle of streets as that is something in the book apparently. 
When she said this is just confirmed my suspicions that I would find myself within it. 
 
I bought it again in the winter, after the end of my second relationship, when I felt 
even more wolf-like than normal, slipping between the mists of winter, drunken and 
teary-eyed and desperate, trudging down the middle of the coastally named roads of 
Brockley;  
 
Fossil, Shell, Cliffiview, Sandrock, Overcliff, Undercliff 
 
Houseplants always make me want to read Steppenwolf.  
 
My first girlfriend lost her mother to cancer last month. 
 
She told me in a message I received at 12:58 on 27th July 2016. 
 
I cried as I formulated a response, stood outside a bank in Stratford. 
 
I think I remember that David Shields favoured the introduction to Steppenwolf, 
maybe I’ve made this up, it fits with a narrative I have of him around the time he 
published Reality Hunger, maybe it was in an article in response written by Zadie 
Smith, her defence of the novel that I see now was published on 21st November 2009. 
 
Almost exactly a year before this, on the 20th November 2008 the New York Review 
of Books published an article by Smith in which she outlines two paths for the novel, 
comparing Netherland by Joseph O Neill to Remainder by Tom McCarthy. 
 
She was worried by the lyrical Realism of Netherland, preferring the emptied-out 
interiority of the protagonist in Remainder, obsessing about events with his life. 
 
Netherland does grate sometimes as does the press that surrounds it, 
 
‘Why is he wearing his cricket whites?’  
 
My friend George wrote, sending me a link to an interview conducted in O’Neill’s 
provisional home in the Chelsea Hotel and published in the Guardian on 16th August 
2008, 
 
Which sort of sums up a financial otherworldliness that the protagonist inhabits. 





But there are two passages in the book that stay with me. When the narrator reflects 
on his last visit to his mother before her death. Going up to the window he had stared 
out of as a child, watching the north sea, the silent house surrounding him, 
 
The second scene I remember is his wife explaining to a marriage counsellor why she 
wants to stay together. As a responsibility to see each other through almost. I had 
thought the same thing had applied with C. It hadn’t. 
 
Maybe I am reading Steppenwolf again now as I find myself falling in love for the 
third time and am allowing myself to daydream of a life away from the Steppes. 
 
My dad has told me that Higgar Tor is where he wants his own ashes scattered, 
something I will resolutely try to avoid thinking about on Saturday as the fractions of 
another life are whipped from us and into the landscape.  
 




Documentation of paintings made and exhibitions organised  





Pages ii — iii  Image details for the paintings from the series APATSS 
    made as part of the doctoral research 
Pages iv — xvi  Reproduction of paintings from the series APATSS made 
    as part of the doctoral research 
Page xvii   Image details for paintings made in Catalunya 2017 
Pages xviii — xxiii Reproduction of paintings made in Catalunya 2017 
Page xxiv   Image details for the organised exhibitions 




Top row left – right 
Memories of Trendy 
Paul 
Oil on canvas 
The Riposo 
Oil on canvas 
System 
Mixed media on canvas 
Middle row l – r 
Portrait 
Oil on canvas 
Casa 
Oil on canvas 
Joaquim 
Oil on canvas 
Bottom row l – r 
Piero 
Oil on canvas 
Giovanni 
Oil on canvas 
Grotesque 








Oil on paper and linen 
 
Page vii 
Top row l – r 
Hh 
Oil on canvas 
Cave at Day 
Oil on canvas 
Frank R 
Oil on canvas 
Middle row l – r 
Bachelor 
Oil and acrylic on canvas 
The Names 
Oil on canvas 
Marcel & Stephane 
Oil on canvas 
Bottom row l – r 
Pupae 
Oil and acrylic on board 
Cave 
Oil on canvas on canvas 
board 
Before we were Born 




Oil on canvas 
 
Page ix 
Top row l – r 
Metamorphoses 
Oil on canvas 
Calculus 
Acrylic and household 
paint on canvas 
An English Volcano 
Oil on canvas 
Middle row l – r 
Bad Timing 
Mix media on canvas 
Redhead 
Oil on canvas 
Now, Now and Now 
Oil and acrylic on canvas 
 
Bottom row l – r 
Venice 
Oil on aluminium 
Geologist 
Oil and acrylic on board 
Portuguese Atlas 
Acrylic on board 
 
Page x 
Top row l – r 
Paul 
Oil on canvas 
Lorenzo 
Oil on canvas 
Luis 
Oil on canvas 
 
APATSS* 
*All Paintings Are The Same Size 
30 x 25 cm or 25 x 30 cm 
iii 
Middle row l – r 
Coverack 
Oil on canvas board  
Washing Day 
Acrylic on canvas 
 
Morag 
Spray paint on socks 
Bottom row l – r 
Gate 
Oil on canvas 
Lump 
Oil and acrylic on canvas 
Rebel 














Top row l – r 
Wave 
T-shirt on canvas 
Landgrab 
Oil and household paint on 
canvas 
Learning Catalan 
Oil on canvas 
Middle row l – r 
Page 
Oil on canvas 
My Werewolf Girl-
friend 
Oil on canvas 
Casa 
Oil on canvas 
Bottom row l – r 
Andrea 
Oil on canvas 
Flower Paul 
Oil on acrylic on canvas 
Tiziano 




Oil on canvas 
Page xv 
Top row l – r 
Cave at Night 
Oil on canvas 
Felipa 
Oil on paper on canvas 
Drawing Asturias 
Oil on board 
Middle row l – r 
Future Disasters 
Oil on canvas 
Halma 
Oil on board 
Marbs 
Oil and felt-tip on board 
Bottom row l – r 
George in the Prado 
Oil on canvas 
Head of Medusa 
Oil on canvas 
Lewisham 




















Paintings made in Catalunya 2017 





Top row l – r 
Daedalus 
Icarus  
Bottom row l – r 
Swarm 





Top row l – r 
Chatarreros 
The Slippery Heart of 
the Seaweed  
Bottom row l – r 
King of Birds 










Vanfire of the Bonities 
 
Page xxiii 









I exhibited regularly throughout my study but only organised two exhibitions specific 
to my research. 
Pages xxv & xxvi show  
AS I TOOK HER ARMS SHE 
STARED THROUGH MY FACE AT 
THE DARK BRANCHES OF THE 
TREES OVER MY HEAD 
Yellow, Varese, Italy 
Christiane Bergelt, Olarn Chiaravanont, 
Michael Lawton, Rasmus Nilausen, Cathe-
rine Parsonage, Ross Taylor 
curated by Michael Lawton 
28.01 – 04.03.2018 
 
Pages xxvii & xxviii show  
Cap Gros 
38b Projects, London  







I would like to acknowledge the time and energy the following people have given to 
help me complete this study:  
Steve Klee  
Amy Sackville 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































     
 




     
 
 
     
 
 

















     
 
 





     
 
 








     
 
 
     
     
 






     
 
     
 
 








     
     
 
 




























     
     
 
 













     
 


































































































































































































                
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1As I took her arm she stared through my face at the dark 
branches of  the trees over my head. We held this pose 
for a moment, frozen in tango, before she blinked as if  
waking, and lead me up the stairs to her studio. 
“Captain? Love the title, so nice to tell people!!”
This was the first time I’d visited. An old warehouse 
with a floor of  ceramic tiles the colour of  caramelised 
sugar. As soon as I entered I was struck by how cold it 
was. Whilst she was making tea in the kitchenette I look 
around at the notes, photographs and paintings that 
covered the walls. I didn’t know what had been done 
for us and what was her own artwork. She was an artist 
before we recruited her to spy for us and still is now I 
imagine. I haven’t seen her since our run of  meetings 
ended.
The information on the walls was arranged so densely 
it was difficult to see individual items, it was a mess 
of  symbols and images, of  photographs, notes and 
paintings. There were representations of  everything; a 
greasy pillow, Nordic House, a haircut, there were flying 
things to disrupt surveillance, lamplighters, scalphunters, 
shoemakers, parts of  bodies pinned together with stumps 
jutting out, a croissant, markings that formed a kind of  
grate. Dissemblance and figuration, gigantic floating 
franken-symbols, small icons, the votive, the iconoclastic, 
politics, botany, the aquatic, hobbies, male pattern 
baldness, growing plants, a vessel of  some kind, a stomach 
swilling and churning, paintings gone bad, a painting 
going well, a lone shoe in the street, a monster, a knight, 
an angel, mutterings and anti-mandalas, a waterfall. 
2Scrawled high on one wall was the phrase ‘RABBIT 
HUTCH GRAB.’
There were only a couple of  windows, small and out of  
the way. The light came instead from the large skylights 
overhead, which whenever I was there, showed a sky 
the rich cobalt blue of  twilight, as I always visited at the 
same time. 
She entered, passing me a cup of  black tea. As she blew 
the steam off the cup she was holding she flicked her head 
toward the large painting I was standing in front of. 
“I often think that the first painting done in a new studio 
is sort of  an outlier, it often doesn’t fit into either the 
work that you did in the old studio, or the work that you 
do in the new one. And maybe you don’t show it, but 
you like it, so you keep it. The paintings that you keep 
tend to be these outliers that don’t feel related to the rest 
of  your work.”
 
I only knew her by her cover name; The Polycephalus, so 
called as she had run so many operatives for us, though 
by the time of  our meeting it was down to just six. Most 
of  them were also artists, or others of  that kind, people 
who made time to drift and mooch, to observe.
She collected material for us in a manner of  forms, from 
her own assignments and those of  her agents. There 
were photographs, texts, recordings, both written and 
spoken, coded dispatches for us to unravel. And there 
were her paintings. These were memories of  things she 
had witnessed, and of  things she had imagined from 
3what she had been told by the lovers she had taken; 
government functionaries who had whispered sweet 
secrets and state nothings, her head resting in the crook 
of  their arm, visualising these occurrences that she 
would then paint. 
She used to report to Oblomov who told me how she 
had described these trysts; that afterwards she would sit 
on the edge of  the bed trying to fix the image that she 
was going to paint for us. Trying to force this objectless 
image into her brain matter.  
We set up regular meetings for debriefing, I was supposed 
to know everything she knew within the six weeks we 
had scheduled, but obviously that was impossible. 
I spent hours in that studio staring at a wall, things 
constantly being playing out in my mind, conversations, 
the fictional, the real, over and over, and over again. 
My hope was to piece together this irregular pattern of  
extremely impulsive thoughts into a trail we could follow. 
But the chain that I was left with was one of  constant 
erasure and by the time I arrived at end, the links had 
been completely forgotten. I often wonder how I would 
have benefited had those missing trails remained. So as 
to work quicker I started to take down short notes in 
quick succession or memorise one or two keywords that 
I would then later expand and elaborate on. I look back 
at my notes and find that I wrote vaguely and obscurely, 
had kept the relationship between the truth and fiction 
translucent.
I have to admit that, at first, I was reluctant to believe in 
the worth of  her work, and challenged her, 
4“So, can we trust these paintings? Are they accurately 
depicting what you were told? Or what you experienced?”
“I’m not saying that painting records. I never have.”
“Okay, well can you tell me more, I am interested in 
how you see these operating.”
“Painting as a way of  expression or communication 
lies somewhere between spoken and written language. 
Painting is, in my case, both intuitive and analytical. 
Often in that order.”
“Painting is a way of  expressing or communicating lies?”
“Yes, I think the painting is not of  the moment while 
being inextricably inter-weaved with that moment, that 
conversation, that conflict; it acts as a catalyst, as an 
impulse for the act of  making.
The possibilities among these marks or words or images 
are important, things which have no relation to their 
natural order suddenly pacify in each stain, drip, blob, 
and smear. They appear to congeal, and thoughts 
become etched into a moment, or more precisely, a 
habit. And in turn, through the contemplation of  this 
surface, each idea, word or moment running through 
my head, has space to intensify, making it conceivable 
to take control.”
I looked at her blankly, ‘gone out’ as people say in my 
home town,
5“Let me try to explain myself: One could easily consider 
that the gaze upon a painting and reading a text could 
be seen as an act that are closely related. I understand 
that, but I often think of  it differently; one doesn’t really 
read a painting but just take it in. I’m quite sure I don’t 
even use any words within my internal conversation 
about this experience. The words only happen if  I have 
to address the experience through conversation with 
someone else. So, these paintings address the gestalt of  
the experiences and should be read as such.”
Though I would prod her with question, I was often 
silent, taking notes whilst she talked. I would move 
around her studio sometimes, examining things; 
continually trying to work out which notes pertained to 
her art and which to her work, or vice versa. On that 
first visit I picked a notebook from a pile on a table.
“Do you keep a journal? Notebooks make a fool of  me 
continually,” she said, barking with laughter as she spoke. 
I saw that the mixture was too dense, her observations 
were so thoroughly intermingled with thoughts about her 
paintings that I had to change tact. Whereas before I tried 
to keep her on track, to divulge what she had been told in 
the line of  our work, I realised the only way to continue 
was to make her think about it as a painter, I tried to coerce 
the knowledge out of  her by talking about painting;
“Okay yes, I can imagine that this is true; that we look at 
paintings without words in our heads. So, there is a loss 
of  memory between writing something down and then 
making a painting of  it? And notes are lost as they are 
6painted? and you talk about finding a space / place for 
them. It made me think that you are painting in these 
gaps? In these losses of  memory, in these spaces. Is this 
where painting exists? In this lacuna? I mean between 
the start of  the painting and the completed object.”
“Painting is a murky business, a bit of  mess, slipping 
and sliding, it all gets heaved into the pot. And you 
are working with wet dust, slabbering something rich 
and lively onto something old and dead. And yes, it’s 
obviously also a way of  thinking. My favourite way of  
doing so, I guess and my favourite painters think, spit, 
speak, stutter, slur in their own sort of  painterly idiolect.”
Sometimes we’d play back the recordings one of  her 
agents, Justine, had made in the Arts’ Club. We knew it 
was used as a meeting place for a number of  interested 
analogue parties.
A cluster or cloud, in which case maybe we’d need more…and 
then a cephalopod, an edgeless, light, nimble thing malleable to 
its mood... I’m not yet sure if  I can make it to Italy, though I’m 
very into the idea of  going… Yes. I have a big mostly black one I 
really like, but it’s a weirdo too… I’m not sure where I will be in 
January...warmest wishes from Rome... 
She would help me decode these tracks of  non-sequiturs, 
listened to with eyes clamped shut and nodding.
“All these words have potency when they swim near a 
painting. 
7I’ve transcribed a couple of  things. I do switch languages 
in the notes and will put the English translation in 
brackets. But I tend to use English language when I think 
about work. I’m not sure why that is, but we could try to 
analyse it. There are languages that I feel comfortable 
using, but I do not necessarily ‘get them’.”
She wiped her mouth, and looked around before 
continuing,
“Thinking about it, there are so far two ways of  
handling writing for me. One is the writing that I do 
myself  as a follow-up to either experiences or something 
I’ve observed happening; I take very short notes and 
lists, at times just naming a space, place or event. I 
use them. Some experiences seem to involve more 
than observation, and the body becomes the tool and 
support.”
“It sounds almost... primal.”
She ignored me, “With the body and the written down 
words I have a possibility to remember something. At 
the same time,”
I interrupted her,
“How do we know that you won’t forget this thing and 
end up making a painting, not a painting of  a memory, 
reaching beyond what you know about the situation?” 
“It’s the trouble of  experiencing an idea or thought in 
the shape words take. I find ideas quite disturbing, I 
8don’t know how to paint them, yet they seem necessary 
to get to paint. I experience, or maybe I think about, 
the process as a multilayered one, of  back and forth 
translation and the joy of  getting lost and present in that 
space. You kind of  get washed over with the things that 
are surrounding you, they and you are picked up by the 
tide of  circumstance and that is the painting.
Recently I have experienced a direct connection 
between encounters and images – to the point that, 
the physically felt event, is pierced with a clear ideation 
of  a painting. I have felt a range of  charged, complex 
responses; unease, disgust, distress, arousal, and these 
feelings can reverberate over time, changing and even 
distancing themselves from the actual encounter so I am 
only left with the pliant memory of  the emotion. And 
though most of  them didn’t actually turn into a painting 
they sure fed into the work.”
“Which work? Your work for us or your artwork?”
She ignored me again.
But this is not the end for the cursed patches...like rare objects 
and swinging necklace...an albatross.. singed and greasy...this 
leader must be killed...making contact with some new space age 
material...and you do kill it…. walking back a few steps to see 
what has happened…. they follow the eel..
Sometimes I lost myself  so completely in our conversations 
that when I read back through my notes that I am not 
9sure which one of  us is speaking.
“It’s hard to explain specifically but there are feelings 
here, undercurrents. I get a sense of  things?”
“What kind of  things?”
“Things between the written and the spoken,”
“I think I understand what you mean. I like what you 
say about it being between spoken and written language, 
like a third form, but one that we can’t talk about using, 
the same language with which we might compare the 
spoken or written language, how grammar is different 
in those two forms.”
“This is exactly what I mean sometimes we think in 
words, in stories, even in storylines. And I think that 
the word line might be an important one here: different 
lines of  thought, but filtered and brought together in 
our heads. Well, mostly I can only speak for myself  
here. One line for words, another one for these other 
elements that you speak of, images, sounds, smell and 
so on... They will run simultaneously, but can be edited 
individually.”
“Maybe painting is more within life.”
“I do believe that painting is within life, the act of  
painting, that is. Looking at it too, but that’s actually 
closer to writing or even reading.”
“Hold that thought.” 
“It’s complete nonsense, I know.”
“I’ve done nothing quickly to be honest.”




In one session we read the notes of  one of  her operatives, 
Angelico, the ciphers our enemies were using and his 








shout / street / supermarket / bike
 Horns and Claws and Cloak
She looked at me as we came to the end of  this list,
“This is one of  the beautiful things about reading, and 
the potential to make paintings about writing– the 
endless intricacies of  language make interpretations 
intimate and personal and we take a sensation, a sliver 
and make something from it that is intuitive and one’s 
own.”
“Do you try and paint the way that books make you 
feel?”
“I experience the same undulating movement when 
painting as when I am reading; a muted gradual 
development of  a plot versus the sharp turn of  events 
is like digesting the appearance of  a painting while 
waiting for the paint to dry versus a quick brush stroke 
11
that spontaneously formulates a shape on a canvas.
There are slight fundamental differences though; reading 
is about unfolding and re-living the moment, whereas 
painting is about creating the moment and responding 
to it at the same time. A constellation that sort of  bleeds 
into one another enough, with every painting a stepping 
stone to the next, just far enough away not to repeat but 
close enough to make the step.
But the hand will always be slower than the mind. When 
I paint about writing, which is roughly every time I 
paint, I search for what we could call graphical solutions 
for words. How can I tell you the way that person felt 









Estate Agent Sex Slippers
And, of  course, she had made copious notes herself.
“Words belong to something else, I borrow them to 
write. Words come from the same place as hands come 
from. They press and hack, like tools, always short, 
12
sharp movements. I write in stunted lines, and join them 
up. Words, writing, fiction, they are built by one another, 
like verse, chapter, book. I cannot see them in any other 
way, they all break down to the same value as material. 
And they must be physical materials which I can dilute 
into feelings. There are words that belong to me and 
there are all the other words.”
The smell of  a Gold pen...The first one I’d have to ask for, I 
don’t have it around any more...borrow from other fields...an 
ambivalent relationship to repetition...reach for other systems that 
are somewhat also endogenous...which is hilarious
Sometimes I would imagine that actually I was painting 
a portrait of  her, chimeric and transcendent. It would 
give me the opportunity to handle her story with a softer 
grip, to think about her hallucinations and satirical 
humour with lightness, nodding toward her without the 
pressure of  embodying her, of  transcribing her for my 
employers.
I imagined her as a Polycephalus, the six heads swooping 
and circling in front of  me, in constant search for 
equilibrium, like a cloud of  starlings flocking in flight, 
ducking and weaving, like the tendrils of  a sea anemone 
wriggling in the current. Sometimes I’d imagined these 
heads masked, arguing with one another, about painting, 
about writing, about spying.
13
Big Head Little Face..grabbing and snapping, savagely timed 
and viciously quick....I really like them, I’d like something with 
their flying capabilities...you never drink them..watch from the 
perimeter…innumerable and elastic..sensation and reflection...
pinching the skin of  the rabbit for control...attached to the temples 
of  moving information...a huge chunk of  head in fact...like an 
appendix.
“How aware are you of  what you are doing when 
working?”
“As I work I try to observe and document the steps I take 
in the work itself  and in a notebook, it is an intuitive 
and simple process. I’m not cutting out the fun and I 
plan much more than usual, but do it as I go along. I 
find methods / signs to know what is what that I can 
read and track back the steps I took, as there are many 
similarities going on. I feel a little weird about it and 
besides enjoying it I keep asking why I am doing this.
The letters and letters I posted are part of  it and the big 
fleshy canvas as well. I’m not even sure what that is, but 
it is a spreading of  words and phrases and an attempt to 
find an appropriate space for them, not a system, but a 
place of  belonging.
I find that in fiction you can change things so quickly, 
you don’t have to justify as much. It’s written down 
somewhere.”
“This fictionalising of  lives; is this what painting does, is 
this why we like it?”
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“Sorry, I’ve not been listening to you. I’ve been captivated 
by myself, by not being able to figure out if  my paintings 
tell a story or not.”
“What has happened to your operatives?”
“Your operatives, you mean,”
I didn’t respond to this so she continued, but angrier
“Flatly, they are the ignored, forgotten, blown into the 
silvery metallic night-time abyss that the grubby studio 
floor occupies in the day. They slip and wiggle into the 
shimmering mercury underworld where they wait for you 
to invoke them. You never renew them, they just keep, 
unquestioned and unnoticed, predestined to become 
displaced, tied up, and to mingle with everything else.”
I changed the subject, used her speech to question 
her about the studio which I had become increasingly 
fascinated by, saw it as fundamental to our work. I rolled 
my finger in a circle as I asked,
“What about this space?”
“The studio collects habits, so do paintings. They are 
steeped in them. Habits for me are what bonds painting 
and words, and words and painting; it’s a reciprocal 
thing for sure. And painting is just a part, or sub-section 
of  thinking, a kind of  ‘plug-in’, or tributary that runs 
alongside a larger river.
I hardly ever sit on the edge of  beds any more, yet I do 
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sit (and lie) on my studio floor for hours. I’ve exchanged 
the location but not the activity. This is why the studio is 
so important to me, it is a place that holds a concern for 
all those other lives, places, types of  violence, sadness, 
and fulfilment.”
Pacified, she then asked me a question;
“I’d like to read your notes; what you write is very 
relevant to me, how you are forming the correlation 
between conversation, fiction & painting will provide 
really rich ground,”
 
“Maybe,” I answered, uncertain now in her presence.
But the last time I saw her I asked her if  I could have 
one of  her works and we swapped a copy of  my notes 
for a painting she had done of  the night water.
Though I am listed as the sole author of  the text, it would be more 
accurately described as a collective piece of  writing as it came from 
months of  interviews with five other artists; namely Christiane 
Bergelt, Olarn Chiaravanont, Rasmus Nilausen, Catherine 
Parsonage and Ross Taylor, on the subject of  writing and painting. 
Some of  their responses have been pasted more or less verbatim 
into this narrative so it is no exaggeration to say that without them 
this  narrative wouldn’t exist, and my role has been as much editor 
as storyteller.
Michael Lawton














When Arabella Carter was very young she was already the best in the town 
at naming things.
Shilick she said, four years old and pointing at the damp grass that seemed 
always damp, drooping like towel-dried hair toward the cracks in the 
pavement, and soon everyone in our constituency was calling it Shilick Grass.
She was 21 when she named the blue-black birds that feed on the Shilick, 
Torozens. It was actually because of their habitat of eating facing the horizon, 
she told me one day in my studio, that her inspiration for their name came 
from. But to those that didn’t know it, there was simply some Torozen-ness 
about these birds and their patient stance, some Torozen-ness about the 
Torozens that we were now all aware of.
 She called the fall you have as you are dropping off to sleep, the 
Thistimble
 She called the moment of being frozen with fear when you wake from a 
nightmare Garllantheon
 She called the sensation on the tongue as it sucks back between the 
pebbles, Shishingle
It was impossible not to see our constituency, our world, through her words, 
from the Bartomollotas grazing in our fields to the Palmillo tree, the fruits 
of which, the Palmilla, we eat every summer.
 Chips of paint she called Tecks
 The unsure footing of shoes on artificial turf she called Fwooth
 The tearing of one’s jealous heart she called Wriwrac
She named all our colours. When I travelled, I realised that we don’t all think 
colours the same way; the painter might think in terms of weight, the cook 
might give colours flavours, the iconoclast, fury, but in our town we had all 
learnt to think of colours as Arabella did. Diozomi was the blue of the evening 
sky in April, Pulmaca the purple of Bartomollota shit. The colour of the blood 
of the trees she called Dinzengent, and then we would call anything else of 
that tawny red Dinzengent, and we also used it as an adjective to describe 
fertility and harvest time. Her words were fuzzed sometimes through our 
usage but they still had their roots in her.
 The ink stains she got on her fingers after writing she called Falruises 
and all of us called the ink stains we got on our fingers after writing 
Falruises.
 The sucking wince she made when her mother applied iodine to her 
scraped knees she called Cha and then all of us called the sucking wince 
we made when our mother applied iodine to our scraped knees Cha.
 The mild flashbacks to hallucinations that we neither blissful nor 
terrifying, she called Polzetos and all of us called the mild flashbacks to 
hallucinations that we neither blissful nor terrifying, Polzetos.
This skill of appositeness of description, this appropriateness of her word 
skills, resulted in many of her neighbours, my countrymen, applying to 
her advice on other matters. At first she’d respond, flattered and demure; 
demurring “I am a poet not a doctor” or “I am a poet not a sorceress.” And it 
is true that back then she was more reticent about naming for others, about 
giving out advice, about settling disputes, about rebranding the rundown.  
“What of the old names?” she said, “what will become of them?”
There was some truth in this. Some of the creatures lost their edges after 
being embraced by her vocabulary, lost that which wasn’t captured by her 
names: The feathers of the Kooxans lost their eyes, or these eyes lost the ability 
of sight anyway, became nothing more than glassy lolling spheres; delicious 
when fried, crispy on the outside, runny inside. After all it was also true that 
the Kooxans were a lot easier to catch once their panoptic vision had gone.
Sometimes she would suggest names for children of kin; she told me what 
I would name my daughter, and I did, but she went no further than that in 
her advices.
We all see the world through our own eyes. But I remember thinking that 
for her it must have been different. The world came to meet her eyes, it must 
have felt to her that the world almost wanted to be seen the way she saw it. 
Unlike me she never left, and her words became embedded in everything, 
little by little she bleached all her surroundings until her world was as she 
wished it.
I don’t know if this is why, but at some point she changed her mind on offering 
advice, on getting involved in the lives of others, perhaps she wanted their 
worlds to look more like hers. At this point I was travelling outside the city 
at the end of my youth, on national service, but before I left word of her 
ability was spreading beyond our constituency, this would have been the end 
of her youth too. When I returned not only was she dispensing advice more 
readily, she had also made some powerful friends.
I can’t really dilk or complain; I took her moffer too when she was in my 
studio that day she bought a painting I’d made of the moon. She told me I 
should only make paintings of the moon, and I did, and made my name as 
an artist.
She came to know a businessman TH Lavinder and with her help, naming 
each of his franchises differently, he became very rich. He seemed to have 
amassed his fortune whilst I was away, there was a park that was renamed 
Lavindery before I left, because of the lavender that grew there, or so 
Arabella said. Whilst I was away Lavinder had taken ownership of it, it was 
in his name after all, and he levelled the park and built flats, expanding into 
property.
When TH Lavinder decided he wanted to run for mayor, Arabella was 
involved in his electioneering; everyone said that it was her naming his 
particular solution for austerity, of radical wealth redistribution, as Remuner 
& Renumer that was the reason for its popularity.
During his candidacy she helped exposed the nepotism that the incumbent 
mayor profited from by naming it Chachality. Until it was named we weren’t 
able to see how seplic, rife and damaging it was, both to democracy and how 
we were perceived outside of our country. As the bodies of the now former 
mayor and his deputy were left in a tank in the main square she called the 
process of putrefaction of the bodies of your rivals Sanstein.
The aqueduct that marked the beginning of Lavinder’s ambitions for 
expansion, she called Forevet. The water that flooded the fields after the 
rains, diverted there by Forevet, she called Tillender. Dizengent was buxful 
because of Tillender for a whole vicade and the city got wealthier and 
wealthier.
Soon more and more of her words had entered our vocabulary. Was she 
speaking for Lavinder or he for her? When he came onto the delepatheron 
and said Asturton! Asturton Piatges! We weren’t really that surprised.
When we went to war she called the machines, our soldiers rode off in 
Coupaers, and she blessed them.
 She called the blood of our enemies, Dismalaplay
 The children of our enemies, Jattle
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